Making the worst of a bad situation: How the interpersonal conflict between Foreign Minister Jozef Beck and Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly affected Poland’s perception of the German threat in the run-up to the Second World War by Kostus, Anna Maria
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








Making the worst of a bad situation: How the interpersonal conflict between Foreign
Minister Jozef Beck and Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly affected Poland’s perception of








Making the worst of a bad situation: How the interpersonal conflict 
between Foreign Minister Jozef Beck and Marshal Edward Rydz-
Smigly affected Poland’s perception of the German threat in the 

















Department of War Studies 






The institutional conflict examined in this thesis can be traced back to the 
successful military coup of 1926, which elevated Marshal Jozef Pilsudski to 
dictatorship. Given the Marshal's interest in military and foreign policy matters, he 
was actively involved in the formation of both, ensuring their coherence. 
Unfortunately, following Pilsudski's death in 1935, the 'Sanacja' regime plunged into 
internal conflict. Rydz-Smigly, who succeeded Pilsudski as the General Inspector of 
the Armed Forces, soon became involved in the domestic power struggle. Named the 
Second Person in the state in 1936 and promoted to Marshal, Rydz-Smigly sought 
greater involvement in foreign policy. This interference met with resistance from the 
Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck. The troubled relationship between both men 
embodied the civil-military conflict in 1930s Poland and is the main subject of this 
doctorate. This thesis examines the extent in which it affected Polish military 
preparedness in 1939 by delaying the process of defensive planning. It also subject 
considers the impact that the tension between the Foreign Ministry and the General 
Staff had on the flow of strategically important information.  
 
Save for Roman Wapinski, whose work focuses on the dynamic between Polish 
foreign and domestic policy, the historiography to date has failed to address the 
importance of this institutional and personal rivalry and tended to focus on either 
diplomatic (e.g. Piotr Wandycz, Anna Cienciala, Marek Kornat, Stanislaw Zerko, 
Michal Zacharias) or military (e.g. Marian Zgorniak, Marian Leczyk, Mieczyslaw 
Cieplewicz, Leszek Gadek, Piotr Stawecki) history. This dissertation looks at both 
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and contrasts the diplomats and military men’s different attitudes to Germany. It 
argues that this dissonance in approach impaired the Polish military and civilian 
authorities' ability to accurately assess the German threat and, consequently, affected 
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Glossary of persons 
Arciszewski, Miroslaw – Polish Ambassador in Romania (1932 – 1938), Second 
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938 – 1939).  
Barthou, Louis – French Minister for Foreign Affairs (1934). 
Beck, Jozef – Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs (1932 – 1939). 
Beck, Jadwiga – Jozef Beck’s wife.  
Biddle, Anthony J. Drexel, Jr. – US Ambassador in Poland (1937 – 1944). 
Benes, Eduard – Czechoslovak President (1935 – 1938). 
Bonnet, Georges – French Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938 – 1939). 
Bullitt, William C. – US Ambassador in the Soviet Union (1933 – 1936), US 
Ambassador in France (1936 – 1940). 
Burhadt – Bukacki, Stanislaw – general in the Polish Army, Jadwiga Beck’s first 
husband. 
Chamberlain, Neville – British Prime Minister (1937 – 1940). 
Chiczewski, Feliks – diplomat, Polish Consul General in Leipzig ( 
Chlapowski, Alfred – Polish Ambassador in France (1924 – 1936). 
Chodacki, Marian – diplomat, Commissioner General of the Republic of Poland in 
the Free City of Gdansk (1936 – 1939).  
Churchill, Winston – British Member of Parliament. 
Ciano, Galeazzo – Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (1936 – 1943). 
Daladier, Edouard – French Defense Minister (1936 – 1940), Prime Minister (1933 
– 1934, 1938 – 1940). 
Delbos, Yvon – French Minister for Foreign Affairs (1936 – 1938). 
Dlugoszowski – Wieniawa, Boleslaw – general in the Polish Army, Polish 
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Ambassador in Italy (1938 – 1940). 
Eden, Anthony – British Minister for Foreign Affairs (1936 – 1938). 
Frankowski, Feliks – Polish diplomat, Counsellor in the Polish Embassy in France. 
Fyda, Wojciech – colonel, Polish Military Attache in France. 
Gamelin, Maurice – general in the French Army, Commander in Chief and Chief of 
General Staff.  
Goering, Hermann – Marshal of the German Third Reich. 
Halifax, Edward – British Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938 – 1940). 
Hitler, Adolf – Chancellor of the German Third Reich (1933 – 1945). 
Hlond, August – Polish cardinal. 
Kasprzycki, Tadeusz – general in the Polish Army, Polish Minister for Military 
Affairs (1935 – 1939). 
Kennard, Howard – British Ambassador to Poland (1935 – 1941). 
Koc, Adam – leader of the Camp of National Unity (1937 – 1938). 
Kwiatkowski, Eugeniusz – Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister (1935 
– 1939). 
Lipski, Jozef – Polish Ambasador in Germany (1933 – 1939). 
Lubienski, Michal – diplomat, Minister Beck’s Chef de Cabinet. 
Lukasiewicz, Juliusz – Polish Ambassador in the Soviet Union (1933 – 1936), Polish 
Ambassador in France (1936 – 1939). 
Mackiewicz, Stanislaw (Cat) – journalist, Editor in Chief of Slowo. 
Moltke, Hans Adolf von – German Amabassador to Poland (1931 – 1939). 
Molotov, Vyacheslav – Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs (1939 – 1949). 
Morawski, Kajetan – Polish Deputy Finance Minister (1936 – 1939). 
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Moscicki, Ignacy – Polish President (1926 – 1939). 
Mussolini, Benito – Italian leader (1922 – 1943). 
Neurath, Constantin von – German Minister for Foreign Affairs (1932 – 1938). 
Noel, Leon – French Ambassador in Poland (1935 – 1939). 
Paul-Boncour, Joseph – French Minister for Foreign Affairs (1933 – 1938). 
Pelczynski, Taduesz – colonel, Head of the Second Department of Polish General 
Staff (1929 – 1939). 
Papee, Kazimierz – Polish Legate in Czechoslovakia (1936 – 1939). 
Pilsudski, Jozef – Marshal of Poland 
Potocki, Jerzy – Polish Ambassador in the United States of America (1936 – 1940). 
Potocki, Jozef – diplomat, Director of the Political Department at the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. 
Raczysnki, Edward – Polish Ambassador in the United Kingdom (1934 – 1945). 
Raczynski, Roger – Polish Ambassador in Romania (1938 – 1940). 
Ribbentrop, Joachim von – German Minister for Foreign Affairs (1938 – 1939). 
Romer, Taduesz – Polish Legate in Portugal (1935 – 1937), Polish Ambassador in 
Japan (1937 – 1941). 
Rydz – Smigly, Edward – Marshal of Poland, General Inspector for the Armed 
Forces and Commander in Chief (1935 – 1939). 
Simon, John – British Minister for Foreign Affairs (1931 – 1935). 
Skladkowski – Slawoj, Felicjan – Polish Prime Minister (1936 – 1939). 
Slavic, Juraj – Czechoslovak Legate in Poland (1935 – 1939). 
Smolenski, Jozef – colonel, Head of the Second Department of the General Staff 
(1939). 
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Sosnowski, Kazimierz – general in the Polish Army, Chief of the General Staff (1935 
– 1939). 
Strang, William – British diplomat, Head of the Central Department (1937 – 1939). 
Szymanski, Antoni – colonel, Polish Military Attache in Germany. 
Szembek, Jan – Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (1932 – 1939). 
Titulescu, Nicolae – Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs (1932 – 1936). 
Vansittart, Robert – British diplomat, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs (1930 – 1938). 
Weizaecker, Ernst von – Head of the Political Department in the Auswartiges Amt 
(1933 – 1938). 
Witos, Wincenty – Polish Prime Minister (1920 – 1921, 1923, 1926). 
Wysocki, Alfred – Polish Ambassador in Italy (1933 – 1938). 













This doctoral thesis focuses on the animosity between the Polish Foreign Minister 
Jozef Beck and the General Inspector of the Armed Forces Marshal Edward Rydz-
Smigly.1 This strife has not been analysed in any detail in either English- or Polish-
language historiography. My first aim is to fill this important gap in the literature 
about the Polish response to the German threat in the late 1930s. I will look at the 
reasons behind the conflict and chart its evolution from inception – amid the power 
vacuum created by Marshal's Pilsudski's death in May 1935 to its culmination in 
early 1939. This period coincided with the weakening of Poland's ally France and the 
rise of Nazi Germany but, as this thesis demonstrates, the deterioration of Poland's 
strategic position can only partly be explained by the changes on the international 
stage. 
My second task is to examine the extent to which the troubled relationship 
between the heads of the Polish armed forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
affected their cooperation in the strategic sphere, and specifically whether it 
influenced the Polish perception of the German threat, subsequently undermining the 
country's military preparedness in 1939.  
 
My multi-archival research, undertaken for the purpose of this study, has 
uncovered new and significant evidence that will contribute to a better historical 
understanding of the Polish foreign policy in the 1930s and the change in the 
                                                            
1 As General Inspector of the Armed Forces Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly oversaw the Polish 
Army, Air Force and Navy. In the event of war, the General Inspector was due to assume the 
responsibility of Commander in Chief. Please refer to Appendix 2 for a table outlining the Polish 
military command structure in the period immediately preceding the Second World War. 
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country's military threat perception. An analysis of historical sources allows us to 
confirm the existence of a strategically debilitating conflict between Marshal Edward 
Rydz-Smigly and Minister Jozef Beck, and thus to unravel the internal crisis that 
significantly weakened the state in the face of German aggression.  
 
In pursuit of an answer to the question, did the discord between Rydz and Beck 
led Poland to make the worst of a bad situation, I will consider a number of 
secondary questions: (1) How did Marshal Pilsudski's legacy affect Poland's 
diplomatic and defensive strategy? (2) Did the strategy change in the period 
considered? (3) Why did the relationship between Beck and Rydz-Smigly 
deteriorate? (4) Why did Marshal Rydz-Smigly seek control of the Polish Foreign 
Policy? (5) How did Rydz-Smigly and Beck differ in their perceptions of Hitler and 
why? (6) How accurate was Polish intelligence on Germany in the run-up to the 
Second World War? (7) What impact did the crises of 1938 have on Poland's 
preparations for the Second World War? (8) Why did the preparation of Western 
Defence Plan begin as late as March 1939? (9) How was it possible for Jozef Beck to 
conceal before Rydz and President Moscicki, the German ultimatum to Poland of 24 
October 1938 for three months? What consequences did his decision have on the 
Polish leadership’s threat perception? (10) Why were the whistle-blowers 
(ambassador Jozef Lipski and military attaché Antonii Szymanski, both from the 
Polish Berlin Embassy) ignored in 1939?  
*** 
Historiographical Review 
Before exploring the available sources and explaining the methodology used in 
 12 
this study, let me consider the existing historiography on inter-war Polish foreign 
and defence policy. The sheer abundance of written material may seem 
overwhelming, yet, save for the Polish historian Roman Wapinski, whose work 
focused on the interaction between Polish foreign and domestic policy, the historical 
discourse to date has tended to focus on either Polish diplomatic or military history 
rather than on the course and impact of the country’s civil-military relations. 
Historians have failed to address the importance of institutional and personal 
rivalries among the Polish military and civilian authorities and to assess whether the 
dissonance between them impaired the Polish ability to accurately understand the 
German threat and, consequently, affected the country's defence in September 1939. 
This doctoral thesis sets out to rectify this omission. 
 
I have identified two broad themes that shaped and continue to dominate the 
writings on Polish pre-war foreign policy. Those are: (i) personalities and 
relationships within the Polish ruling elites and (ii) military preparedness in 1939. 
These will be examined below: 
 
(i) Personalities and Relationships 
 
The origins of the institutional conflict examined in this thesis can be traced to the 
successful military coup of 1926 that elevated Jozef Pilsudski to the dictatorship of 
Poland. Given the Marshal's interest in military and foreign policy matters, it is 
hardly surprising that he took active part in the formation of both and ensured their 
coherence. Unfortunately, following Pilsudski's death in 1935, his authoritarian 
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government, known as the 'Sanacja' regime, plunged into internal conflict. Though 
not initially interested in politics, Rydz-Smigly, who succeeded Pilsudski as the 
General Inspector of the Armed Forces2 but not in his other roles, soon became 
involved in the domestic power struggle. Named the 'Second Person in the State' in 
1936 by President Ignacy Moscicki and promoted to Field Marshal, Rydz-Smigly 
sought greater involvement in foreign policy. Naturally, this interference met with 
resistance from Foreign Minister Jozef Beck. The troubled relationship between both 
men embodied the civil-military conflict that will be the main subject of this thesis. 
Beck initially refused to serve in the government headed by Felicjan Slawoj-
Skladkowski, Rydz-Smigly's protégé. Both men were, fatefully, at odds over 
Germany and the brief 1937 and 1938 alliances they made merely punctuated their 
protracted hostility. Then, this thesis will focus on the way in which it affected 
Polish military preparedness in 1939 by delaying the process of war planning. 
Finally, it will assess the impact of the tension between the Foreign Ministry and 
General Staff on the flow of strategically important information in the Government.   
*** 
 
     Short biographical and character sketches of Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly and 
Minister Jozef Beck will be provided in Chapter Two, which will familiarise readers 
with the key personalities featured in this thesis. Here, however, I will review the 
extensive literature on Minister Beck, the 'Colonels' forming Pilsudski's inner circle 
and Poland's key diplomats.  
 
                                                            
2 A key military post equivalent to that of a Commander in Chief.  
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(a) Jozef Beck 
In their collection of biographical sketches of Second Republic politicians, Jacek 
Czajkowski and Jacek Majchrowski state that ‘when looking at the different 
solutions and richness of conceptions for restructuring of Poland's internal affairs; 
historians usually do not see beyond the big three: Pilsudski, Dmowski and Witos.’3 
Paraphrasing them, one could say that looking at the available literature on Polish 
foreign policy in the decade preceding the Second World War, historians usually 
only see one person – Józef Beck. He is usually portrayed as somehow detached and 
isolated in his decision making process – Pilsudski's adherent but disconnected from 
anyone else.  
This description is inaccurate. For instance, one of the best examples of both 
Beck’s struggle to maintain autonomy, and of the limits to his power, is his initial 
concealment of Germany's territorial demands presented to Lipski on 24 October 
1938. Unsure as to whether they were issued at Ribbentrop's own initiative or came 
from Hitler, and wary of Rydz's interference in policy-making towards Germany, the 
Foreign Minister concealed them until his early January 1939 visit to Berchtesgaden. 
Only then, having confirmed Hitler's involvement, did Beck inform Moscicki and 
Rydz-Smigly about German territorial claims.4 This was followed by an emergency 
meeting in the presidential residence. On 8 January, the National Defence Council 
consisting of Beck, Rydz, Prime Minister Skladkowski and Finance Minister 
Kwiatkowski, chaired by President Moscicki, decided to reject the German demands, 
                                                            
3 Jacek Czajkowski and Jacek M. Majchrowski,  Sylwetki politykow Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej 
[Politicians of the Second Polish Republic], (Krakow, 1986), 5. 
4 Marek Kornat, Polityka Równowagi 1934-1939. Polska miedzy Wschodem a Zachodem  [The 
policy of equilibrium 1934-1939: Poland between the East and the West], (Krakow, 2007), 408. 
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thus fixing Poland's policy toward Germany until the outbreak of the war.5 We see 
that while Beck was granted some level of independence and although he tried to 
stretch it, he was certainly not allowed to make foreign policy on his own. 
Indeed, analysis of the available literature focuses on Beck, and Poland's foreign 
policy, at the expense of the country's military policy shaped by Beck's 'rival' Rydz-
Smigly. Historians minutely dissect Beck’s policies and decisions yet 
overwhelmingly ignore Rydz’s constant presence and influence. Their recording of 
Rydz-Smigly’s active participation in the negotiation of the Treaty of Rambouillet is 
the only notable exception.    
However, in order to better understand the scholarly debate surrounding Beck’s 
public persona, let me briefly focus on the man himself. Having taken office on 2 
November 1932, Józef Beck was the longest serving Foreign Affairs Minister of the 
Second Polish Republic. He was handpicked for the post by Pilsudski and, in his 
own eyes at least, remained a loyal executor of the Marshal's political testament of 
1935 in the foreign sphere. A former intelligence officer and extremely private 
person, Beck did not keep a diary. His Final Report (also known by its French title, 
Le Denier Rapport) of 1943 was in fact nothing more than the titular final report 
intended for the President of the Polish Government in Exile Edward Raczkiewicz 
and dictated by a terminally ill Beck under internment in Romania. It focuses purely 
on his activity as Foreign Minister and does not, as such, afford much insight into his 
decision-making habits or wider political beliefs.  
Always worried about the journey his words would take once spoken, Beck was 
an autocratic boss and believed in controlling his subordinates by restricting the 
                                                            
5 Romuald Szeremietiew,  Czy Moglismy Przetrwac: Polska a Niemcy w Latach 1918-1939  [Could 
we have survived: Poland and Germany between 1918 and 1939], (Warszawa, 1994), 306. 
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information available to them. In his memoir, Beck's private secretary Pawel 
Starzenski recalls that  
at the base of Beck's work lay the belief that an agency's chief 
should concentrate on its specific role. And that, should it become 
necessary, the central office would inform them about other 
matters. Only the most important legates and ambassadors were 
briefed by Beck and even then he exercised a lot of discretion. 
Very few could say they knew Beck’s policy doctrine let alone his 
actual thoughts and hesitations.6 
 
Fortunately for historians, a number of Beck’s contemporaries were rather less 
secretive. This has allowed us to reconstruct Beck's behaviour in office. The most 
useful publications concerning Beck as a Minister are the diary and documents of his 
deputy Count Szembek, and secretary Pawel Starzenski's, Trzy lata z Beckiem. 
Nonetheless, the late composition of his account, compiled by Starzenski using old 
notes, has prompted some historians (e.g. Henryk Batowski) to question their 
reliability. Further insights about Beck as both a private person and a politician can 
also be found in the writings of his close friend, the Religion and Education 
Minister, Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, while the unpublished manuscript of the memoir 
written by Beck's closest colleague and Chef de Cabinet, Michal Lubienski, held in 
New York by the Jozef Pilsudski Institute of America, also offers analysis of the 
Minister's views and character. 
 
                                                            
6 Pawel Starzenski, Trzy lata z Beckiem [Three years with Beck], (London, 1972), 54. 
 17 
His terse telegrams and official reports could suggest that Beck was not much of a 
writer. He did, however, maintain a lively and interesting correspondence with count 
Raczynski, the Ambassador in London, and one of his close friends, Boleslaw 
Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, at first a general and subsequently Ambassador to Rome 
between 1938 and 1940. 
The politician-priest, Bronislaw Zongollowicz, an avid and shrewd commentator, 
also paid a lot of attention to Beck's activity as a minister, his personality and his 
sometimes troubled relationships, Beck's friendship with the leader of the so-called 
'Colonels' Clique', Walery Slawek, former Prime minister, and Pilsudski’s closest 
friend, as well as occasional tensions with President Moscicki and, particularly in the 
later years, the General Inspector for the Armed Forces - Edward Rydz-Smigly. 
Finally, an unusual but, nevertheless, one of the most interesting account of 
Beck's life can be found in his wife's memoirs Kiedy bylam Ekscelencja. Beginning 
with the rushed journey back from a holiday in Africa to answer Pilsudski's 
summons, Mrs Beck describes the background of official visits to, among others, the 
Soviet Union, Italy and Germany. She reflects on the couple’s social life in 1930s 
Warsaw and portrays Beck as an ordinary person.  
 
Beck's depiction by historians differs radically from the picture of a warm, 
devoted husband and a dog lover drawn by his wife. Gerhard Weinberg remarks that 
most scholars of the inter-war period consider Beck to personify Poland’s new 
doctrine of greater independence and looser ties with France. Describing him as 
‘young, vain, and with the reputation of having a slippery tongue’ as well as ‘a 
coldly opportunistic follower of Pilsudski’, and addressing Beck's 'pro-German 
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reputation', Weinberg warns against falling into the trap of oversimplifying his 
political views: ‘like Pilsudski, he wanted Poland to observe a balance in its relations 
with Germany and Russia – trying to keep its two neighbours from becoming so 
friendly that they might agree to divide Poland between them, or so hostile that they 
might force Poland to side with one against the other.’7 
Piotr Wandycz and Anna Cienciala, who have both produced extensive 
monographs on Polish foreign policy in the 1930s and are regarded as authorities in 
the field, hold similar views. Cienciala even argues that the term ‘Beck's policy’ is 
confusing and should not be used,8 whereas Wandycz has spent considerable time 
dismantling the ‘myth of Poland [viewing itself] as a Great Power’.9 Indeed, most 
contemporary Polish historians often complain about what they call the ‘Black 
Legend of Józef Beck.’10 The ‘Black Legend’ is the suggestion that Jozef Beck 
knowingly pursued the worst foreign policy for Poland and could thus be held 
accountable for the September 1939 fiasco. It was promoted by the Wladyslaw 
Sikorski administration in exile and later incorporated into the Polish communist 
historiography.  In accordance with the ‘Black Legend’, Beck has been commonly 
portrayed as a Germanophilic, short sighted, aloof and politically reckless individual. 
Henry Roberts remarks that: 
 
Among the public figures of countries overrun by Nazi Germany, 
Colonel Józef Beck, Poland’s Foreign Minister from 1932 to 1939, 
                                                            
7 Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Starting World War II: Diplomatic 
Revolution in Europe 1933-36, (Chicago, 1970), 58. 
8 Anna Cienciala, Polska Polityka Zagraniczna w latach 1926-1932 [Polish Foreign Policy between 
1926 and 1932], (Paris, 1990), 23. 
9 Piotr Wandycz, Z dziejow dyplomacji [From diplomatic history], (London, 1988), 84-85. 
10 Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 85. 
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has probably received the least sympathy. Despite his determined 
resistance to Hitler’s threats leading to the outbreak of the Second 
World War, he has been remembered as one of the Pilsudskian 
epigoni, as the man who refused to work with the Little Entente or 
the League of Nations, who pursued, in substance, a pro-German 
policy after 1934, who joined in the dismembering of 
Czechoslovakia, and, finally as the man whose stubborn refusal to 
enter any combination with the Russians contributed to the failure 
of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations of the spring and summer 
of 1939.11 
 
Hugh Seton-Watson has likened Beck to a ‘Machiavellian genius’ - a description 
sparked perhaps by Leon Noel’s depiction of the Foreign Minister.12 The French 
Ambassador's dislike of Beck was common knowledge but even he described Beck 
as 'one of the most unusual, in certain respects one of the most mysterious, and 
above all one of the most interesting persons it has fallen to me to be associated 
with.'13 D.C. Watt referred to Beck as ‘foxy’, devious and two faced’.14 He did not, 
however, share some of the other commentators' apparent awe for Beck's diplomatic 
abilities. Writing about his conduct during the Czechoslovak crisis, Watt compares 
him to the Italian foreign ministry Count Ciano and states that ‘in negotiation his 
                                                            
11 Henry L. Roberts, 'The Diplomacy of colonel Beck', The Diplomats 1919-1939, Gordon A Craig 
and Felix Gilbert (eds), (Princeton, 1953), 579. 
12 Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 1918-1941 (Cambridge, 1945), 388. 
13 Roberts, 'The Diplomacy', 580-581. 
14 Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War 1938-
1939 (London, 2001), 58. 
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style varied from a legalistic stonewalling to an arrogant imposition of conditions.’15 
While this description might, on the whole, be accurate, Anna Cienciala argues that 
Poland’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the actions of the Great Powers 
and that Beck’s ultimatum to Prague was a result of the Munich Conference and 
Czechoslovakia’s capitulation rather than Poland’s revanchism.16 Another Polish 
historian trying to break with the aforementioned ‘black legend’ is Marek Kornat. 
Together with Mariusz Wolos, they are currently working on Beck's first, 
comprehensive, biography.17 The minister’s interesting biographical sketch is also 
included in Kornat's book Polityka rownowagi 1934-1939: Polska miedzy Wschodem 
a Zachodem, the essay focuses on Beck's three (or perhaps even four) attempts to 
leave office, which the author sees as confirming18 that, contrary to his critics' 
opinions, Beck was not a power-hungry politician but a man with a sense of duty and 
conviction.19  
 
Despite agreement that 1930s Poland produced no credible replacement for Beck, 
some scholars continue to ponder whether Polish history would have run a 
significantly different course had Beck not been the Foreign Minister in 1939. In 
fact, his original appointment was far from preordained. Beck hesitated to join the 
Koscialkowski government in 1935 and made at least two attempts to resign: in the 
autumn of 1938 and the spring of 1939.20 Marek Kornat argues that, regardless of 
who would be at the helm, in 1939 Poland had no other real alternative than to 
                                                            
15 Watt, How War Came, 59. 
16 Anna Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers 1938-1939. A Study in the Interdependence of 
Eastern and Western Europe (London, 1968), 54. 
17   Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 386.  
18 The story of Beck's possible fourth resignation is examined in Chapter 5.  
19 Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 385. 
20  According to Beck’s wife Jadwiga, he  
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follow the political course it did.21 Gerhard Weinberg has expressed a similar 
opinion, stating in the two volume study The Foreign Policy of Germany that in 
1939 ‘fighting was the only, even if hopeless, alternative’ left to Poland.22 As did 
another Polish historian, Michal Zacharias. Usually very critical of Beck and his 
policies, he makes the same argument in his work, which concentrates mostly on the 
Polish-Soviet relations and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.23  
 
The question of whether Beck pursued the 'right' policy is inextricably linked to 
the problem of Pilsudski's foreign policy testament. According to Beck's own 
account, and the views of leading Sanacja figures, such as the Jedrzejewicz brothers, 
he remained forever faithful to Pilsudski's maxims and foreign policy principles. 
Many historians share this opinion of Beck. For instance, in the article cited above, 
Marek Kornat argues that Beck's attempts to quit confirm his devotion to Pilsudski's 
directives. The fact that some historians even argue that Beck’s reliance on 
Pilsudski’s directives rendered his policy in the late 1930s detached and inflexible 
serves as an indicator of how widely accepted this view is. There are, however, some 
who question that Beck was really the anointed executor of Pilsudski's last political 
will. 
One of the opponents of this view was Beck’s contemporary, Stanislaw Cat-
Mackiewicz. While asserting that Beck followed the Marshall's directives until 1935, 
Cat-Mackiewicz argued that after Pilsudski's death, Beck ‘conducted a policy which 
                                                            
21 Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 419. 
22 Gerhard Weinberg (1994), The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II 1937-
1939, (Chicago, 1970), 627. 
23 Marek Kazimierz Kaminski and Michal Jerzy Zacharias, W Cieniu Zagrozenia: Polityka 
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– up until the final catastrophe – went completely against them.’24 Two other 
observers of the politics of the Second Polish Republic, Jerzy Gedroyc and Adam 
Bien also put a similar view forward. They believed, perhaps mistakenly, that, 
instead of denouncing the idea of 'peace at any cost' and for the sake of national self-
preservation, Poland should have ceded Danzig to Germany and allowed for the 
construction of an extraterritorial highway. Gedroyc even agued that had Pilsudski 
been alive at the time, there would have been no German-Polish war in 1939.25 And 
even had there been one, as Jerzy Lojek has argued, Poland would have been better 
positioned for it as a German ally.26 
 
Foreign scholars do not, usually; go as far as suggesting Poland should have 
become a Nazi ally. Despite that, there certainly exists a consensus amongst some of 
them that Poland's refusal to yield to Hitler's demands and her 'Great Power' 
ambitions created the conditions for the 1939 disaster. Jurgen Pagel and Hans Roos 
are both advocates of this view. In the English language literature, this notion of 
‘Polish delusion’ can also be found in Anthony Read and David Fisher’s The Deadly 
Embrace and – to some extent – in the work of Anita Prazmowska, who, while 
justifiably decrying Poland's image as a passive subject of Great Power politics,  
notes that the country's rulers o [behaved] ‘not as helpless victims but as leaders of a 
Great Power, [… conducting] a complex foreign policy.’27  Moreover, she argues 
                                                            
24 Stanislaw Mackiewicz, Polityka Becka [Beck's Policy], (Krakow, 2009), 81. 
25 Hanna Maria Giza, 'Ostatnie Lato w Maisons-Laffitte z Jerzym Giedroyciem rozmawia Hanna 
Maria Giza' ['The last summer in Maison-Lafitte: Hanna Maria Giza talks to Jerzy Giedroyc], 
Stacja Naukowa Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 6, (2003), 76. 
26 Jerzy Lojek, Agresja 17 wrzesnia 1939. Studium aspektów politycznych [The Agression of 17 
September 1939. A study of political themes], (Warszawa, 1990), 16. 
27 Anita Prazmowska, 'Poland' in The Origins of World War Two: The debate continues, Robert 
Boyce and Joseph A Maiolo, (Basignstoke, 2003), 155.  
 23 
that Poland's 'Great Power' foreign policy was formed completely independently of 
military considerations. In other words,  
 
the unthinkable occurred: namely, in what was a military regime the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs had no clear idea of Poland's military 
strength and conducted foreign relations separately from important 
questions of Poland's offensive and defensive capabilities. Conversely, 
the Commander-in-Chief respected his colleague's control over his 
ministry and did not attempt to influence him in order to minimise the 
likelihood of defeat, or to increase the number of allies in the 
forthcoming war.28 
 
This is a simplistic view of the relationship between Beck and Pilsudski's 
successor as the General Inspector for the Armed Forces, Edward Rydz-Smigly. 
And, although it is not unreasonable to claim that the initial reason behind the choice 
of Rydz-Smigly over general Sosnkowski for the post of the General Inspector can 
be attributed to the ruling elite's conviction that he would not compete with them for 
power, as the decade progressed, Rydz-Smigly – who became the ‘Second Person in 
the State’ by a presidential decree of May 1936 - insisted on becoming increasingly 
involved in Polish foreign policy.29 One of the ways in which this manifested itself 
was his successful opposition to certain promotions and ambassadorial 
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nominations.30 He was also a member of the National Defence Council, which 
deliberated on matters such as the Polish response to German demands in Danzig 
and the Corridor and eventually developed the attitude that ‘no important state 
matter can be decided without me’.31 
 
The central focus of his thesis is to demonstrate that Beck and Rydz-Smigly 
differed significantly in opinions. The Polish policy toward Germany was a 
particular point of friction, as was both men’s attitude towards Marshal Pilsudski's 
legacy. In addition to these, the Marshal and the Minister disagreed on a range of 
smaller issues including personnel decisions. They kept their distance, did not 
socialise with each other and even officially 'made peace' on at least one occasion.32  
And while historians question whether Rydz-Smigly ever developed an alternative 
diplomatic doctrine, he was widely regarded by contemporaries as Beck's political 
opposite:33 a belief evident in the reports written by the diplomats accredited in 
Warsaw;34 as well as the failed attempts to topple Beck orchestrated by the French 
foreign service (probably more ambassador Noel than the Quai d'Orsay) in 1936.35 
 
Beck's ‘Great Power policy’ was also unanimously condemned by Polish post-
war historians. A good example is Marek Drozdowski's accusations that ‘Beck failed 
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to realistically evaluate the capabilities of the Second Republic on the European 
stage and attempted to conduct a foreign policy independent of the Great Powers, 
without taking into account the country’s economic and military position. He 
completely disregarded public opinion.’36 Invoking public opinion was often used as 
an argument to evaluate (negatively) the 1934 Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact. 
Criticised by a large section of public opinion at the time as well as the political 
opposition, the issue of Nazi-Polish détente remained a key focus in official post-war 
Polish historiography. Indeed, the orthodox view is that it constituted the crowning 
example of Beck's ‘political blindness’. 37  Using arguments similar to those 
advocated by Hans Roos and Anita Prazmowska in foreign language historiography, 
Polish scholars argued that Poland should not have so lightly dismissed the idea of 
collective security, particularly the Eastern Pact (Franco-Soviet-Czechoslovak-Polish 
alliance). A tendency to suggest that closer engagement with the Soviet Union was a 
valid alternative to the Nazi-Polish rapprochement was also widespread and can be 
seen in the works of Polish communist-era historians such as Jaroslaw Jurkiewicz, 
Andrzej Micewski and Henryk Batowski. However, documents discovered after the 
fall of the Soviet Union confirm that the country’s leadership never seriously 
pursued a close alliance with Poland.38 
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Nevertheless, pointing out Beck’s inability to engage with the Soviet Union 
remains a valid critique of his policy. Looking at the period during which the 'policy 
of equilibrium' between Germany and the Soviet Union was in force - from 1934 to 
1939 - it is clear that Poland's relationship with Germany was incomparably better 
than that with the Soviet Union. Conversely, historians continue to criticise Beck's 
decisions to pay only one official visit to Moscow and to never have met or tried to 
meet Stalin.39  
 
Examining the controversy surrounding the alliance with Russia that never was, 
one cannot fail to mention the debate over the one that did materialise - the British 
guarantees extended to Poland in March 1939. While there seems to be a consensus 
on what motivated the British to ‘ally’ themselves with Poland – preventing her 
absorption into the German orbit and deterring Hitler against further expansion – the 
Polish involvement in the alliance continues to raise controversy.40 Some scholars, 
including Anita Prazmowska, argue that Poland's opposition to any Soviet 
involvement ruled out any hope for a collective security system and with it the 
possibility of an effective eastern front. 41  Some even believe that the British 
guarantee to Warsaw encouraged Poland's reckless behaviour in the run up to the 
war. Critics of this view include Anna Cienciala, who stated that ‘the British 
guarantee […] came a few years to late’ to significantly alter the course of events.42 
Some Polish historians vehemently criticise the country’s entry into the alliance. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
and the Coming of World War II (New York, 2013). 
39 Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 473. 
40 Czeslaw Grzelak and Henryk Stanczyk, Kampania Polska 1939 Roku [The Polish Campaign of 
1939], (Warszawa, 2005), 14. 
41 Anita Prazmowska, Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front (Cambridge, 1987), 61. 
42 Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 177. 
 27 
Writers such as Mackiewicz, who described Warsaw’s acceptance of the British 
guarantees as ‘mental aberration and an act of madness’, see the March declaration 
as another aspect of the ‘Western Betrayal’ of Poland.43  
Interestingly, as this thesis will demonstrate, unlike in their views on Germany 
and France, Beck and Rydz-Smigly generally agreed on the strategic direction for 
Poland's relations with both Britain and the Soviet Union. However, in case of the 
former, their personal conflict and domestic political infighting influenced Warsaw's 
agenda when dealing with London. 
 
(b) The 'Colonels' 
In the period after May 1926, the Polish government consisted of in Seton-
Watson words as ‘a cast [of] colonels and landowners’. 44  Similarly, Anita 
Prazmowska states that  
after the coup Pilsudski surrounded himself with a coterie of military 
men with whom he shared the experiences of the Legions, which he 
had formed in 1914 to fight for Austria. This group had no political 
programme to solve Poland’s problems. […] The army took over 
ministries, key administrative posts and industries associated with 
military production.45  
 
Military historians Marian Romeyko and, more recently, Andrzej Misiuk also wrote 
about an ‘exodus from the army’ into the civil sphere and the advent of ‘politicians 
in uniforms’. However, unlike Prazowska, who focused on their shared military 
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background, Misiuk points to the officials' shared experiences in the military 
intelligence service. Equipping its members with knowledge of all aspects of 
government – foreign and interior policy, communication, army, trade and economy 
– as well as useful contacts, service in Oddzial II46 allowed for a seamless transfer 
into civilian administration. Apart from Beck, three of the decade's Prime Ministers 
(Walery Slawek, Marian Zyndram-Koscialkowski and Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski) 
also had intelligence experience. This common past had, according to Misiuk, 
shaped their views on governance and led to the transfer of cloak-and-dagger 
methods such as ‘conspiracy, secrecy, making decisions without wider consultations’ 
into public life.47 
 
Expressions such as the ‘Colonels' clique, - group or - regime’ were coined by 
opposition writers in the Second Republic and intended to be derogatory. Even at the 
time, Janusz Jedrzejewicz had criticised them for being 'stupid'; it should be noted 
that in contemporary Polish writing the 'colonels' clique' appears only in inverted 
comas. Indeed, much to the dismay of contemporary Polish historians ‘Colonel’s 
clique’ remains a common term in international historiography – often applied in a 
blanket manner to the entire period until 1939. Yet, aside form the two above named 
British examples, these terms can also be found in the historiography and were 
prevalent in post-war Polish historiography, which attributed the failure of Polish 
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foreign policy to the narrow class origins of the political and military elites.48 
Because the interplay of personalities in the making of civil-military relations is the 
focus of this thesis, let us look at who they were and where Polish elite came from.  
 
According to Andrzej Garlicki, the main difference between post-May Poland and 
the other authoritarian systems of the time was Pilsudski's lack of concern that he 
may be ousted.49 Surprisingly, no member of the Marshal's entourage ever tried to 
oust him. However, as secure as his hold on power as he might have been, in the 
1930s, Pilsudski was already in his sixties and his health was deteriorating rapidly. 
Concerned about the future of Poland after his death, he insisted on changing the 
constitution and started to prepare a group of associates to run the country without 
him. Zongollowicz's diary gives a first hand impression of the group that surrounded 
Pilsudski in the early 1930s and, which by and large found itself in charge of the 
country after the Marshal's death: 
Captain Swirski, Pilsudski's former adjutant, explained to me today 
that we currently have three governments in Poland – Pilsudski, the 
Apparent Government with the Prime Minister, and a 'backstage party' 
– Wyzel-Sciezynski, Switalski, Beck, Miedzinski. The last 
'government' – people devoid of ideas, of ideals and seeking 
promotion and money that would allow them to live the high life. 
They do not serve anyone but themselves and will sell everyone to 
always stay afloat. The secret of their apparent closeness with the 
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Marshal lies in the fact that they immediately pick up not even 
Pilsudski's thoughts but his beckoning. He does not like to talk too 
much or explain. In 1926 Beck did not know how to do it and, upon 
their first meeting, Pilsudski called him an idiot, a fool. But Beck 
quickly learned his ropes... This is a dreadful clique – of ruffians and 
drunks, compromising the government and Sejm [the Lower House of 
Polish Parliament] in 'Adria' [a popular, upmarket nightclub in 
interwar Warsaw] every night.50  
 
As the events of 1935 demonstrated, Piludski's effort to install his hand picked men 
to follow his legacy as a stable coalition failed – differences in outlook and long 
hidden ambitions eventually led to fragmentation in the governing camp. The three 
strongest 'parties' that staked a claim for Pilsudski's 'inheritance' were President 
Moscicki's 'Castle' clique, the 'Colonels'' group – which included a number of 
Sanacja officials including Janusz Jedrzejewicz, Kazimierz Switalski, Aleksander 
Prystor, Ignacy Matuszewski, Boguslaw Miedzinski and Józef Beck; who gathered 
around the Marshall's closest friend, ally and anointed presidential candidate, Walery 
Slawek – and, later, Rydz-Smigly's coterie. The Slawek clique's cooperation with 
Moscicki's group resulted in Rydz's election for the post of General Inspector for the 
Armed Forces. However, soon it became clear that this initial cooperation was to be 
short-lived. This was because, as mentioned above, despite having backed 
Mascicki's candidacy for the second term, Pilsudski ultimately planned for Slawek to 
take on the presidential office. The President was to hold his post until after the 
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proclamation of the new constitution or the parliamentary election and step down, 
passing power on to Slawek. In his book on the private lives of the elites of the 
Second Republic, Slawomir Koper cites a conversation Pilsudski allegedly had with 
the President shortly after the latter's re-election. The Marshal reportedly told 
Moscicki that ‘Slawek should replace him when he feels tired’.51 An election was 
scheduled for September 1935 but the persecuted opposition parties called for a 
boycott. Unfortunately for the regime, the public listened to the opposition’s pleas - 
overall, less than half (45.9 per cent) of those eligible voted – in Warsaw less than a 
third (29.4 per cent).52 This constituted a major defeat for the government thus 
further contributing to the already deepening internal crisis within the Sanacja camp. 
Defying everyone's expectations, Moscicki did not even contemplate resignation. 
Instead when, following the election, Prime Minister Slawek presented him with the 
customary letter of resignation, Moscicki accepted it. Apparently, even the public 
was surprised by Moscicki's decision – while old Pilsudskites were positively livid. 
Having forged an alliance with the increasingly powerful Rydz-Smigly and aided by 
Slawek's lack of desire to fight him – Moscicki had managed to successfully 
eliminate ‘the Colonels’.53  
 
(c) The Ambassadors 
As one might expect, the course of the Second World War inflicted significant 
damage on Polish military's and Foreign Ministry's archives. Prior to their 
evacuation in mid-September 1939, the Polish authorities destroyed part of their 
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archive. In addition to that, many documents perished in war-torn Poland or were 
seized and subsequently misplaced by the invading German and Russian forces. 
Fortunately for historians, however, many of Poland's diplomats managed to 
safeguard their private papers and some public documents. This thesis's focus on the 
nuanced relationships within the Polish leadership makes diplomatic memoirs and 
private collections an extremely valuable source. Thus, it is important to spend some 
time reviewing the available published material on Poland's key interbellum 
ambassadors. On 1 September 1939 Poland had embassies in Washington, London, 
Rome, Ankara, Paris, the Vatican, Moscow, Berlin, Tokyo and Bucharest. And, as 
much as Beck might have preferred to keep his ambassadors at a distance, they were 
obviously instrumental to the conduct of his foreign policy.  
Józef Lipski, who served as Ambassador in Berlin for almost a decade was, like 
Beck for the Ministry, handpicked for the job by Pilsudski. The Marshal appreciated 
his character and was certain that Lipski would be an effective agent of his policies.54 
A.J.P. Taylor's anecdotal revelations about Lipski's conduct during the last days of 
peace to some extent corresponded with Beck's 'Black Legend’.55 Most historians, 
however, regard Lipski as a highly competent diplomat who was instrumental in the 
signing of the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact. Lipski’s private papers indicate that he 
later became aware of the danger facing Poland from Germany and continued to act 
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in the nation’s best interest.56 One of the most recent attempts to demonstrate that is 
Marek Kornat's analysis of Lipski's various papers. 57  D.C. Watt is similarly 
complimentary. Writing about Lipski's conduct following the Munich conference he 
commended on his imperviousness to German threats: 
 
Throughout the disastrous year […] he remained unperturbed, in 
control, unflappable. He regarded the maintenance of good relations 
with Germany as of the utmost importance for his country […. and] 
was prepared to use the unstable personalities that made up the Nazi 
leadership, to flatter their pride and show concern for their 
susceptibilities. He was not, however, at any time ready to compromise 
the sovereign rights and honour of his country. He was to need all his 
courage, control, urbanity and determination to give nothing away in 
the negotiations which were to follow.58 
 
Ambassadors Lukaszewicz and Raczynski have also left memoirs and extensive 
personal archives. Juliusz Lukasiewicz's papers have been published, as were some 
of Edward Raczynski's. Moreover, the latter's biography is presently being written 
by Krzysztof Kania.  
 
Slawomir Koper employs an apparently light-hearted but informative approach to 
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the Second Republic's key political figures in his recent book Zycie prywatene elit 
Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej. He depicts politicians such as Rydz, Slawek, Wieniawa, 
Moscicki and Pilsudski through the relationships and friendships they formed, their 
military service, and the period they lived in. Its nightlife, entertainment, duels and 
code of honour – provide the background to Beck's May 5th speech in which the 
Minister famously refused German demands for an extraterritorial corridor through 
Pomerania. Andrzej Garlicki's Piekne lata trzydzieste serves a similar purpose. This 
volume, which includes extended versions of some previously published articles as 
well as new texts, explores among other topics Pilsudski's attempts to subordinate 
the Sejm, the detention of the opposition in camps at Brzesc and Bereza Kartuska, 
and the problem of anti-Semitism among students.  
Taken together, these monographs, memoirs and unpublished papers provide a 
valuable insight into the personal relationships among the decision-making elite, and 
thus constitute a valuable source for this thesis.  
 
(ii) Military preparedness in 1939: 
 
The last historiographical theme explored in this introduction is Polish military 
preparedness. Prazmowska argues that in the period preceding the war, ‘the Poles 
over-estimated their military prowess, under-estimated the German Army and finally 
ignored the possibility of Germany and the Soviet Union coming together.’59 Valid 
though that conclusion may be, Prazmowska fails to mention that the last criticism 
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could be applied equally to Britain and, to a lesser extent, France.60 This thesis will 
evaluate all three of Prazmowska’s criticisms and cast fresh light on each of her 
arguments. It will specifically examine if there was a link between the Western 
denial of the possibility of a Soviet-German pact and the Polish military's 
abandonment of the R+N (USSR + Germany or Rosja + Niemcy in Polish) defence 
plans it drew in 1920s. 
 
The argument about Poland's overestimation of her military capability may stem 
from a number of factors. First of all, the controversy regarding ‘nine German 
divisions’, a phrase reportedly used by Beck during a meeting in 1939 where he 
outlined his foreign policy strategy for the coming months.59 Trying to explain this 
grossly inaccurate estimate, Jan Weinstein came up with two hypotheses. Beck 
might have been referring to 1938, when the Chief of Czechoslovak General Staff, 
General Kreijci, decided to order a partial mobilisation in response to information 
that eight to ten German divisions had concentrated near the border in Saxony. 
Alternatively, the number might have originated in the Western press, which 
reported that the acquisition of Prague on 15 March 1939 was carried out by 
approximately one hundred and twenty thousand soldiers – the equivalent of 
between nine and ten divisions.61 
 
Unlike most historians, Weinstein does not put the number down to an 
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intelligence failure. A negative view of military intelligence (Oddzial II) features 
prominently in the works of military historians writing about the coming of the war. 
Their criticism is usually three-fold: (1) a perceived lack of communication between 
Foreign Ministry and the General Staff; (2) unfortunate staffing decisions – 
primarily the replacement of experienced Colonel Tadeusz Pelczynski with colonel 
Jozef Smolenski – a novice; and (3) a belief that the Soviet Union did not pose an 
immediate danger to Poland.62 Nevertheless, a successful critique of this view can, 
and has, been made on the bases that it relies on the findings of the two investigative 
commissions set up by the Polish government in exile, which of course had axes to 
grind against their predecessors. 'The new governing “crew”,' writes Marek Kornat 
of the first Registration Commission, 'were determined to find materials to discredit 
the government of 1939, a purpose served first by the Registration Office within the 
Ministry for Military Affairs and later the Registration Commission, which was 
officially headed by General Józef Haller but in effect run by the deputy minister 
General Modelski – who was deeply involved in the ‘one sided policy of [settling 
political scores]’.63 
 
The opening of the surviving Polish military archives in 1970s led to a surge in 
literature on the functioning of Polish intelligence services in Germany. This 
included Wladyslaw Kozaczuk's Bitwa o tajemnice, which focused on the shallow 
intelligence and counter-intelligence work of regional Oddzial II outposts in 
Bydgoszcz and Katowice. Mieczyslaw Cieplewicz and Marian Zgorniak published a 
collection of intelligence documents regarding the Polish knowledge of German war 
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preparations; and Leszek Gondek prepared the first comprehensive study of 
intelligence on Nazi Germany between 1933 and 1939. The historical view on 
intelligence began to change. Ten years ago, in his monograph on secret services, 
Andrzej Misiuk evaluated Oddzial II very positively. He noted the ability of its 
Western division to correctly estimate the quantitative strength of the German army, 
guess directions of future attack and warn about German plans to occupy Prague.64 
He too, however, criticised the staffing decisions made in 1939 by the General Staff. 
Henryk Cwiek, on the other hand, focused on the lack of cooperation between the 
wider General Staff and Oddzial II, showing that the relationship between the 
consumers and producers of military intelligence in Poland was dysfunctional.65  
Memoirs of former intelligence officers likewise give a mixed view of the 
service. On one hand, Polish agents were very skilled: Major Zychon, one of the 
Polish 'Intelligence Aces', believed that Poland had the best intelligence on Germany 
in the world during the second half of the 1930s.66  Yet the decision makers 
seemingly ignored this excellent intelligence. Both the Military Attaché in Berlin 
Antoni Szymanski and Jan Dlugolecki felt that their reports had no effect on either 
the General Staff or Foreign Ministry.67  
 
Another criticism, commonly voiced in particular by international historians, is of 
                                                            
64 Misiuk, Sluzby Specjalne, 79. 
65 Henryk Cwiek, Przeciw Abwehrze [Against the Abwehr], (Warszawa, 2001), 175-6. For a more 
general discussion of the importance of a good consumer-producer relationship in intelligence, see 
Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, 2007), 240-256 and 289-29; 
and Robert Jervis, 'What’s wrong with the intelligence process?,' International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 1 (1) (1986), 28–41. 
66 Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 140. 
67 Antonii Szymanski, Zly Sasiad. Niemcy 1932-1939 w oswietleniu polskiego attache wojskowego w 
Berlinie [Bad neighbour. Germany 1932-1939 remembered by the Polish military attaché in 
Berlin], (London, 1959), 128-8. 
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Poland's conviction that her Western allies would not allow her to fall.68 However, in 
a report sent to the Foreign Office in January 1939, Ambassador Howard Kennard 
stated that Beck based his foreign policy on the assumption that neither Britain nor 
France was ready to help Poland in the event of further German expansion in Central 
Europe.69 Having seemingly secured British support and being a French ally there 
was no reason why Poland should fear abandonment. Yes, the British did not rush to 
clarify the terms of the alliance and agreed to significantly lower armaments loan 
than they first intimated; and equally yes, the French High Command did not believe 
effective defence of Poland would be possible without Soviet support but the French 
had, in the end, agreed to start immediate air assistance and a mobilisation three days 
after the German attack.70 Given the much greater force and technological superiority 
enjoyed by the Germans it seemed natural that the short term Polish defence plan 
should focus on holding up the German attack until allied help could be provided. 
Unlike Prazmowska's and Taylor’s view that the British were 'conned' into 
guaranteeing Poland's independence, the prevailing opinion among Polish historians 
is that Britain ‘knowingly wrote Poland a bouncing cheque’.71  
 
All the above-mentioned issues are, in fact, parts of a much greater problem: that 
                                                            
68 Prazmowska, Eastern Europe, 152. 
69 Marek Kornat, Polska 1939 roku wobec paktu Ribbentrop-Molotow: Problem zblizenia 
niemiecko-sowieckiego w polityce zagranicznej II Rzeczpospolitej [1939 Poland and the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact: The idea of a German-Soviet détente in the foreign policy of the Second 
Polish Republic], (Warszawa, 2002), 242. 
70 Szeremietiew, Czy moglismy przetrwac, 318. 
71 Grzelak and Stanczyk, Kampania polska, 14; this view is shared by Halik Kochanski who points 
out that not only Poland's British and French allies, but also the Americans, were familiar with 
Warsaw's defence plans and that 'the Poles were under the impression that the British and French 
understood their plan and the absolute necessity of mounting an effective offensive.' Halik 
Kochanski, The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, (London, 2012), 
55. 
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of the conflict over threat perception among the Polish political and military elites. A 
much-understudied topic – no doubt due to its complexity and the lack of a complete 
Polish archive – but fascinating and much needed if we are ever to fully understand 
the events leading to the war. The only historian who has looked at this issue is 
Roman Wapinski, whose two papers focused on the psychological factors and 
preconceptions that had influenced different Polish policy makers between 1921 and 
1939. Wapinski based his interpretation on the political and military leadership's 
attitude to a possible German-Soviet détente, which, while being an interesting case 
study, provides a limited picture. Indeed, in his analysis, Wapinski wanted to 
discover the connection between beliefs, preconceptions and threat perception 
among the political elites but rejects the idea of a link between these and military 
planning and defence tactics employed in September 1939. Moreover, no 
consideration is given to the topic that is the central focus of this thesis, namely the 
poor inter-personal relationship between Minister Beck and Marshal Rydz-Smigly 
and the effect it may have had on German threat perception among Polish political 
and military elites.72  
 
I began this introduction by noting that while it is impossible to write about the 
origins of Second World War without Poland, the country often receives no more 
                                                            
72 Roman Wapinski, 'Rezultat kalkulacji czy chciejstwa? Kwestia wspoldzialania Niemiec I ZSRR 
przed 17 wrzesnia 1939 w wyobrazeniach polskich srodowisk przywodczych' ['Calculation or 
wishful thinking? The question of Soviet-German cooperation as seen by the Polish military and 
political leadership'] in Henryk Batowski (ed.), 17 wrzesnia 1939: Materialy z Ogolnopolskiej 
Konferencji Historykow [17 September 1939: Materials from a Polish Historians' Conference],  
(Krakow, 1994), 75-90; also Roman Wapinski, 'Wzajemne oddzialywanie polityki zagranicznej i 
wewnetrznej Polski wiosna i latem 1939 r.' ['The interdependence of Polish domestic and 




than a superficial mention. Even elaborate monographs are not immune to 
oversimplification and can harbour a number of preconceptions. This was certainly 
the case with Polish language literature written in the period of Communist rule, 
between 1948 and 1989.  Historians of that period cultivated a negative image of the 
1930s and laid the blame for September 1939 on the Sanacja government in general 
and the Foreign Affairs Minister Jozef Beck in particular. They strongly criticised 
his policy of rapprochement with Germany and, unsurprisingly, his negative attitude 
to the Soviet Union.  
Western scholarship has, on the whole, shared some similarities with the post-war 
Polish one, with a tendency to portray Beck in an unequivocally bad light and focus 
on his attempts to pursue a 'Great Power' diplomatic policy from a position of 
weakness. Anna Cienciala and Piotr Wandycz have long challenged this approach. 
They reject the anti-Beck view dominant in the Cold War era literature and instead 
advocate a more balanced - although in no way apologetic - view of Beck and Polish 
foreign policy throughout 1930s. The belief that Beck chose the only path available 
to him is also prevalent in current Polish historical debate.  
 
An analysis of the historiography demonstrates a certain pattern in the available 
literature. When writing about the coming of the war, military historians stress the 
lack of sufficient communication between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the 
General Staff and the intelligence service. This point is rarely raised in diplomatic 
histories, which instead focus on the 'militarisation of the political life’. There is of 
course truth in both accounts but if one considers them separately one looses sight of 
a bigger problem – the interconnectedness between foreign policy, threat perception 
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and war planning. To say that soldiers dominated the government elite is not a good 
enough explanation on its own and neither is complaining that the communication 
between the Government and the General Staff was strained. Surprisingly, the vast 
literature on Poland and the coming of the war still lacks a comprehensive analysis 
of what this multi-tiered relationship really was.  
This study does not argue that, had the civil-military relationship been better, the 
outcome of the September 1939 campaign would have in the end been different. 
Even perfect civil-military relations would not have overcome the vast disparity 
between Germany’s and Poland’s armed forces. It does, however, claim that the 
dissonance between the diplomats and the armed forces, which resulted in a foreign 
policy that did not correspond with Poland’s military strength, hampered the 
country’s ability to defend itself. Assertively presenting itself as a major regional 
player whose large army could temporarily withstand assault encouraged a degree of 
complacency not just in Warsaw but also among Poland's allies. The connection 
between threat perception and foreign policy is crucial for understanding the 
processes culminating in the outbreak of the Second World War and should receive 
greater scholarly attention. Luckily, the abundance of published and archival 
materials – memoirs, notes, letters, sometimes even official reports – that shed light 
on Polish policy making process and the nature of the civil-military relationship 
should, no doubt lead to this gap being filled. This thesis aspired to make a 





Methods and sources 
Scholars investigating the Polish government in exile or the Polish Armed Forces 
in the Second World War can be confident that they will be able to access complete 
collections of relevant documents stored in the Sikorski Institute in London. A 
researcher working on a project related to pre-war Poland enjoys no such comfort. 
Earlier in this chapter, I alluded to the tumultuous history of the Polish military and 
civilian archives. Many of the Polish documents from the 1920s and 1930s perished 
forever during the war and those that survived are scattered in archives around the 
world. This situation was apparent to surviving Pilsudskites, who began to worry 
about being written out of history immediately after the war. Indeed, in a letter from 
12 January 1946 to Ignacy Matuszewski, Boguslaw Miedzinski, the former Speaker 
of the Sejm and editor in chief of the Pilsudskite Gazeta Polska newspaper, wrote: 
 
 
Like a toothache one cannot stop thinking about, a disconcerting 
thought keeps gnawing at my mind. The current state of affairs 
might lead to stupid and blatant falsification of Polish history of 
the last 35 years. We are in danger of having our history (re)written 
by Wanda Wasilewska and [Stanislaw] Kot to the point when any 
objective future historian would struggle to find sufficient material 
to uncover the truth. There are still a few of us left in this world, 
who could put together our collective knowledge and memories 
and write an honest account of the period between 1910 and 1945 – 
the story of our generation. Or we could at least gather materials 
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which would aid researchers. I cannot but think this our duty 
towards the future, or perhaps the past and all our fallen.73 
 
Therefore, to address the incompleteness of the document archives in Poland, and to 
answer the questions asked in this doctoral thesis, my research made use of Polish 
and foreign archival materials available in archives in Poland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. The available sources are reviewed below and a detailed 
collection index is provided in Appendix I at the back of this thesis. 
 
(i) Polish-language sources 
 
In the course of my research, I have found that there are fewer Polish documents 
in Poland than abroad.  The Warsaw-based Archiwum Akt Nowych and Centralne 
Archiwum Wojskowe hold a number of governmental (AAN) and military (CAW) 
papers relevant to this research. Archiwum Akt Nowych stores part of the archive of 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry, whereas Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe holds the 
files of the Polish General Staff (out of these the collections of Oddzial I, Oddzial II 
and Oddzial IV are of particular relevance to this research), materials from the office 
of the Minister of Military Affairs, papers of the Air Force and Armoured Weapons 
Commands, the Procurement Office files and assorted officers' papers.74 
In addition, Biblioteka im. Ossolinskich in Wroclaw holds two interesting 
                                                            
73 Boguslaw Miedzinski's letter to Ignacy Matuszewski, 12 January 1946, JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana 
Weinsteina Zes. 103/34. 
74 Created by Pilsudski to protect the Armed Forces from political interference, the complicated 
system of dual command, different in peace- and war-time, proved counter-productive as muddled 
lines of responsibility and lack for personal and institutional accountability complicated decision-
making. For an explanation the organizational structure of the General Inspectorate for the Armed 
Forces and the General Staff see Chapter Two, pages 96 - 99. 
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collections of private papers. One by Ambassador Alfred Wysocki (the Polish 
representative in Berlin and Rome), the other by the second most senior officer in the 
Polish Armed Forces, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski. I found these collections 
extremely useful in understanding the institutional structures at the time and the 
broader historical backdrop of the events examined in this thesis.  
 
The two Polish archives in London, the Jozef Pilsudski Institute and the Polish 
Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM) together boast more 1930s Polish documents 
than collections in Poland itself. The Sikorski Institute stores the complete archive of 
the Polish Embassy in London, part of the archive of the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
and private papers of ambassadors Edward Raczynski and Jozef Lipski, minister Jan 
Szembek, colonel Antonii Szymanski and colonel Jan Emisarski. What is more, 
PISM also holds the statements, testimonials and minutes for and by the Winiarski 
Commissions of  (investigating the causes of the September 1939 defeat) and 
Registration Commission of 1940. However, although these two collections consist 
of much interesting material, the context of political recrimination in which the 
testimonials were produced requires historians to approach them with a sceptical 
eye. 
The second Polish archive in London, the Jozef Pilsudski Institute (JPI-London), 
is a European outpost of the Jozef Pilsudski Institute of America (JPIoA) based in 
New York. Unlike PISM, the JPI holds relatively few official papers focusing, 
instead on private collections. JPI-London, while small, is home to the files of Jozef 
Beck, Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Tadeusz Pelczynski, Ludwik Lubienski and Stefan 
Meyer. Whereas JPIoA keeps the papers of the Becks, Roman Debicki, brothers 
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Jedrzejewicz, President Ingacy Moscicki, general Jaklicz, Norbert Fethke, 
Ambassador Janusz Lukasiewicz, Kazimierz Switalski, Jan Weinstein, Jerzy 
Niezbrzycki, Major Witold Langenfeld and the surviving fragments of Marshal 
Rydz-Smigly's private archive. 
 
In addition to the materials outlined above, a large number of Polish intelligence 
files are reportedly held in the State Archive of the Russian Federation. The Red 
Army seized these documents during the Second World War. Access to them 
however is severely restricted, and I was unable to gain assured access to them 
during the course of my doctorate at King's College London. 
 
(ii) Foreign documents and published primary sources 
As we see from the outline above, Polish-language sources are fragmented and 
incomplete. Therefore, in addition to Polish documents, this research will also draw 
on a number of foreign, particularly British, materials. Foreign Office (FO 371, 417, 
688, 404 and 954/19B) and Cabinet Papers (CAB 63, 65/1, 66/1-3 and 81-88) 
collections available in the Public Records Office provide valuable background 
information about the Polish internal affairs.  
This thesis will also make use of published memoirs of political (e.g. Jadwiga 
Beck, Jozef Lipski, Edward Raczynski, Jan Szembek, Pawel Starzenski) and military 
(e.g. Colonel Antonii Szymanski) figures, where these are available. Unfortunately, 
neither of the main subjects of this study left a memoir or diary. Jozef Beck never 
kept a diary while Marshal Rydz-Smigly’s one was stolen during the violent 
burglary in 1951 into his widow Marta's house.  
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Organisation and Structure 
The breakdown of relations between Jozef Beck and Edward Rydz-Smigly, was a 
gradual process and I have reflected this in the structure of this thesis. After an 
introductory chapter explaining the background of Jozef Pilsudski's May 1926 coup 
and an exposition of the key people featured in this thesis, the narrative follows a 
chronological order and starts in the spring of 1935 – just as Poland's defacto dictator 
(and, recall, Beck's mentor) Marshal Jozef Pilsudski died. His death opened a power 
vacuum which gradually eroded the political influence of nearly all of the 'Colonels' 
– men associated with Pilsudski’s First World War Polish Legion – save for Beck 
himself. This process was more or less complete by the middle of 1936, when we 
begin to see the first signs of ideological disagreements between Beck and Rydz-
Smigly. These were caused by the latter's elevation into Marshaldom and increased 
involvement in foreign policy making following his diplomatic success of signing 
the Franco-Polish military agreement at Rambouillet. 
The interpersonal conflict grew more acute as time went on and began turning 
into a broader, political and civil-military conflict in 1937 when Rydz-Smigly 
attempted to strengthen his position through an alliance with the Polish Right. 
Indeed, this thesis shows that far from being the 'quiet year' 1937 is sometimes seen 
as, Poland's internal developments at the time were in fact instrumental for 
understanding some of Warsaw's most controversial political moves in 1938. 
Including its ultimatums to both Kovno and Prague and its initial response to 
German territorial demands.  
The consequences of the dysfunctional relationship between the civil and military 
decision makers came to head in 1939 when Poland faced the direct threat of 
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German aggression are examined in the final chapter of this paper. It focuses on the 
first eight months of 1939 that tested both Beck’s and Rydz’s political and decision 
making agility and found both men lacking. 
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Chapter One: May 1926 
 
On 12 May 1926, Jozef Pilsudski left his manor house in Sulejowek, a gift from 
his former soldiers, at 7 am. He was going to Warsaw and before he left, he assured 
Aleksandra – his wife – that he would be back by 3 o'clock – just in time for dinner. 
It may seem like a quotidian conversation but Poland's First Marshal was not 
travelling to the nearby capital on business or for a spot of shopping – he was going 
to overthrow the government.  
 
Pilsudski, the victor of the 1920 Battle of the Vistula, withdrew from public life in 
1923 and lived a life out of the public eye, his purdah occasionally punctuated by 
writing and the odd public lecture. He would, from time to time, receive old friends 
and former subordinates who relayed to him the goings on or news from the capital. 
The Marshal listened, and did not like what he heard. In the mid-1920s, Poland 
suffered from a number of social and political ills, including the Polish-German 
customs war that broke out in 1925 further destabilised the fragile post-war Polish 
economy. Against the backdrop of rising unemployment and still higher inflation 
levels, strikes and riots became relatively common. The fifth government since the 
November 1922 Parliamentary election headed by Prime Minister Skrzynski was 
unable to stop the disturbances and resigned on 5 May 1926, one week before 
Pilsudski's coup. Skrzynski was succeeded by Wincenty Witos, leader of the Peasant 
Movement and one of the key personalities in the dominant Centre-Right coalition. 
This would be the third, and last, time he would be asked to form a cabinet.  
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No love was ever lost between Witos and Pilsudski. Even before formally 
assuming office, the new PM attacked the Marshal in a newspaper interview. He 
planned, he told the reporter, to fire all Pilsudskite district prefects.75 Worse still, 
Witos wanted to replace General Lucjan Zeligowski, a devout adherent of the 
Marshal's, with General Juliusz Malczewski. Schooled at the Imperial Austrian 
Military Academy, Malczewski epitomised the antithesis of a Pilsudskite officer.  He 
was old, right wing and he had not served in either the secret para-military Polish 
Military Organisation founded by Pilsudski  or the Great War Polish Legion led by 
him. Worst of all, he was bound to interfere with the structure of Pilsudski's beloved 
Army.76 The Marshal responded in his trademark robust style. Talking to Polska 
Zbrojna [Armed Poland], he accused the government of deliberately trying to 
'destroy the morale of the Polish Army’, corruption and dirty tricks.77 He left a 
parting shot full of menace. He promised to 'attack the main evil of this country, 
which is its domination by political parties which care nothing for the nation and 
whose members are only intent upon graft.' 78  Unsurprisingly, the Witos 




                                                            
75 Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918-1939, (New York, 1979), 217. 
76 During his previous premiership, between 28 May and 14 December 1923, Witos had already 
started dismantling the dual structure of command put in place by Pilsudski when Commander in 
Chief. 
77 Pilsudski believed that he had been spied on by the previous Witos administration: 'I was 
surrounded by paid spies and they [the Witos government] bribed with money or promotions 
everyone that betrayed me – the former commander in chief!' Watt, Bitter Glory, 217. 
78 Pilsudski's disenchantment with political parties could be traced back to the politically motivated 
killing of Poland's first President Gabriel Narutowicz on 16 December 1922. He blamed it on 
militant partisanship and was disgusted by the reverence with which the assassin – Eligiusz 
Niewiadomski – was treated by the National Democrats.  
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The Upheaval 
Pilsudski expected his coup to be a formality. He gathered very few troops, no 
more than two thousand soldiers, but was convinced firstly, that cowardly Witos 
would give in under the slightest pressure, and moreover that the Army would refuse 
to stand against its Marshal. His first assumption was correct, Witos did indeed 
panic. But fortunately for the government, President Stanislaw Wojciechowski, 
Pilsudski's old friend, was determined to defend the principles of democracy and 
took command. The Marshal's second assumption, on the other hand, proved 
completely wrong. When his troops attempted to cross the Vistula into central 
Warsaw they found their way blocked. A number of units remained loyal to the 
government and were ready to open fire on Pilsudski's insurrectionist force.  
The ensuing confrontation on the Poniatowski Bridge drew President 
Wojciechowski into discussions with the Marshal but his conversation with Pilsudski 
yielded no results. Civil war seemed imminent as when the insurgents eventually 
entered the capital through a different crossing, combat broke out. Throughout the 
day Pilsudski's forces would make advances only to be pushed back by the loyalist 
troops. Reinforcements were sent for but unfortunately for Premier Witos and 
President Wojciechowski, the Left feeling marginalised by the Centre-Right had by 
then decided to throw its lot with Pilsudski.79 The Unions called a general strike with 
immediate effect. Military trains carrying loyalist soldiers were shunted into sidings 
but the ones carrying troops sent to aid Pilsudski by rogue military commanders 
were allowed to pass. They reached Warsaw early on 14 May and attacked loyalist 
positions including the Belvedere, where the President and the government were 
                                                            
79 Pilsudski originally sprung up from the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). 
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gathered. Later that day, under covering fire provided by a rump of their forces, the 
loyalist leadership managed to escape to the leafy suburb of Wilanow from where, at 
approximately 7 pm, they petitioned for a ceasefire. Premier Witos, President 
Wojciechowski and the cabinet all resigned. The Presidency passed on to Maciej 
Rataj, the Speaker of the Sejm, who travelled to Wilanow to conclude ceasefire 
terms accompanied by one of the main subjects of this doctoral thesis, colonel Jozef 
Beck.  
 
The very next day, in accordance with Pilsudski’s wishes, interim President Rataj 
named Kazimierz Bartel as the new Prime Minister whose government of 
technocrats assumed responsibility immediately. As the Marshal did not call an early 
parliamentary election, the last act of his coup was the presidential election 
scheduled for 31 May 1926.80 Pilsudski won a landslide but, in a successful attempt 
to humiliate the Sejm, refused to accept his nomination.81 The revolution was 
complete. Four days later Ignacy Moscicki, a chemist, assumed the presidency with 
Pilsudski's blessing and the new administration embarked on a programme of 
political change engineered by the Marshal who once again assumed the command 
of the Armed Forces.  
*** 
 
                                                            
80 The Polish President was not elected directly by poplar vote but by the National Assembly, which 
combined membership of both Houses of Parliament. 
81 Apparently some took this refusal as an indication that Pilsudski wanted to become Poland's new 
monarch. According to journalist Waclaw Zbyszewski, one of his foreign colleagues, a New York 
Times correspondent called Floyd was most insistent on meeting the Marshal and finding out if he 
intended to become King. Waclaw A. Zbyszewski, Gawedy o ludziach i czasach przedwojennych, 
[Stories of pre-War times and people], (Warszawa, 2000), 29. 
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'The Decisive Factor'82 
The events described in this thesis take place after Marshal Pilsudski's death in 
1935, but in order to understand the political reality of the late 1930s Poland the 
reader must understand the processes which created Sanacja – the Pilsudskite 
autocracy or, to use the Marshal's own term 'controlled democracy'.83 To aid this, I 
have briefly explained the events of Poland's coup d’état and will now look at some 
of the legislative and organisational changes enacted by Pilsudski.84 These will 
include the formation of the regime's own political party, the promulgation of a new 
constitution and the development of a new military command structure. 
 
Although Pilsudski did not at first try to exact revenge on his political opponents, 
and allowed the Sejm's current term to run its course, constant parliamentary 
obstruction made him hanker for a party that would be sympathetic to him. Thus, in 
January 1927, the Marshal, then also Prime Minister, entrusted his old associate 
Walery Slawek with the task of putting together a 'party'. The use of inverted comas 
is deliberate. The Non-Party Bloc of Cooperation with the Government  (BBWR) 
was obviously not a traditional political party.85 Rather, it was a loose and diverse 
grouping of people who agreed with Pilsudskite principles. BBWR's members 
                                                            
82 Parliamentarian's Bernard Singer's moniker for Pilsudski. Andrzej Garlicki. 'Przeciwnikow 
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Hull. Jozef Potocki, Polish Ambassador in Washington, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign 
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this thesis.  
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ranged from large landowners and industrialists to Socialists many of who still 
belonged to the Polish Socialist Party. Indeed, the BBWR did not require new 
joiners to relinquish previous party affiliations. 
 
Pilsudski's surprising benevolence towards his political opponents extended to the 
lower officer ranks. He did, however, use the coup as an opportunity to purge the 
Army of those long hostile to him. These were usually older officers who had started 
their careers in the Austrian or Tsarist armies. Thus, while in 1924 there were 143 
generals in the Polish Army, by 1932 there were only 27 left and 22 out of these 
were former Great War Legionaries.86 In his bid to 'rejuvenate' the officer corps, the 
Marshal also increasingly promoted his former subordinates to key military posts.87 
By 1932, 71 per cent of all regional Army Inspectors came from Pilsudski's Legion, 
a 43 per cent increase from 1924.88  
 
In addition to introducing personnel changes, Pilsudski also vigorously took to 
reversing the changes introduced in the military by his predecessor General Sikorski 
and further remodeled the command structure. First of all, he ordered the creation of 
the post of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces – a wartime commander in 
chief – which came in the aftermath of the August 1926 constitutional 
Amendments.89 Jozef Pilsudski naturally became the first General Inspector and, as 
                                                            
86 12 generals died but the remaining 104 were retired from service. Mieczyslaw Jablonowski, 
Ministrowie Spraw Wojskowych 1918-1944: z badan nad polityka wojskowa Polski [Ministers for 
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Jablonowski, Ministrowie Spraw Wojskowych, 162. 
88 Ibid.,  162. 
89 The Amendments gave the President power to decide all matters of national defence not 
mentioned in the constitution by decree countersigned by the Minister of Military Affairs. The 
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he was already the Minister for Military Affairs, the Marshal was now able to 
exercise unchallenged control over the military both in peace and war, and influence 
foreign policy. Of course, this had both a good and a bad side. The bad was that 
Pilsudski's personal agenda and preconceptions ruled out objective strategic 
thinking. The somewhat better? Pilsudski's authority kept the military free from 
political interferences other than his own. 
Immediately after the May 'Upheaval,' Poland's constitution was effectively 
suspended. 90  Indeed, the above-mentioned August Amendments provided a 
temporary legal framework, while work on a new constitution got under way. The 
April Constitution of 1935 that was passed through the Assembly just weeks before 
Jozef Pilsudski's death greatly strengthened the executive. To raise the President's 
prestige in preparation for his new role, the Marshal emphasised presidential control 
over the armed forces, thus ensuring the army's independence from parliamentary 
pressures. 
 
By combining the two offices of head state and foreign affairs, the Marshal also 
became his own deputy, which, considering his personality and work style, must 
have suited him well. Working for Pilsudski was not an easy task. On the contrary, 
he was a difficult and somewhat moody boss. As Richard Watt notes: 
Pilsudski was extremely secretive. He kept no diary nor did he keep 
one person informed of his plans. Instead he discussed bits and 
pieces of various programs with a number of aides who were then 
                                                                                                                                                                        
first such decree published on 6 August 1926, named the President Commander in Chief in peace 
time (position to be exercised by proxy by the Minister of Military Affairs) and the General 
Inspector of the Armed Forces in wartime.  
90 Known as the March Constitution, from the month it was passed in 1921. 
 55 
left to try to put the whole together in conversations among 
themselves.91 
 
Later in this thesis we will see that many of these bad habits would be adopted by 
Pilsudski's erstwhile aides.92 This group of intimates was made up of people who 
participated on the Marshal's side in the struggle for independence and were now 
either active or reserve officers of the Polish Army. Of roughly the same age and 
united in their worship of their 'Commandant', the men were often regarded as a 
monolith and given a designation inspired by the military rank many of them had in 
common – 'the Colonels' clique.'93 For the first two years after the coup – until the 
first post-May parliamentary election – Marshal Pilsudski kept his 'Colonels' quite 
close, intending he said to ‘teach his subordinates statesmanship’.94 
He was only half joking. Although he professed his dislike for 'politicians in 
uniforms', with the 1928 election out of the way, Pilsudski began the 'militarisation' 
of public life.95 This process occurred in two stages. First, many senior officers were 
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92 Even though his successor as Marshal, Edward Rydz-Smigly had not worked very closely with 
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planning and order giving, did not, usually go beyond 'the immediate'. He didn't want to disclose 
his intentions prematurely and thus, (…) one had to 'drag' long term plans out of him and even 
them his remarks were minimal – imprecise and indirect. General remarks intended for his closest 
collaborators rather than those who were to implement them later.' Quoted in Roman Wapinski, 
Polityka i Politycy: o polskiej scenie politycznej XX wieku [The Politics and Politicians: 
Comments on the Polish political scene in the 20th Century], (Wroclaw, 2006),  137. 
93 Reverence towards Pilsudski was generally widespread within the army. When Mieczyslaw 
Niedzialkowski, the editor in chief of socialist Robotnik allowed for publication of articles 
accusing Pilsudski of financial misgivings a group of officer applied for their superior's 
permission to 'do him in'. They were denied but the soldiers were allowed to beat the journalist up 
'if they make it clear that the whooping is connected to the allegations.'  Kordian Zamorski, 
Dzienniki (1930- 1938) [Diaries (1930-1939)], (Warszawa, 2011),  42. 
94 Jadwiga Beck, Kiedy bylam ekscelencja [When I was an Excellency], (Warszawa, 1990),  31. 
95 Although he himself combined governmental responsibilities with military duties, Pilsudski did 
not want to set a precedent. In his memoir, Waclaw Jedrzejewicz recorded a 1928 conversation 
with the Marshal who though his future successor as General Inspector of the Armed Forces 
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retired from the army and put into high profile civilian jobs. For example, General 
Roman Gorecki became Director of Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, General Jakub 
Krzemienski became Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, Kordian 
Zamorski became Chief of Police and General Stefan Paslawski became the Voivode 
(Governor) of Bialystok. These ex-servicemen naturally transplanted some military 
procedures into the administrative bodies they entered and, probably unconsciously, 
attempted to turn the civil servants into soldiers.96 And although standing to attention 
and reporting in formal tones did not become normal practice, other 'military' 
practices were adopted.97 Decisions were taken more readily with less consultation, 
bureaucracy was cut down and, in general, less paper was generated. Some 
departments would also incorporate elements of the military working style. The 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for example, had a de facto 'general staff' – a small 
group of officials who controlled information and drafted political strategy – which 
operated out of the Minister's secretariat.  
 
Unsurprisingly, many of the Legionaries already installed in state administration 
drafted in further former comrades in arms. Indeed, although despised and 
discouraged by Pilsudski, favouritism was not wiped out by the coup but enhanced. 
Contemporary documents suggest that prominent legionaries had to deal with dozens 
of applications from erstwhile colleagues or subordinates asking for help with jobs, 
                                                                                                                                                                        
should be insulated from political life and that the only person who could 'do politics in uniform is 
himself'. Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Wspomnienia [Memoirs], (Wroclaw, 1993),  270. 
96 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 27, Jozef Pilsudski Institute of America - New York (thereafter 
abbreviated to JPIoA – NY), Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
97 Piotr Lossowski, Dyplomacja Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej [Diplomacy of the Second Polish Republic], 
(Warszawa, 1992),  221. 
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transfers, tenancies and even hospitality licenses.98 Sometimes no appeals were 
necessary as just a mention of one's Legionary past could open doors or change the 
attitude of uncooperative bureaucrats. In fact, at one point the number of claimed 
Polish Legion veterans far exceeded the formation's actual head count.99  
 
This elevated status of Pilsudski's Legion affected the public's overall attitude 
towards the armed forces. With the 1920 triumph over the Red Army still fresh in 
many minds, the Polish people held the military in great esteem. What is more, they 
believed that their army was among the best in the world, well trained, well equipped 
and more than able to defend the country's borders.100 This attitude did not alter after 
Marshal Pilsudski's death. Indeed, as we will see in later chapters, the regime's 
skillful propaganda reinforced it to the point that writing in 1938 the British 
Ambassador to Warsaw, Howard Kennard remarked that: 
Is impossible for any observer to live long in Poland without being 
struck by the essentially military outlook of the people. They take a 
very great, and in many ways justifiable, pride in their army in which 
the training is undoubtedly among the hardest in the world. Military 
service, as the Minister for War remarked in his speech, has social and 
educational value in this country as well as a military one. The present 
regime depends essentially upon the political support of the ex-service 
men with their strong military tradition, and the Government and the 
                                                            
98 Kordian Zamorski's diary offers multiple examples of this phenomenon.  
99 Watt, Bitter Glory,  276. 
100 Reminiscing on the 1930s, Polish post-war oppositionist-come-politician Wladyslaw 
Bartoszewski spoke about the public's unwavering belief in their Army's might which transcended 
class and political divisions. Michal Komar and Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, Wywiad rzeka 
[Extended Interview], (Warszawa, 2006), 29-30 
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Camp of National Unity are both headed by retired army officers. The 
position of the armed forces in Poland is one of supremacy (….)101 
 
Interwar Poland spent a third of her national budget on the armed forces. The 
military benefited from generous public contributions to the National Defence Fund 
and state investment in shared military and civilian infrastructure.102 Its General 
Inspector for the Armed Forces (Commander in Chief) enjoyed the status of the 
'Second Person in the State' behind the President, its Prime Minister was a general 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs a retired colonel. And yet none of its leaders 
predicted or prepared for the German attack of September 1939 as efficiently as they 
might have done. This thesis argues that some of the blame for the fiasco of the 
September 1939 campaign should be laid on Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly and 
Foreign Minister Jozef Beck, whose personal and ideological conflict impaired 
interdepartmental communication, intelligence flow, strategic planning and effective 
foreign policy formation. However, before we move on to charting out their strife, 
the next chapter will introduce to readers the two protagonists, their respective 




                                                            
101 Howard Kennard to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, 7 Feb. 1938,  The National Archives 
(hereafter abbreviated to TNA), C 98958555, Foreign Office (hereafter abbreviated to FO) 417/38. 
102  These were 'public developments' such as roads. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in 
Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 7 Feb. 1938,  TNA, C 98958555, FO 
417/38.  
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Chapter Two: A Biographical Studies of the Foreign and Defence Policy Decision- 
Making elite in 1930s Poland 
  
Some readers may notice similarities between the dramatic events described and 
analysed in this thesis and the plots of Shakespeare's plays: as in Hamlet or King 
Lear where a ruler's death often prompts a bitter struggle for power that 
inadvertently facilitates a foreign conquest, so it was in interwar Poland. And while 
the author of this PhD thesis is not a dramatist but a historian, I argue that to 
understand the processes and appreciate the findings presented in further chapters, 
readers need to grasp the complex internal situation in inter-war Poland and the 
dramatis personae who shaped it.103  
Biographical sketches of the two figures central to our argument - Foreign 
Minister Jozef Beck and General Inspector of the Armed Forces Edward Rydz-
Smigly – will be followed by the information about their respective entourages and 
other prominent public figures.  
*** 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in the years following the 1926 coup the 
legend of Pilsudski's Legion and, in particular, of his First Company became 
                                                            
103  The increased scholarly focus on psychological factors in decision making dates back to the mid-
20th century when psychologists, political scientists and, to a lesser extent, historians began to 
assess the role of individuals and personalities in policy and decision-making. See for example, 
Donald Cameron Watt, Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign 
Policy in the Twentieth Century, (Notre Dame, 1965); Daniel Levinson, ‘Authoritarian Personality 
and Foreign Policy’, Conflict Resolution, 1 (1), (1957), 37-47. This author agrees with the view 
that historical events cannot be fully evaluate d without considering the role of individuals and the 
purpose of this chapter is to identify the commonalities and differences among the prominent 
members of the Polish elite which would allow us to examine how these influenced their decision 
making between 1936 and 1939.  
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inextricably linked to the rebirth of the Polish state in 1918. The Zwiazek 
Legionistow Polskich (Legionaries Association formed in 1918), the organisation of 
veteran Legionaries, operated in all sixteen voivodeships (high-level regional 
administrative units) as well as Warsaw and, as we will see in further chapters, its 
General Congresses occasionally provided an arena for conflicts between political 
factions or even a springboard for new political ambitions.104 
Naturally, a spell in Pilsudski's legions did no harm to man's military or political 
career hopes. Indeed, in a scathing critique of his staffing choices, the British 
ambassador to Warsaw, Howard Kennard described the Marshal as a 'mediocre 
judge of character, […] inclined to surround himself by men whose only 
qualification might be their struggle in the Legions or participation in some other 
way in the struggle for Polish independence.'105 Indeed, looking through WWI 
photographs one is startled to see how many of Poland's future leaders and highest-
ranking officers can be spotted. These snapped mementos of respite show future 
Prime Ministers: Walery Slawek and Janusz Jedrzejewicz, generals: Kazimierz 
Sosnkowski, Tadeusz Kasprzycki and Leon Berbecki, ambassadors: Michal 
Sokolnicki and Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski and finally a young bearded 
Edward Rydz (Pilsudski's successor at the helm of the army) and a fresh-faced Jozef 
Beck (the Foreign Minister). Indeed, in a testimony to how small and close-knit the 
                                                            
104  For example, in a speech for the delegates to the XIII General Congress (1935) Edward Rydz-
Smigly asserted his leadership and military credentials. Moreover, the idea of a new political 
movement, the Camp of National Unity was first introduced during the 1936 Delegates' Congress 
and the internal conflicts within the Sanacja regime were exposed when a group of prominent 
Pilsudskites boycotted the XIV General Congress (1937). Arthur Francis Aveling, Counselor in 
the British Embassy in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Leader of the House of Lords and Lord 
Privy Seal in London, 11 Aug. 1937, TNA, C58872455, FO 371/20759. 
105  Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 
Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1935, TNA, C 52257555, FO 417/35. 
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Sanacja elite was, they even show Jozef Beck's second wife's first husband, 
Stanislaw Burkchardt-Bukacki. 









                                                             (Source: NAC106) 
 
The photograph above shows Jozef Beck, Poland's Foreign Minister at the 
outbreak of the Second World War and one of the two people whose actions are 
central to this thesis. A picture is supposed to be worth a thousand words, which is 
perhaps why some writers believe that a photograph alone can bring alive the ghosts 
of figures past. However, the only things this picture tells us about Colonel Beck are 
that he possessed a rather prominent nose and that half-profile was not the best angle 
for him. Over the next few pages, we will look at Beck's life and character in an 
attempt to help the reader understand his behaviour during the period under 
examination.  
 
                                                            
106  Jozef Beck, portrait photograph, Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe (thereafter NAC), zes. Koncern 
Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny – Archiwum Ilustracji, 1-A-2449-3. 
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The future Foreign Minister was born on 4 October 1894 to Warsaw-based 
intelligentsia family of Flemish origin.107 His father, Jozef Senior, a lawyer by 
training, was disbarred and imprisoned for two years for his involvement in the 
Polish national movement. Trying to escape Russian repression, the family moved 
often and young Jozef spent the first three years of his life in Riga.108 The Becks later 
moved to Lvov and eventually settled in Limanowa (in Austria-Hungary), where 
Beck lived until his secondary school graduation. Initially set on becoming an 
engineer, he enrolled in Lvov Technical University but soon moved to Vienna to 
study international trade. He clearly enjoyed the time spent in the imperial capital 
and, much to his subordinates chagrin, often reminisced on his antics there.109 
Indeed, when an opportunity presented itself during a brief 1937 stay in the city, 
Beck attempted to relive his memories. He happily sneaked out half way through the 
production of the Rosenkavalier and took his assistants on a jolly tour through 
Viennese drinking hovels and inns, delighted about 'not being a minister,' if only for 
these few hours. 110  The following morning the Minister's Private Secretary's 
diplomatic skill was put to a test when he had to fend off Mrs Beck's telephone 
enquiries after her husband, who was sleeping like a log. He later overheard his boss 
fabricating the details of the performance to his wife.111 Had Mrs Beck realised she 
was being lied to, she would likely have very angry with him as his drinking habits 
reportedly nearly cost him his career. 
                                                            
107  Olgierd Terlecki, Pulkownik Beck [Colonel Beck], (Krakow, 1985), 13. 
108  Different spelling of the family name (Bek) used by Beck's father is often attributed to an attempt 
to confuse the Tsarist police forces.  
109 Marian Romeyko, Wspomnienia o Wieniawie i rzymskich czasach [Remembering Wieniawa and 
Roman times], (London, 1969), 67. 
110  Pawel Starzenski, Trzy lata z Beckiem [Three years with Beck], (Warszawa, 1991), 55. 
111  Starzenski, Trzy lata, 55. 
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After a promising start, when he was said to have been hand-picked by Pilsudski 
to negotiate the right of passage for Polish troops in 1919 with Romania and later 
appointed military consultant to the Polish-Lithuanian talks in 1921,112 Beck was 
expelled from Paris in 1922, barely a year after he arrived there as the new Polish 
Military Attaché. One of the possible reasons for this banishment was Beck's 
insulting of the French Army (and its officers), insolent behaviour likely to have 
been caused by the influence of drink.113 Even if one dismisses this allegation as 
malicious gossip and agrees with Richard Watt, who explained Beck's departure by a 
transfer of power from Pilsudski to Witos (and Dmowski),114 there is no denying the 
fact that his debauched and dissolute life lost him Pilsudski's favour. Indeed in early 
1926 the Marshal even dismissed him as an 'idiot'.115 Pilsudski’s attitude towards the 
man changed rapidly because only four years later, in 1930, he would blackmail his 
newly formed cabinet into agreeing to making Beck his Deputy.116 
 
Beck's 'rehabilitation' can be attributed to his unequivocal support for Pilsudski 
during the May Upheaval - the 1926 Military Coup. He spent the next four years 
                                                            
112   The 4th Polish Riffles Division commanded by General Lucjan Zeligowski was part of the French 
contingent fighting against the Red Army.  
113  Other versions of the story point to promiscuity – on either Beck's on his first wife's part - and, 
more damningly for the Minister, the stealing secret French documents as the reasons for his 
sudden departure. The latter allegation proved particularly tenacious. Perpetuated by anti-Sanacja 
figures (e.g.: Wladyslaw Sikorski, Wincenty Witos), it continues to periodically resurface (most 
recently in a 2009 volume of published Russian Archival Sources. Lev Sockov (ed.), Siekriety 
polskoj politiki. Sbornik dokumientow (1935–1945) [The secrets of Polish policy: Collected 
documents (1935-1945)], (Moscow, 2009)) and contributed to Beck's so-called 'Black Legend'. A 
negative and arguably skewed historical depiction of the Foreign Minister by certain Western, 
Russian and Polish Communist, and émigré historians. 
114  Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and Its Fate 1918-1939 (New York, 1982), 311. 
115  Slawomir Koper, Zycie prywatne elit II Rzeczpospolitej [The private life of the elites of the Second 
Polish Republic], (Warszawa, 2005), 25. 
116  According to the future Premier, Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, prior to accepting his Premiership, 
Marshal Pilsudski inquired whether his ministers would mind him bringing Colonel Beck in as 
Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister without portfolio. He warned that in the event of opposition 
to Beck's candidacy, he would chose him above any Minister. Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, 
Strzepy Meldunkow [Scraps of reports], (Warszawa, 1988), 135. 
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being groomed for diplomacy as the Marshal's Chief of Staff in the Ministry for 
Military Affairs. An official from the War Ministry recalled a conversation with the 
Marshal: 'Do not count on Beck. You will never have him. M. Beck is not going to 
make his career in the army. M. Beck will go to Foreign Affairs, to be charged with 
responsibilities of high importance.'117 Nevertheless, some observers, including the 
then French Ambassador to Warsaw, Jules Laroche, believed that Beck's success 
was really down to his second wife Jadwiga.118 Even Pilsudski is said to have 
remarked on how helpful Mrs Beck could be during official visits.  When the couple 
met they were both married to other people.119 And if the amiable split of Jadwiga's 
marriage went largely unnoticed,120  Beck's divorce from beautiful, long-legged 
Maria, raised eyebrows.121 Indeed, persons as sympathetic to him as his Chef de 
Cabinet – Michal Lubienski, were puzzled at how this faithful and honourable 
'medieval knight' could leave his wife just weeks before the birth of his son.122  
Adopting the widely spread practice of his time, Beck then converted to 
Calvinism.123 He and Jadwiga Burkhardt-Bukacka wed sometime in 1927. 
 
                                                            
117  Henry L. Roberts, 'The Diplomacy of colonel Beck', The Diplomats 1919-1939, Gordon A Craig 
and Felix Gilbert (eds), (Princeton, 1953), 580. 
118  Koper, Zycie prywatne, 24. 
119  Jozef Beck was married to Maria Slonimska and Jadwiga Salkowska to General Stanislaw 
Burhard-Bukacki. Waclaw Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach przedwojennych [Stories of 
people and times of the Antebellum], (Warszawa, 2000), 253. 
120  Terlecki, Pulkownik Beck, 63. 
121  In a stark contrast to Jadwiga, Maria Beck's first wife seems to have lived entirely in the shadow 
of her husband and was hardly afforded a mention by her contemporaries. The diary of journalist 
Waclaw Zbyszewski being one notable exception. Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 253. 
122  Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 41. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes, 103/28. 
123  In the early years of the Second Polish Republic, divorce was not possible under Polish law. In 
order to remarry, one needed to either obtain an annulment from the Church or convert. Given the 
relative ease of converting, the practice was widespread among the Polish elites. Indeed, Pilsudski 
himself led the way, his marriage to his first wife Maria was celebrated in a Lutheran church 
whereas his second one, to Aleksandra – a Catholic one. 
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The new Mrs Beck came from a wealthy bourgeois background. She was well 
travelled, intelligent, cultured and multilingual. A perfect wife for a diplomat and 
doubtless an asset to a man bent on a political career. As soon as the wedding bells 
sounded, Jadwiga Beck took to work on her groom's public image. In particular, she 
curbed his fondness for drink. Ambassador Joules Laroche recalled a particular party 
at the Romanian legation, when as soon as Beck started showing signs of enjoying 
himself a little too much, his hawk-eyed wife glided over and took away his 
champagne glass with a reproachful 'You've had enough of that already.'124 
Despite being a doting and indulgent husband, Jozef Beck never fully gave up his 
drink.125 Indeed, his Chef the Cabinet, Michal Lubienski goes as far as calling him an 
alcoholic in his memoir.126 However, in testimony to Dziuba's effectiveness, his 
overindulgences became rarer and were confined to occasions when he escaped his 
wife's watchful eye. His visits to Geneva are a notable example of just such 
transgressions. A whisky enthusiast, Beck would 'dine' with the Polish representative 
to the League of Nations, Tytus Komarnicki.127 And then, much to Komarnicki's and 
his wife's annoyance, spend hours 'having a dram' and 'monologuing about his 
visions for changing European policy.'128  
 
Always a divisive figure, Jozef Beck's sympathetic contemporaries his friends, 
family and subordinates admired his wit, patriotism and honour. Painting a picture of 
                                                            
124  Koper, Zycie prywatne, 24. 
125  In a biting commentary on Beck's ascension to Pilsudski's cabinet in 1930, General Kordian 
Zamorski, claimed that Beck's first decision was to reinstate his drinking companion, Wladyslaw 
Jaroszewicz as the Governmental Commissar for Warsaw. Kordian Jozef Zamorski, Dzienniki 
(1930-1938) [Diaries (1930-1938)], (Warszawa, 2011), 4. 
126  Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 41. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
127  Tytus Komarnicki served as the Polish Representative to the League of Nations between 1934 and 
1939.  
128  Koper, Zycie prywatne, 25-26. 
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a devoted father and husband, a well-meaning if misguided statesman and above all 
a passionate follower of Pilsudski who cherished the Marshal's friendship and 
mourned his death.129 The Minister's critics, like fellow Minister, father Bronislaw 
Zongollowicz, saw him as an aloof and cocksure opportunist. A 'Yes-Man' whose 
silver-tongue won him Pilsudski's favour which he then abused for position and 
material benefit.130 This author agrees with both sides' belief that Pilsudski is the 'key 
to Beck'. Indeed, as we will see in later chapters, not only were the late Marshal's 
ideas central to Beck's foreign policy, they were also one of the causes of the 
Minister's rocky relationship with Edward Rydz-Smigly – Jozef Pilsudski's successor 
at the helm of the Polish Army. 
 
According to his latest biography, Beck first met Pilsudski in Zakopane in 1913, 
while visiting the resort with his uncle, who was involved in the independence 
movement.131 One may presume that young Jozef was very impressed by his 
namesake as soon after this meeting he joined the Polish Military Organisation 
(POW) and became a member of Pilsudski's Polish Legion. Beck advanced quickly 
through the ranks and by spring 1916 he had already became an officer – a second 
lieutenant. Following Poland's independence, Beck enlisted in the newly forming 
Polish Army and commanded a platoon during the 1918 Polish-Ukrainian War. As 
                                                            
129 Michal Lubienski went as far as to say that Pilsudski was Beck's 'religion, philosophy and 
morality'. Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 43. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
130 Bronislaw Zongollowicz, Dzienniki 1930-1936 (Warszawa, 2004), 346. 
131 Pawel Wronski, 'Jozef Beck i jego polityka zagraniczna. Namascil go Marszalek' ['Jozef Brck and 
his foreign policy. Annointed by the Marshal'], Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 September 2009, Archiwum 
Cyfrowe 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,97737,7056499,Jozef_Beck_i_jego_polityka_zagraniczna__Namascil_go.ht
ml (last accessed on 6 September 2013). 
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we already know, Beck's rise halted somewhat in latter half of the 1920s only to 
resume in 1930. 
 
Interestingly, despite Pilsudski's long term plans to entrust Polish diplomacy to 
Beck, the man who was to become the longest-serving foreign minister of the 
Second Republic never formally became a diplomat. Indeed, as Jan Meysztowicz 
pointed out, 'Beck did not see himself as a politician who once wore a uniform, but 
as a senior level soldier who, after being ordered so by the Marshal, took over the 
management of Polish foreign policy.'132 Yet 1930 brought a definitive farewell to 
arms for Beck who was put on gardening leave from his post at the Ministry of 
Military Affairs. Initially due to last 6 months, this break was later extended by a 
further year. It was around this time that, according to contemporaries, the Warsaw 
political and diplomatic community began to suspect Beck's impending move to the 
world of foreign affairs as he started appearing at functions not in uniform but in 
white tie.133 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Beck missed his former life and 
might have held mufti in slight disdain. When given a choice of outfits during his 
visit to George VI's coronation, not once did he forgo his dress uniform in favour of 
tails.134 The Germans in particular were quick to notice Beck's yearning for his army 
days. On one occasion, after inspecting the troops during an official visit to Berlin, 
the Minister was delighted to hear that the officers recognised in him a fellow soldier 
and complimented his posture and walk. This 'soldierly' attitude was also apparent in 
                                                            
132 Piotr Lossowski, Dyplomacja Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej [Diplomacy of the Second Polish Republic], 
(Warszawa, 1992), 255. 
133 Koper, Zycie prywatne 24. 
134 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 17 -18. 
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Beck's attitude towards Pilsudski, to whom he continued to refer to the 
'Commandant' and whose instructions were 'orders'.135 
 
After a brief stint as Pilsudski's Deputy Prime Minister in Autumn 1930, the 
Marshal made Beck 'his man' in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was at the time 
run by August Zaleski. Naturally, not all Ministry employees approved of Beck's 
arrival. One of them, Knoll, even compared it to 'a bandit's descent on an idiots' 
shelter.'136 Formally only a deputy, Beck, surrounded by a troupe of other officers 
'seconded' to the Foreign Ministry, quickly established his authority within the 
institution. His nickname, 'the Boss', does not leave any doubt as to who the civil 
servants thought in charge of the establishment. Zaleski, by contrast, was referred to 
as a much more benevolent sounding 'Patron'.137 Indeed, 1930 marks the beginning 
of the development of what became known as 'Beck's Foreign policy', initially 
defined in opposition to Zaleski, who had by then fallen out of Pilsudski's favour. 
Zaleski remained in office until November 1932 but his departure was so foretold 
that when Beck rang Pilsudski's office on 2 November, and asked the Marshal's 
adjutant to inform Pilsudski that he (Beck) could now be reached under the new 
number; Lepecki instantly congratulated him on his elevation.138 'There is nothing to 
congratulate' replied Beck, ever the soldier, as he began his seven-year tenure at the 
Foreign Ministry. The first two and a half years of his service saw him negotiate and 
sign, in accordance with Pilsudski's instructions, the German-Polish Non-Aggression 
                                                            
135 Repeated mentions of Beck referring to 'Commandant' and his 'orders' can be found throughout 
Jadwiga Beck, Kiedy bylam Ekscelencja (Warszawa, 1990); Starzenski, Trzy lata; Michal 
Lubienski's manuscript. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
136 Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 253. 
137 Konrad Wrzos, Pulkownik Jozef Beck [Colonel Jozef Beck], (Warszawa, 1939), 7. 
138 Lepecki, Pamietnik, 139. 
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Treaty of 1934. He would regard this as one of his greatest achievements, no doubt 
contributing to his perception of this treaty as a 'constant' element in the Polish 
foreign policy framework. 
 
But what about the man behind the picture? Ever the cautious intelligence 
operative and blessed with a prodigious memory, Beck reportedly disliked the 
written word. He kept note and instruction writing to the bare minimum and even 
though he left behind his unfinished monograph 'The Last Report' this document 
does not shed very much light on the Minister's character and decision making 
process.139 Indeed, to pass judgement on Beck 'the man', scholars have to rely on 
second – and third – hand accounts. These suggest a man who was 'reserved and 
quiet' in social situations and who 'never talked politics.'140 He also seems to have 
enjoyed his morning lie-ins and spend relatively little time in his ministerial office, a 
practice that once led to a diplomatic spat.141 
The Minister's nearest and dearest praised his easy charm and the ability to make 
others feel at ease.142 Most friends and foes alike praised his intellect143 and the fact 
                                                            
139 In a 2009 interview, Leopold Unger who was sheltered by Beck in the Bulgarian villa the minister 
spend most of his internment, mentioned that he believed that Beck was writing another 
monograph but in the end no manuscript was found. Leopold Unger. 'Ostatnia wilia ministra 
Becka' ['Minister Beck's last Christmas Eve'], Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 September 2009, Archiwum 
Cyfrowe  http://wyborcza.pl/1,97737,7056498,Ostatnia_wilia_ministra_Becka.html (last accessed 
on 6 September 2013). 
140 After Halina Regulska, Dziennik z oblezonej Warszawy [Diary from a besieged Warsaw], 
(Warszawa, 1978), 27. 
141 When British Ambassador Howard Kennard called on Beck in the morning of 1 October 1938, he 
was asked to return later as the Minister was still abed. News of this leaked to the Polish press, 
which full of nationalist zeal after the incorporation of Zaolzie, reported that the Minister refused 
to see the British official. This was picked up by the Times and the Daily Telegraph, and 
commented on by Winston Churchill in the House of Commons. In the end the Foreign Office 
forced London's Polish Embassy and the Foreign Ministry to issue denials in British and local 
press. William Strang, Head of the Central Department at the Foreign Office in London, to British 
Embassy in Warsaw, 10 Oct. 1938, TNA, C 1193755, FO 371/21810. 
142 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 34;  Unger. 'Ostatnia wilia',   
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that he did not bear grudges. Indeed, even one of the Minster's harshest critics – 
Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz refutes the claim that it was Beck's anger at a hostile 
Slowo144 article caused his (Mackiewicz's) incarceration in the Bereza Kartuska 
detention camp.145  
In October 1932, around the time of Beck's taking office in the Bruehl Palace,146 
Warsaw's gossips whispered that as Minister Zaleski's deputy, Beck took advantage 
of his superior’s absences to slowly take control over the resort. Indeed, Zaleski's 
resignation was reportedly prompted by his discovery, upon his return from a League 
of Nation's summit in Geneva, that someone (presumably Beck or one of ‘Beck's 
people’) had rifled through his desk.147 Yet, to people familiar with the internal 
politics of the Sanacja regime, the switch was nothing more than the culmination of 
an ongoing shift in the direction of Polish foreign policy, and that Beck's 1930 
appearance in the Ministry marked him as the ‘heir apparent’ to Zaleski, who was 
quickly loosing Pilsudski's favour.  
 
Sensation-hungry scandalmongers fabricated that particular little coup but, as we 
will see in later chapters, Beck's own lengthy absences created real opportunities to 
undermine him in turn. They were only partly due to his ministerial duties. Having 
gone through a bout of tuberculosis in his youth, Beck periodically suffered from 
                                                                                                                                                                        
http://wyborcza.pl/1,97737,7056498,Ostatnia_wilia_ministra_Becka.html (last accessed on 6 
September 2013). 
143  Although Beck himself, is said, to affect an 'anti-intellectual' pose. Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 
39. JPIoA,  Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
144 Slowo was a conservative daily newspaper published in Vilna.  
145 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official communiqué to distance itself from the arrest. 
Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz, Polityka Becka [Beck's policy], (Krakow, 2009), 187. 
146 Colloquial name for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 
147 Jan Gawronski, Moja misja w Wiedniu 1932-1938 [My posting to Vienna 1932-1938], (Warszawa, 
1965), 17. 
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relapses of the disease.148 According to Lubienski, the Minister's health deteriorated 
dramatically in 1936 when the TB spread to his stomach.149 No longer  'His old 
brilliant self,'150 but determined to carry on despite his illness, Beck apparently 
entrusted his health to the famous Polish healer Oskar Wojnowski.151 Wojnowski, 
given a few days notice, was able to patch him up in time for a foreign visit or other, 
similarly important, occasion.152 Once in a while, though, Beck's health caught up 
with him and he would travel south for some respite. That was when the Minister's 
adversaries made inroads into his domain.153 
 
As long as Marshal Pilsudski was alive he decided on the principles of Polish 
foreign policy. Thus, it is not surprising that after the Marshal's death, Beck's main 
competitor for control over Poland's diplomacy was Pilsudski's successor at the helm 
of the armed forces, General, later Marshal, Edward Rydz-Smigly.  
 
  
                                                            
148 He would eventually die of it 1941, during his internment in Romania.  
149 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 41. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
150 Lubienski quoted in Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 258. 
151 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 41. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
152 Ibid. 
153  Refer to Chapter Three, 111 – 112 for more detail. 
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In his description of Beck, Lubienski wrote that the Minister looked 'more like an 
artist than a soldier.'155  Amusingly, a similar description could not have been 
afforded to Marshal Rydz-Smigly (pictured above), who – bold and clean-shaven – 
had been an artist but looked rather more soldierly.  
In contrast to Beck's, and indeed most of the Pilsudskite establishment's, upper or 
middle class backgrounds, Edward Rydz-Smigly came from very humble and 
somewhat murky beginnings. As he rose to prominence, the 'yellow press' 156 
increasingly speculated about his and his family's origins. Rydz-Smigly consistently 
declined to comment, and while he continued to visit his hometown of Brzezany and 
even funded three scholarships for poor students attending his former secondary 
school, he was careful to keep his past under wraps. Indeed, immediately after 
                                                            
154 Edward Rydz-Smigly, portrait photograph, NAC, zes, Koncern Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny – 
Archiwum Ilustracji, 1-A-2449-3. 
155 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 39. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
156 Polish for 'Red Tops'. 
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becoming the Second Person in the State, he ordered the marriage certificate of his 
parents and his mother's death certificate to be marked as secret.157 This, as well as 
his expressed belief that people ought to be judged by their deeds not their birth 
suggest that Rydz-Smigly might have been a little sensitive about his background. If 
so, it could explain why, at the height of his career, he became quite susceptible to 
flattery. 
 
Two years Beck's junior, Rydz was reportedly born out of wedlock on 11 March 
1886 in Brzezany, a small town in the 'Polish' Ukraine. His parents, Maria Babiak 
and Tomasz Rydz, a warrant officer, married in 1888, shortly before his father's 
death from tuberculosis. Maria followed her husband just eight years later, leaving 
Edward an orphan at the age of ten. The Rydz family lived in a different part of the 
country and did not acknowledge the boy so he was entrusted into his maternal 
grandparents' care. This worked well until his grandfather Jan's death that came soon 
after Edward's enrolment at the local secondary school. His grandmother, who was 
reportedly never too pleased about the charge foisted on her, began to openly resent 
Rydz-Smigly as she struggled to support both of them.158 Their house fell into 
terrible disrepair and Rydz-Smigly was eventually rescued from its draughts and 
leaky roof by the well-off parents of one of his school friends, Edmund 
Urbanowicz.159  
                                                            
157 This was to cover up his mother's Orthodox faith which could have proved embarrassing 
considering the ongoing ethnic Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicja. Andrzej Suchcitz, 
'Dziecinstwo Edwarda Smiglego-Rydza' ['Edward Smigly-Rydz's childhood'], Zeszyty Historycze, 
81(434), (Paris, 1987), 196-197. 
158 Edward Urbanowicz quoted in Cezary Lezanski, Kwatera 139. Opowiesc o marszalku Rydzu-
Smiglym [Grave 139. The tale of Marshal Rydz-Smigly], (Lublin, 1989), 21. 
159 Lezenski, Kwatera 139, 21. 
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Not long after, young Edward discovered that he had some artistic talent and 
spent hours sketching or painting (mostly landscapes or imaginary scenes from the 
most recent of failed Polish independence spurts, the January Uprising). Encouraged 
by his new guardians, the Urbanowiczes, and their friend Michalina Widmanowa 
who offered to fund him, in 1905 Edward Rydz-Smigly enrolled into the Academy 
of Fine Arts in Krakow.160 There, he was taught by some of the finest Polish painters 
but Rydz-Smigly's own paintings were apparently mediocre.161 
 
    Amusingly, Edward's benefactress, Widmanowa, a fortune-teller of some local 
renown, is said to have on occasion predicted the First World War, Polish 
independence and Rydz-Smigly's eventual ascent to the helm of the Polish Army. 
Naturally, at the time everyone treated these revelations with a raised eyebrow and 
they must have been a cause of some confusion and embarrassment for Edward. In 
spite of being involved in the Polish Independence Movement (Zwiazek Walki 
Czynnej) since his arrival in Krakow, he was set on becoming an artist. However, the 
Austro-Hungarian universal conscription interrupted Rydz-Smigly's academic 
progress in 1910. Despite an offer from a friendly doctor to help him dodge the draft, 
Edward – who had by then adopted his nom de guerre 'Smigly' - took a year out to 
                                                            
160 According to other sources, a few prominent Bzezany families (the Urbanowiczes, the Widmans, 
the Barzykowskis and the Schaetzels) funded or secured a scholarship for Edward. Koper, Zycie 
prywatne, 219 
161 According to his college friend, Franciszek Studzinski, Rydz-Smigly exhibited his paintings 
Studnicki's father's gallery but none of them ever sold and, after years of storage, the pieces 
eventually perished in war-time Warsaw. Incidentally, Studzinski claims that eight other, equally 
'chocolate-boxy' landscapes, signed 'A.Hitler' were destroyed alongside Rydz-Smigly's work. 
Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 61-62. 
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complete his national service.162 He explained that the experience could become 
useful in the Polish independence struggle.  
  
Once in uniform, the mustachioed painter so impressed his superiors that he 
was offered a commission. Rydz-Smigly declined it and went back to university, but 
must have enjoyed soldiering because soon after his return to Krakow he joined the 
Riflemen’s Association with which he completed his officer's training.163 Through 
this paramilitary work, Rydz-Smigly met some of Pilsudski's closest associates, 
including future  Prime Ministers Walery Slawek and Aleksander Prystor. According 
to his official pre-Second World War  biographies, Edward had also met and 
'became a friend' of Jozef Pilsudski.164 It is not clear whether this is true. The late 
1930's biographies of Rydz-Smigly were propaganda intended to develop his 
personality cult. So although the two could have met before the First World War, it 
is unlikely that this 'played a decisive role in [Rydz-Smigly's] later life.' In any event, 
Rydz-Smigly, charming, good-looking and extraordinarily well organised, was 
quickly entrusted with command of the Association's Brzezany chapter, of which he 
was himself a member.165 This proved a prelude to an extraordinarily brilliant 
                                                            
162 Przebieg sluzby Wojskowej Marszalka Smiglego-Rydza w Armii Austriackiej [Record of Marshal 
Smigly-Rydz's service in the Austrian Army], undated, JPIoA, Kolekcja Edwarda Rydza-Smiglego, 
Zestaw 98/1. 
163 Zwiazek Strzelecki was a Polish paramilitary organisation.  
164 Oficjalny Szkic Biograficzny Marszalka Edwarda Rydza-Smiglego [The Official Biographical 
Sketch of Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly], (undated). JPIoA Kolekcja Edwarda Rydza-Smiglego 
Zes. 98/1. 
165 Rajmnund Scholtz, Fragmenty pamietnika o przejsciu granicy wegierskiej przez gen (eneral) 
K(azimierz) Sosnkowskiego [Memoir excerpts on how General K(azimierz) Sosnkowski crossed 
the Hungarian border] (undated). Jozef Pilsudski Institute – London (thereafter referred to as JPI-
L). Kolekcja Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego 19/5/3/4. 
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military career that saw him gain Pilsudski's approval and attain a colonelcy by the 
age of 31.166  
 
Although one of the original legionaries, Rydz-Smigly was not a member of 
Pilsudski's legendary First Cadre Company. Initially drafted into the Austro-
Hungarian army, he joined the Commandant's troop  in August 1914. He stood by 
Pilsudski during the so-called 'oath crisis' 167  in 1917 but, unlike most senior 
Pilsudskites, managed to escape prison on the grounds of poor health. As a senior 
officer still at large, Rydz-Smigly was named by Pilsudski as his successor as the 
Commander of the Polish Military Organisation. He managed very well until the 
very end of the war, when, in a misguided bid to secure Pilsusdkite influence against 
Dmowski's National Democrats, he mobilised his troops in November 1918 and 
initiated the formation of the Socialist government of Ignacy Daszynski. 
Unfortunately, unbeknownst to Rydz-Smigly, Pilsudski had by then decided to sever 
his ties with the Socialist movement and so was very displeased with Rydz-Smigly 
who, in his absence, became the Minister of War in the Daszynski cabinet formed in 
Lublin.  
Out of his internment in Magdeburg, Pilsudski dismissed the Lublin government 
in his typically vulgar fashion and took Rydz-Smigly into his disfavour. In 
retaliation for what he perceived as disloyalty, the Marshal refused to acknowledge 
Rydz-Smigly's general's rank and initially kept him away from Warsaw. However, as 
                                                            
166 Pilsudski praised Rydz-Smigly's leadership, heroism and calm in combat situations. Jozef 
Pilsudski, Pisma zbiorowe [Collected writings], Vol. 4, (Warszawa, 1989), 27-28. 
167 Trying to distance himself from the Central Powers following to capitulation of Russia, Pilsudski 
and his 1st and 3rd Brigades of the Legions declined to swear an oath of allegiance to Emperor 
Wilhelm II. As a result the Legions were forcibly dismantled. Their members either drafted to the 
Austro-Hungarian or Prussian armies or jailed. Pilsudski himself was detained in the Magdeburg 
fortress. Watt, Bitter Glory, 49-50. 
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we saw in Beck's case, the Marshal was able to change his mind and it was possible 
to reclaim his favour. As military activity continued, Rydz-Smigly quickly gained an 
opportunity to return to his good books. Initially sent out to Volhyn, he commanded 
a battle group during most of the Polish-Ukrainian and the early phase of the Polish-
Bolshevik war. Later transferred to Lithuania, Rydz-Smigly continued to impress 
Pilsudski who would later describe him as having the 'strongest character and will of 
all the other Polish generals.'168 Rydz-Smigly 's troops captured Vilna and a number 
of smaller towns occupied by the Red Army earning the general a public accolade 
from the Marshal.169 Nevertheless, Pilsudski's assessment of Rydz-Smigly was not 
entirely composed of glowing positives. Although he described him as fair to his 
troops, the Marshal chastised Rydz-Smigly’s 'capriciousness' and the tendency to 
surround himself with 'yes-men' who would not challenge him. He also doubted 
Rydz-Smigly 's ability to objectively evaluate a country's military strength.170 As we 
will see in later chapters, both of these criticisms proved accurate.  
Rydz-Smigly's later successes as the Commander of joint Polish-Latvian forces, 
which captured the Latvian city of Daugavpils in January 1920, from the Bolsheviks 
won him further praise and the Order of Virtuti Militari – Poland's highest military 
decoration. This good run continued with the capture of Kiev in May 1920. A 
comparatively easy victory, which nevertheless earned Rydz-Smigly the grand-
sounding sobriquet 'The Conqueror of Kiev.'171 Recognising his leadership and 
combat brilliance in the run up to what would prove the decisive battle of the war – 
                                                            
168 Pilsudski's 1922 characteristics of Rydz-Smigly. Quoted in Ryszard Mirowicz, Edward Rydz-
Smigly: Dzialalnosc wojskowa i polityczna [Edward Rydz-Smigly: Military and political activity], 
(Warszawa, 1988), 34. 
169 Pilsudski's appeal to the troops. First published in Monitor Polski on 30 April 1919, reprinted in 
Jozef Pilsudski, Pisma Zbiorowe [Collected writings], Vol. 5, (Warszawa, 1937), 77. 
170 Pilsudski, Pisma, Vol. 5, 77. 
171 Koper, Zycie prywatne, 229. 
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the Battle of the Vistula, Pilsudski then entrusted the 34 year old general the 
command of the Central Front which was to encircle the retreating Russian forces. 
As combat activities began to wind down in October 1920, Rydz-Smigly led his 3rd 
Army to assist General Lucjan Zeligowski in his 'mutiny', a sham insubordination 
that was orchestrated at Pilsudski's instigation and aimed at upholding Polish control 
over Vilna. 
Rydz-Smigly's rehabilitation was complete. In peacetime, he was promoted to an 
Army Inspector and stationed in Vilna. Ostensibly content with his position, he 
appears to have learnt his lesson from the Lublin fiasco and either reined in or 
abandoned his political ambitions. Indeed, his friend Studnicki even commented on 
the general's dramatic change of behaviour following the end of the Polish-
Bolshevik war. The formerly feisty Rydz-Smigly reportedly became passive and 
apathetic, 'all he was interested in was game of bridge and conversation with a few 
friends.'172 This author believes Studnicki to be somewhat exaggerating in denying 
Rydz-Smigly any ambition. While it is true that others described him as 'quite shy', 
avoiding parties and having a 'retiring disposition, 173  Rydz-Smigly certainly 
continued to improve his theoretical military knowledge. He also never gave up on 
his other passion, painting, and would often go sketching when out on military 
exercises. 
 
Studnicki suspected that Edward's marriage might have been the cause of his 
withdrawal. If true, it would make Marta Rydz the exact opposite to Jadwiga Beck, 
                                                            
172 Quoted in Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 62. 
173 Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 
Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1935, TNA, C 52257555, FO 417/35. 
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who, as we have mentioned earlier, was thought instrumental to her husband's 
success. Naturally, we cannot ascertain that this was indeed the case but it appears 
that the attractive Mrs Rydz held some influence over her husband. 174  This, 
combined with the most unattractive picture of her painted by contemporaries, 
earned her the moniker of Sanacja's femme-fatale.175 She is said to have been greedy, 
hysterical, superstitious, snobbish and, above all, extremely fond of embarrassing her 
husband in public.176 One of her favourite 'sports' in Vilna was to pick a young 
officer on the street, laden him with her shopping and flirt mercilessly all the way to 
home. There, the enthusiastic 'suitors' were inevitably met by general Rydz-Smigly 
who often had to revive the swooning or disarm the suicidal.177 The popular 
commander must have felt uneasy about these antics but he either failed to intervene 
or his wife completely ignored him.  
 
Rydz's support for Pilsudski's 1926 May Upheaval, resulted in his transfer from 
Vilna to Warsaw. Fortunately for him, by then Marta got bored of seducing dashing 
young officers. Instead, on the rare occasions that the couple participated in social 
events together, she wore gloves and blamed it on being allergic to her husband.178 In 
                                                            
174 Letter by Madame Irena Sokolnicka, widow of Ambassador Michal Sokolnicki in Istambul, to the 
Jozef Pilsudski Institute, 11 Jul. 1964. Jozef Pilsudski Institute – London (thereafter abbreviated to 
JPI – L), Kolekcja Ambasadora Michala Sokolnickiego. Zes. 52/1. 
175 Dariusz Baliszewski, 'Polska femme-fatale' ['Polish femme-fatale'], Wprost, no. 51/52, (2006), 
Archiwum Cyfrowe, http://www.wprost.pl/ar/99991/Polska-femme-fatale/?pg=0 (last accessed on 
6 September 2013). 
176 According to Luciana Frassati-Gawronska, Marta Rydz spent all her free time consulting 
fortunetellers. Luciana Frassati-Gawronska, Przeznaczenie nie omija Warszawy [Destiny doesn't 
pass Warsaw], (Warszawa, 2003), 45; Kordian Zamorski also suggested that she was treated by a 
dubious haler named Jaworowicz. Zamorski, Dzienniki, 360. 
177 Baliszewski, 'Polska femme-fatale', http://www.wprost.pl/ar/99991/Polska-femme-fatale/?pg=0 
(last accessed on 6 September 2013). 
178 Koper, Zycie prywatne, 229. 
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reality, she probably tried to hide her paretic hand and Rydz-Smigly's agreement for 
this public humiliation demonstrates his devotion to his wife.  
Following the couple's arrival in Warsaw, Edward's position put him in the public 
eye and warranted more frequent mentions in diplomatic reports and society gossip. 
Initially, they repeat the earlier observations of 'earnest and direct,' charming and 
courteous.179 We also learn that he was very fond of children180 and erudite – 
especially when talking about art – and quite well-read.181 The earliest account of 
Rydz-Smigly's increasing touchiness dates back to 1934, when the then Prime-
Minister, Janusz Jedrzejewicz, received a letter in which the general complained that 
Jedrzejewicz's friend, the MP Maria Jaworska, had criticised Marta Rydz in a private 
conversation in Krakow some weeks previously.182 However, it was not until some 3 
years later that Rydz-Smigly's metamorphosis was widely noticed. Things took a 
turn for the worse after Marshal Pilsudski’s death in 1935.  
 
According to contemporary accounts, it was widely expected that General Rydz-
Smigly would take over the command of the army. Indeed, Pilsudski apparently 
wished him to do so and met with Rydz-Smigly just weeks before his death to speak 
about the plans for the reorganisation of the Polish forces. However, what few, if 
anyone, anticipated was that Rydz-Smigly could, or indeed, might ever want to 
become a 'like-for-like' replacement for the deceased Marshal. Writing in his diary in 
the turbulent months after May 1935, the former Prime Minister Kazimierz Switalski 
                                                            
179 Koper, Zycie prywante, 229. 
180 This is evident not only through contemporary accounts (e.g. his building's attendant's son) but 
also through the fact that once he was in a position to do so, Rydz-Smigly founded three 
scholarships for gifted pupils from Brzezany. Koper, Zycie prywatne, 233. 
181 Janusz Jedrzejewicz, W sluzbie idei – Fragmenty pamietnika i pism [In idea's service – Excerpts 
from diary and writings], (London, 1972), 209. 
182 Jedrzejewicz, W sluzbie idei, 209. 
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remarked that the political bets that see Rydz-Smigly eventually becoming Poland's 
next President 'must be taken without Rydz-Smigly's knowledge.'183 And while he 
did not doubt that the public's 'attachment to military figures' would raise Rydz's 
standing, Switalski was wary of allowing to the new General Inspector of the Armed 
Forces to take too active a role in political life.184  
As we will see in later chapters, this very process is the backdrop if not the cause 
of the significant events analysed in this thesis. Regardless of whether it was caused 
by an awakening of dormant ambition, the influence of his snobbish wife who 
fancied herself the 'Grande Dame' of the Polish society, 185  self-interested 
opportunists,186 or those members of the Sanacja regime who believed that the 
system required a leader-figure in order to continue. The latter would to some extent 
explain the bizarre, if brief, emergence of Rydz's portrait above Pilsudski's deathbed 
where it replaced the customary icon of Our Lady of the Gate of Dawn.  
In reality, all of these factors likely played a role. In an attempt to fill the vacuum 
left by Pilsudski, General Edward Rydz-Smigly was ‘en-marshaled’ and promoted to 
the 'Second Person in the state' in 1936. This was followed by attempts to justify 
Rydz-Smigly's position, which eventually turned into a personality cult complete 
with anthologies of his speeches, biographies for children as well as adult readers, 
and hagiographical songs and poetry.  
 
                                                            
183 Note from 19 November 1935, Andrzej Garlicki and Ryszard Swietek (ed.), Kazimierz Switalski. 
Diariusz 1919-1935 [Kazimierz Switalski's Diary 1919-1935], (Warszawa, 1992), 705. 
184 Garlicki and Swietek, Kaziemierz Switalski, 706. 
185 According to Jan Gawronski, Marta Rydz was prone to taking advantage of her husband's 
position. Gawronski, Moja misja, 352. 
186 In Rydz-Smigly’s own words 'People devoted to him, even toadying who patronised him or 
abandoned completely after the war broke out.' This author suggests August Zaleski, Konrad 
Niezbrzycki (add some more) as examples of such people. Quotation after Jadwiga Maxymowicz-
Raczynska's memoir. JPIoA, Kolekcja Edwarda Smiglego-Rydza, 98/2. 
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In the background, Poland's strategic situation continued to worsen through the 
mid-1930s as Nazi Germany dismantled the post war European settlement. And in 
addition to the main question about whether the poor relationship between Minister 
Beck and Marshal Rydz-Smigly impaired their perception of the German threat one 
of the side themes explored in this thesis is, whether Rydz-Smigly was aware of the 
danger but became prisoner to his public image or whether he lost grounding in 
reality and began to believe in the illusion himself.187 A difficult task under any 
circumstances, addressing the matter is rendered even more complex by the dearth of 
material available to researchers.188   
*** 
 
As we have seen from the brief character sketches above, Beck and Rydz-Smigly 
differed in almost every aspect. Although they both grew up mostly in Austria-
Hungary, in Polish Galicia, their backgrounds could not be more different. Beck was 
a typical member of the intelligentsia whereas Rydz-Smigly was an orphaned 
proletarian who was fortunate to have found benefactors willing to put him through 
school and university. Considering that even fifteen years later, youngsters from 
peasant and working class families constituted only 15% of all students, it is likely 
                                                            
187  According to Jadwiga Maxymowicz-Raczynska, who sheltered Rydz-Smigly after he secretly 
returned to Warsaw in 1940, the marshal realised that he lacked Pilsudski's authority with 
President Moscicki. Yet, he was convinced he had clout over the army and high standing with 
Poland's allies. Jadwiga Maxymowicz-Raczynska's memoir. JPIoA, Kolekcja Edwarda Smiglego-
Rydza, 98/2. 
188 In the previous chapter, I mentioned the gruesome circumstances surrounding the 1957 death of 
Rydz-Smigly's widow and the subsequent disappearance of his diary and most papers. Prior to her 
death Marta Rydz donated some document relating to Rydz-Smigly’s 1936 visit to France to the 
Jozef Pilsudski Institute of America. The Sikorski Institute in London holds some of Rydz-
Smigly's notes and correspondence.  
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that Rydz-Smigly always felt like an outsider in his milieu. Indeed, this could 
explain his transformation after elevation to the heights of national power.  
What's more, their temperaments were poles apart – which translated to diverging 
paths in their military careers. Rydz-Smigly’s brilliance in the field and leadership 
skills made for an excellent commanding officer. Beck, despite his later 
romanticising of soldiering, was better behind a desk than on a horse. Charming and 
intelligent, he became a negotiator.  
However, what the two did have in common was Pilsudski.  
Always on the hunt for talent, Pilsudski insisted that, after WWI broke out, the 
Austrian Army authorities transfer young Edward Rydz-Smigly from the 55th 
infantry division to his Polish Legion. Once there, he was able to prove himself and 
– was quickly promoted – until the fiasco of his involvement in the Lublin 
government which caused the young general great anguish. This author believes, 
that, this incident was one of the causes of the conflict central to this thesis.189  
 
In a post-war letter to Mrs Beck, Michal Lubienski stated that following the 
ousting of Walery Slawek from premiership, 'Beck and the governmental camp 
[Rydz-Smigly] had a different idea about what it meant to maintain Pilsudskite 
values in Poland's internal policy.'190 This thesis asserts that the conflict extended 
well beyond internal politics and into foreign policy and that its roots did not lie 
                                                            
189 As we will see in Chapter Three, some of Rydz-Smigly's more suspicious contemporaries – 
notable Pilsudskites - emphasised his hostile, or in any rate less venerate attitude to Pilsudski. It 
was commonly believed that it stemmed from the confrontation Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly had 
over the former misguided involvement with the Lublin Socialist government. Letter by Madame 
Irena Sokolnicka, widow of Ambassador Michal Sokolnicki to the Jozef Pilsudski Institute, 11 Jul. 
1964. JPI – L, Kolekcja Ambasadora Michala Sokolnickiego. Zes. 52/1. 
190 Michal Lubienski, Jozef Beck's Chef de Cabinet, in a letter to Jadwiga Beck, widow of Jozef 
Beck,  18 Aug. 1947. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/32. 
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simply in political infighting or even just ideological differences. Instead, personal 
reasons caused the dispute and sustained it.  
For Beck, who, as we remember, was also at one point sidelined by the Marshal, a 
second chance translated into life-long devotion. Thus it is widely accepted that 
Pilsudski became the minister's 'religion, philosophy (…) a moral compass' and was 
central to his confidence and sense of self worth.191 For Rydz-Smigly however, 
Pilsudski remained a senior officer. Discipline required that his orders – for example 
supplying troops during the 1926 Coup – were carried out, but his words never 
became the gospel they were to Beck.192 Indeed, in Rydz-Smigly's view they were 
more like mumblings of a rambling lunatic, an opinion he apparently shared with his 
old friend and a fellow General Kordian Zamorski in July 1932.193  
Later chapters will show that after Pilsudski's death, Beck's and Rydz-Smigly’s 
differing attitude to the Marshal's legacy and political thought caused friction, 
breeding distrust and resentment between the two with disastrous effects on Poland's 
national security.   
 
In the end, after the crushing defeat of September 1939 and not long after the 
events described in this thesis, both of the protagonists met with sad ends. Jozef 
Beck's tuberculosis returned with vengeance during his internment in Romania. He 
eventually succumbed to the illness after aerial bombings of Bucharest prompted the 
                                                            
191 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, 43-44. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
192 In a conversation with Zamorski on 1 October 1930, Rydz-Smigly bemoaned Pilsudski's lack of 
vision for the continuous development of the Armed Forces and his ignoring of German threat. 
This mismanagement apparently led him to consider leaving the Army. Zamorski, Dzienniki, 51-
52. 
193 Note from 11 July 1932: 'In [Rydz-Smigly's] view, [Pilsudski] is a madman [whose madness] will 
not be hidden from the public forever and once they find out they will think us [the Sanacja 
establishment] a herd of fools for not realising it.' Zamorski, Dzienniki, 200.  Incidentally, 
Zamorski was also, privately, very critical of the Marshal.  
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local authorities to move him, in early 1944, from a villa on the outskirts of the 
capital to a provincial village of Stanesti. Deprived of medical assistance and 
suffering from the poor conditions there, Beck died on 5 June 1944. As previously 
mentioned, Rydz-Smigly’s early life was obscure; however, the circumstances 
surrounding his death are even murkier. Historians are at odds not only about the 
circumstances but even concerning the year of his death. The majority of scholars, 
this author included, support the view that Smigly died in occupied Warsaw of a 
heart attack on 2 December 1941. However, his host, Mrs Maxymowicz-Raczynska, 
suggested that Rydz-Smigly was murdered.194 Another version, promoted by Dariusz 
Baliszewski, asserts that the marshal died of TB in Otwock in the summer of 1942. 
 
(III) The surrounding cast 
In the Prologue, I raised the spectre of the 'man who wasn't there', Poland's 
original Marshal: Jozef Pilsudski. Recall that shortly after the 1926 coup, he was 
offered – and refused – the office of the President of the Second Polish Republic. 
Instead, this ceremonial role went to Ignacy Moscicki who remained in office until 
October 1939. Born on 1 December 1867, a scion of an ancient, but somewhat 
impoverished, noble family, Moscicki followed a path typical of a man of his social 
background. After completing secondary education in Warsaw, he enrolled to read 
chemistry at the Riga Polytechnic Institute and become involved in the Polish 
independence cause. Eventually, in 1892, this nationalist zeal forced the newly wed 
                                                            
194 Raczynska wrote to an acquaintance, general Waclaw Hryniewicz-Bakierowski, about her 
suspicion that Rydz-Smigly's adrenaline ampoules were tempered with. 'Zatrute Zycie Smiglego-
Rydza' [‘Rydz-Smigly’s Poisoned Life’], Focus, 25 June 2012, Archiwum Cyfrowe, 
http://www.focus.pl/cywilizacja/zobacz/publikacje/zatrute-zycie-smiglego-rydza/nc/1/  
     (last accessed on 6 September 2013). 
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future President into exile.195 Moscicki spent the next five years in London where he 
continued his education and took a variety of jobs ranging from carpentry to 
hairdressing (with a spell as a dairy merchant in between) to support his family. He 
also continued his involvement with the Polish cause. It was in London that 
Moscicki met and developed a friendship with Jozef Pilsudski and often had the 
future Marshal to stay at his house. The friendship and visits continued after the 
Moscickis moved to Switzerland where Ignacy was offered a research position at the 
University of Freiburg. Academic life agreed with him and he stayed in Switzerland 
for twelve years, where he developed a new method of nitric acid production and ran 
a factory which used the process.  
Despite other, more profitable, offers, Moscicki decided to move his family back 
to 'Poland' and, in 1912, accepted a teaching position at the Lvov Polytechnic. After 
Polish independence, Moscicki, despite his early socialist sympathies (which he 
retained despite having run a factory), did not become involved in the politics of the 
new state. Instead, he became involved in the development of Polish chemical 
industry and continued his academic work first in Lvov and, since 1925 in Warsaw.  
Nevertheless, through no involvement of his own, the May coup drew him to the 
corridors of power when the former Prime-Minister and fellow Lvov Polytechnic 
professor, Kaziemierz Bartel, suggested Moscicki as a presidential candidate to 
Pilsudski.196 As the Presidency was a purely ceremonial function, so Moscicki's lack 
of political ambition and his familiarity with Pilsudski made him an ideal candidate 
                                                            
195  Hoping to assassinate the Governor-General of Poland, Iosif Romeyko-Gurkho, Mosciki was 
preparing a suicide bombing of a Warsaw Orthodox church. Andrzej Garlicki, 'Prezydent Ignacy 
Moscicki' ['President Ignacy Mosckicki'], Proceedings of the President Ignacy Moscicki w Spale 
Conference in Spala, 30 September 2007, Wyzsza Szkola Turystyki i Rekreacji, (2007), 1. 
196 Andrzej Garlicki, 'Prezydent Ignacy Moscicki' ['President Ignacy Mosckicki'], Proceedings of the 
President Ignacy Moscicki w Spale Conference in Spala, 30 September 2007, Wyzsza Szkola 
Turystyki i Rekreacji, (2007), 4. 
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in the Marshal's eyes. After he was sworn in, the new President's only independent 
initiative was to encourage industrial (particularly chemical) development. However, 
because Pilsudski remained the de facto ruler he wanted to build up the prestige of 
the presidency. This manifested itself in showing particular deference to Moscicki as 
well as the decision to move the President's official residence from the Belvedere to 
Warsaw's Royal Castle. The 1926 'Godfather' initiative was also an attempt to 
popularise the office.197  
Moscicki's first term ended in May 1933, after the election was brought forward 
by a month at Pilsduski's insistence. It appeared that the time for a 'yes-man' was 
over especially since this coincided with increased work on the new constitution 
granting more powers to the presidency. When in the end Pilsudski decided to 
endorse Moscicki's candidacy, the re-elected President seemed to take it to mean that 
he now had the Marshal's full confidence. Energised by this belief, or as the unkind 
would suggest, his new marriage, Moscicki became increasingly involved in political 
decision-making.198 In fact, the real reason behind Moscicki's new independence was 
Pilsudski’s ailing health. Having suffered two strokes, the Marshal was weak and no 
longer able to exercise full control and command over his disciples. This allowed 
                                                            
197 Moscicki offered to become a 'godfather' to every seventh son born during his presidency to a law-
abiding Polish family. The children included in the scheme benefited from free secondary and 
higher education and a savings account in their name. Moscicki's 'godchildren' were the subject of 
parliamentarian's Artur Gorski's question for the Polish Finance Minister. Parliamentary 
proceedings record, question number 3030 submitted during the Sejm's 32nd session, 7 Jan. 2013. 
198  Hinted at in British diplomatic cables. TNA, Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to 
Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1938, TNA 
C 58422055, FO 417/38. Moscicki's first wife Michalina (his first cousin) died in August 1932 
and his second marriage barely a year later, in October 1933, was shrouded in a cloud of scandal. 
The new First Lady, Maria was not only almost 30 years the President's junior, more 
controversially, she was his late wife's secretary and married to his adjutant.   
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Moscicki to have a say on ministerial and Prime-Ministerial nominations and 
resignations.199 
 
The new constitution, that extended the President’s powers became law in April 
1935, less than a month before Pilsudski's death in May, after which the increasingly 
ambitious Moscicki was thrust to the centre of the vacuum in the Polish political 
scene. However, his days in office again looked to be numbered as Pilsudski had 
previously decided that Moscicki was to be forced out of office mid-term (in late 
1935) and replaced by the Marshal's closest friend Walery Slawek. But, 
unexpectedly to almost everyone, the formerly pliable President did not resign his 
office. Rydz-Smigly became Moscicki's most important ally in the ensuing struggle, 
events that will be explored in more detail in the next chapter.  
 
Despite his seemingly powerful office, this thesis treats Ignacy Moscicki as a 
secondary character who did not directly influence either Polish foreign policy or its 
defence strategy. Yet, especially after his truce with Rydz-Smigly came to an end in 
1937, he provided a useful counterbalance for the quarrelling Rydz-Smigly and 
Beck.200 Moreover, by keeping 'his man', the Deputy Prime Minister and Treasury 
Minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski in power, Moscicki also maintained some control 
over the purse strings. 
                                                            
199  In May 1933 he supported the choice of Janusz Jedrzejewicz for Prime Minister. Two years later, 
in March 1935, he contributed to the resignation of Jedrzejewicz's successor, Leon Kozlowski. 
Andrzej Chojnowski, 'Ignacy Moscicki, Prezydent Rzeczpospolitej 1 VI 1926 – 31 IX 1936', 
Prezydenci i Premierzy Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej [Presidents and Prime Minister of the Second 
Polish Republic], (Wroclaw, 1992), 225. 
200 Disagreements over Moscicki's drifting towards the left side of the Sanacja camp. TNA, Howard 
Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, Leading 
Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1938, TNA, C 58422055, FO 417/38. 
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Kwiatkowski is most famous as the 'builder' or the initiator of the construction of 
Gdynia – a port to rival Danzig – on the narrow, 140 km long strip of the Baltic 
coast awarded to Poland in Versailles. A fellow chemist, who had worked with 
Moscicki in 1921 when the latter was put in charge of re-opening a nitrogen plant in 
Chorzow, he so impressed the future President that he recommended his candidacy 
for the Ministry of Industry and Trade. Unsurprisingly, when he was put in charge of 
assembling the new government in October 1935, Moscicki gave his protégée the 
Treasury brief and made him the Deputy Prime Minister.201 Beck, who disliked him, 
had to put up with Kwiatkowski's 'economic experiments' until September 1939.202  
 
For Prime Minister, Moscicki chose Marian Zyndram-Koscialkowski, a 
somewhat distant Pilsudskite who although 'a great friend of [Prystor, Switalski and 
the Jedrzejewicz brothers]' was not part of Sanacja's inner circle. 203  The 
Koscialkowski cabinet lasted only seven months and he was pushed out amid a 
power struggle between President Moscicki's 'Castle group' and Rydz-Smigly’s 
clique. Koscialkowski's successor, general Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski was a 
soldier through-and-through, who had previously served as the second deputy to the 
Minister of Military Affairs and owed his speedy rise to being hand-picked for the 
post by Rydz-Smigly, whom he continued to view as his superior and 'regarded it as 
                                                            
201 According to Kaziemierz Switalski, Kwiatkowski was the first member of the new cabinet to be 
picked, before even the PM, by Moscicki.  Garlicki and Swietek, (ed.), Kazimierz Switalski, 669; 
British diplomatic reports also stress  that Kwiatkowski enjoyed 'the particular confidence of the 
President.' TNA, Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary 
in London, Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1938, TNA, C 58422055, FO 417/38. 
202 In a note from 18 October 1935, Switalski recounted his meeting with Moscicki who quoted his 
conversation with Beck from five days before. Garlicki and Swietek, (ed.), Kazimierz Switalski, 
681. 
203  Waclaw Jedrzejewicz , Wspomnienia [Memories], (Wroclaw, 1993), 256. 
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his primary duty to carry out [Rydz-Smigly’s] orders.'204 To further emphasise his 
allegiance, Skladkowski, who was also the Interior Minister, introduced weekly 
meetings with Rydz-Smigly, parallel to his audiences with the official head of state 
Moscicki.205  
 
Skladkowski's former boss in the Ministry of Military Affairs, general Tadeusz 
Kasprzycki, was also associated with Rydz-Smigly. The British annual Personalities 
in Poland dispatches report general Kasprzycki's title as the Minister of War. This 
was a mistranslation which, as we will see, rather coincidentally hinted at the 
Minister's actual status within the Armed Forces.206 Unlike in the Western European 
tradition, where a War Ministry was a purely administrative body whose chief 
responsibilities were matters of pay and procurement for the land army, the Polish 
Department was intended to be more akin to a present-day Defence Ministry. The 
Polish Minister of Military Affairs was not only responsible for the entirety of the 
Armed Forces (Army, Navy and the Air-Force), in peace time he also acted as 
Commander in Chief. He had the power to promote and demote officers and was 
constitutionally and parliamentary accountable for his decisions. In wartime, the 
command passed on to the deputy Minister of Military Affairs, the General Inspector 
                                                            
204  Upon entering he embarked on a new wave of 'militarisation' of the civil service but his attempts 
to introduce soldierly discipline in the bureaucratic ranks were only moderately successful. TNA, 
Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 
Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1938, TNA, C 58422055, FO 417/38. 
205  Chojnowski, 'Ignacy Moscicki', 227. 
206  Reports from 1936, 1937 and 1938., Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, 
Foreign Secretary in London, Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1936, TNA, C 52257555, 
FO 417/35; Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, Leading Personalities in Poland, C 252555, FO 417/37; Howard Kennard, Ambassador 
in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 
Jan. 1938, TNA, C 58422055, FO 417/38. 
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of the Armed Forces whose peacetime activity should have centred on defence 
planning.207  
 
For nearly a decade after its creation, this complicated system of dual 
responsibility appeared to work; but only because Jozef Pilsudski was both Inspector 
and Minister, exercising full control over planning, administration and command of 
the Armed Forces. The Marshal's successor to the General Inspectorate, Edward 
Rydz-Smigly, immediately attempted to free his office from the nominal oversight of 
the Ministry of Military Affairs. He succeeded in May 1936, when the President 
decreed himself the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and made the 
General Inspector responsible to him personally.208 Thus, the Ministry of Military 
Affairs was relegated to the back seat. Minister Kasprzycki was required to 
countersign all new laws, decrees and regulations pertaining to the Armed Forces but 
had little to no control over their content.209 GISZ also had a say on military budget 
and cost allocation and it was the General Inspector's rather than the Minister's 
prerogative to initiate the meetings of the National Defence Committee (KOP) 
which, in addition to the two, included the President, the Prime-Minister, Foreign 
and Interior Ministers and the Finance Minister.210 
                                                            
207  Presidential decree from 6 August 1926, established something known as the 'two track system' 
and created the office of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces. Dziennik Ustaw RP, No. 79 
(1926), sections 444 and 445. 
208  Presidential decree from 9 May 1936. Dziennik Ustaw RP, No. 38, section 286.  
209  Examples of regulations drafted by the General Inspectorate for the Armed Forces between 1936 
and 1939 include: Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (thereafter abbreviated to CAW), New 
Conscription Law, Biuro Inspekcji GISZ, sygn. I.302.4.89, 1-296; CAW, Presidential Decree on 
new rules of procurement and provisioning, GISZ, sygn. I302.4.81 and CAW, Ordinances 
regulating the National Defence Fund (FON), GISZ, I. 302.4.84). 
210  The GISZ collection held at the Central Military Archive in Warsaw (CAW) includes eight budget 
estimates drafts for the period between 1927/28 and 1936/37. CAW, GISZ, sygn. I.302.4.1792-
1796. The General Inspectorate was also invited to have the last word on the 1936 amendments to 
officers' pension provisions. CAW, Biuro Inspekcji GISZ, sygn. I.302.4.85. 
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In the previous paragraphs we explained the 'two track system' of command and 
how the Polish Ministry of Military Affairs was intended to be more powerful than a 
conventional European War Ministry. Similarly, the competencies of the General 
Staff also differed. However, this time it was the Polish organ that was more limited 
than its counterparts. The General Staff's only task was war-planning, this included 
carrying out strategic work (drawing operational, mobilisation and provisioning 
plans) as well as ensuring that the troops were adequately trained and equipped, and 
that the formations scattered across the country were able to communicate and act as 
a cohesive Armed Force. All Staff activity was overseen by the Chief of the General 
Staff who was handpicked by the General Inspector of the Armed Forces and acted 
as his deputy.  
 
Unsurprisingly then, replacing the Chief of the General Staff was one of the first 
personnel changes undertaken by Rydz-Smigly after taking office.211 He selected 
Waclaw Stachiewicz, nominally the last of 'Pilsudski's generals,'212 a legionary, 
educated in France and with an extensive staff experience, which included roles in 
both the General Staff and the General Inspectorate.213 Stachiewicz's elder brother 
Juliusz, also a general, was by all accounts, an extremely gifted officer and much 
                                                            
211  Stachiewicz became the new Chief of Staff on 5 Jane 1935 and the speed of this turn around 
reportedly really put out his predecessor Gasiorowski. Note from 27 June 1935 in Tytus 
Komarnicki (ed.), Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka (1935-1945) [Jan Szembek's Diary and Papers], 
Vol. I, (London, 1964), 326. 
212  Even as his health continued to deteriorate Pilsudski continued to look over and approve officer 
promotions. Lepecki, Pamietnik, 273. Waclaw Stachiewicz was the last general whose promotion 
was signed by Pilsudski, on 26 January 1935. 
213  Interestingly, he was first nominated for strategic work by Edward Rydz-Smigly who, in 1918, 
entrusted him the Staff at the Central Command of the Polish Military Organisation. Bogdan 
Stachiewicz, General Waclaw Stachiewicz: Wspomnienie [Remembering general Waclaw 
Stachiewicz], (Warszawa, 2004), 79. 
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liked by Pilsudski.214 Indeed, some said that the Marshal intended to give the General 
Staff to the older of the brothers.215 In the end it was the younger Stachiewicz who 
would be in charge of the Staff in the run up to the Second World War. 
The nomination is said to have come as a surprise to both the general himself and 
the members of the officer corps.216 Contravening the rule that the Chief of the 
General Staff should at least hold the rank of Lieutenant General, Rydz-Smigly put 
many a nose out of joint. Not only was Stachiewicz 'a mere' Brigadier General but he 
had only held this rank for six months before his promotion. To top it off, he was 
younger than his counterparts and virtually unknown in the capital, having spent the 
previous eight years in Vilnius and provincial Czestochowa.217 
 
Whether Rydz-Smigly purposely upset his generals is unclear. He might just have 
been looking for someone hard working and compliant; someone who would not use 
his formal military knowledge and Rydz-Smigly 's lack thereof in an argument with 
his principal.218 However, Stachiewicz's total lack of political ambition, seen as 
distraction from strategic work might have also played a part. The general's famous 
loathing of 'networking' and schmoozing aristocrats, politicos and foreign diplomats 
                                                            
214  Pilsudski was the Godfather of Julian Stachiewicz's only son Mieczyslaw. Stachiewicz, General 
Waclaw Stachiewicz, 70; When Pilsudski was told about Juliusz Stachiewicz's premature death on 
20 September 1934, he insisted that he was kept up all night by the clomping 'Julek's' (a 
diminutive form of Juliusz) invisible boots when the general's ghost 'came to say goodbye to his 
Commandant.' Waclaw Jedrzejewicz and Jan Cisek, Kalendarium zycia Jozefa Pilsudskiego 1867-
1935 [The life of Jozef Pilsudski 1867-1935], Vol. III, (Warszawa, 1994), 196. 
215  Stachiewicz, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, 71. 
216  Stachiewicz, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, 77. 
217  Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 
Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1938, TNA, C 58422055, FO 417/38. 
218  Stachiewicz, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, 78. 
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made him an ideal chief of a Staff which would a play second fiddle to Rydz-
Smigly's General Inspector.219 
 
In the end Stachiewicz proved an extremely loyal subordinate and an excellent 
executor of his superior's plans for the modernisation of the Polish Armed Forces. 
Practical and very focused, the Chief of General Staff continuously lobbied for an 
increase in the military budget. He also originated new fund-rising initiatives such as 
the Rambouillet armaments loan, which strengthened the Franco-Polish alliance 
favoured by Rydz-Smigly.220 Himself an outsider, Rydz-Smigly surrounded himself 
with other outsiders, some of whom, like Waclaw Stachiewicz, were quite happy on 
the sidelines. Indeed, he reportedly repeatedly refused approaches by his politically 
engaged old companions to engage in public life.221 Others resented their place 
outside Pilsudski's innermost of circles and often felt that they were passed over for 
promotions by other 'Colonels.'222  
 
Adam Koc and Boguslaw Miedzinski, two other prominent supporters of Smigly- 
Rydz-Smigly, belonged to the second category. Rydz-Smigly’s former comrades 
from the Legions, they too spent the 1930s on the fringes of the 'Colonels' Group' 
                                                            
219  Alluded to by general Gasiorowski in a conversation with Szembek. Diariusz i Teki Jana 
Szembeka, Vol. 1, 326. This is confirmed by Wanda Stachiewicz who mentioned it in her diary 
several times. For example on 24 March 1939, Mrs Stachiewicz wrote: 'Dinner at ambassador 
Noel's (…) Wacek [a diminutive form of Waclaw] was furious he had to attend.' Stachiewicz, 
General Waclaw Stachiewicz, 26. 
220  PISM, Juliusz Lukasiewicz's statement for the Winiarski Commission, 22 Nov. 1943, 
A.11.49/cz/3/11. 
221  Bogdan Stachiewicz suspected that some legionaries resented this and their opposition might have 
caused his father's late promotion to general. Stachiewicz, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, 76. 
222 Waclaw Jedrzejewicz's characterisation of Rydz-Smigly's associates. Jedrzejewicz, Wspomnienia, 
268; Bogdan Stachiewicz agreed that opposition from politically engaged legionaries might have 
explained his father's late promotion to general. The reason was W. Stachiewicz's constant denial 
to participate in any public activities. Stachiewicz, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, 76. 
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and rose to power after throwing their lot with the new General Inspector. After an 
unsuccessful attempt to install Koc as Prime Minister in 1935, Rydz-Smigly asked 
him to write the manifesto for and serve as leader of his political platform, the Camp 
of National Unity (OZN).223 The OZN formed in 1937 unsuccessfully tried to replace 
Pilsudski's, now dissolved, Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government 
(BBWR). Adam Koc was also the founder and, until 1931, editor of the daily Gazeta 
Polska, a pro-Sanacja paper.224 He was succeeded as editor by Boguslaw Miedzinski 
who initially maintained the publication's Pilsudskite sympathies but later moved it 
to the right and it increasingly became a mouthpiece for OZN and Rydz-Smigly's 
clique. Miedzinski left Gazeta in 1938 to become the Speaker of the Sejm. 
 
Unsurprisingly, while Rydz-Smigly purged the Staff, the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs changed little. Theoretically, Beck's closest colleague should have been his 
deputy Jan Szembek but their scheduled weekly meetings were often postponed or 
cancelled. Szembek's repeated applications to Beck's secretary to needle the Minister 
had varying effect.225 And the deputy minister privately complained that he was not 
consulted and generally kept in the dark about the changes in Poland's foreign 
policy. 226  This scarcity of contact is confirmed by Szembek's diaries, which 
meticulously record his daily conversations.  
On his part, Beck seemed happy with his deputy and never saw the need to 
replace him. Waclaw Zbyszewski suggested this was out of convenience but it is 
also possible that Beck did not want to remove anyone who was so explicitly chosen 
                                                            
223  Komarnicki, (ed.) Diariusz i Teki, 377, 381 and 390. 
224  Other Sanacja titles included: Kurier Poranny, Narod and Rzad i Wojsko. 
225  Starzenski attributed these cancellations to Beck's health problems. Starzenski, Trzy lata, 36. 
226  Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 255. 
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for him by Pilsudski.227 Nominated on the same day, the two were so different that 
Beck's secretary, Pawel Starzenski wondered some years later if the late Marshal 
juxtaposed them on purpose.228  
Beck's deputy was as fat and gourmand as the Minister was skinny and relaxed 
about food. He was also thirteen years older, decidedly more aristocratic and a career 
diplomat who cut his teeth in the Austria-Hungarian Foreign Service. Prior to his 
arrival at Wierzbowa (the location of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), 
Szembek headed the Polish missions in Budapest, Brussels and Bucharest. Never 
considered for his dream posting: Paris, Szembek was instead offered Berlin in 
spring of 1939. 
The rapid deterioration of Polish-German relations prevented the Berlin posting 
from happening but had Beck ever wanted to replace Szembek, count Edward 
Raczynski, the Polish Ambassador to the Court of St James, would have been one of 
the possible candidates. Indeed, according to Raczynski himself, in June 1938, Beck 
talked to him about becoming his second deputy,229 but in the end the ambassador 
remained in London.  
 
One of the few who were on first name terms with the Minister, Edward 
Raczynski was undoubtedly one of Beck's favourites.230 His boss not only praised the 
                                                            
227  Ibid., 255. 
228  Starzenski, Trzy lata, 36. 
229  Edward Raczynski, W sojuszniczym Londynie: Dziennik Ambasadora Edwarda Raczynskiego 
1939-1945 [In allied London: Diary of Ambassador Edwards Raczynski 1939-1945,  (London, 
1997), 18. 
230  The other ambassadors who were on first name bases with the Minister were Juliusz Lukasiewicz 
and Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski. The former knew Beck from the time of his ill-fated 
posting to Paris while the latter, was a cavalry companion who was hand-picked for the mission in 
Rome in 1938. Romeyko, Wspomnienia o Wieniawie, 40. 
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ambassador's 'diplomatic skill'231 but also 'trusted Raczynski's political judgment' and 
believed that he 'could implement the new [Polish] policy with force and finesse.'232 
But Raczynski was not just a highly competent diplomat and administrator; he was, 
perhaps more importantly, a committed Anglophile. Educated in the London School 
of Economics and previously married to an MP's daughter, Lady Joyous Markham, 
Raczynski did not have the 'inferiority complex' Beck detested in his diplomats. In 
1939 he proved instrumental in the signing of the Anglo-Polish alliance.  
 
     So instead of going to Raczynski, an informal second deputy ministership was, in 
1938, given to Miroslaw Arciszewski, the former Polish representative to 
Bucharest.233 Beck never defined the responsibilities of either of his deputies. By 
spoken arrangement, Arciszewski was entrusted with economic and budgetary issues 
and represented Beck at the government's Economic Committee but he later 
described his role as being predominantly a  'Szembek's double':  a deputy's deputy. 
In busy times or in Szembek's absence, the second deputy undertook   'dealing with 
foreign diplomats, issuing secondary instructions and de-briefing of Polish 
representatives when they visited Warsaw.'234 Interestingly, it was Arciszewski, not 
Szembek, who held a series of 'last chance' meetings with the increasingly absent 
German ambassador, Hans von Moltke in June 1939.  
According to a contemporary, Arciszewski – a short man with enormous 'wet' 
eyes – was 'nice and kind, intelligent' but also 'romantic, sentimental and a dreamer, 
                                                            
231  Jadwiga Beck, widow of Minister Jozef Beck in London, to Jan Weinstein, retired Polish diplomat 
and archivist in London, 5 Jan. 1972, JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/35. 
232  Starzenski, Trzy lata, 265. 
233  He was never formally appointed. 
234  The meetings, arranged through the Bulgarian minister, Troyanov, were Beck's last attempts to re-
start negotiations with Germany. PISM,  Miroslaw Arciszewski's, former Second Deputy Minister 
for Foreign Affairs statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, A.11.49/Cz/3/I. 
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the opposite of a cold, suspicious, calculating and cynical professional diplomat.'235 
Yet, his career in Bucharest proved that looks could be deceiving and this 
unprepossessing man proved to be an intriguer of quite the first caliber. Indeed, he 
played an important role in the 1936 removal and expulsion of the pro-Soviet 
Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu.236 Beck, who loathed Titulescu and 
was concerned that Poland might lose an important ally, generally approved of 
Arciszewski's involvement with the Romanian opposition and the ambassador’s 
heavy lobbying against the Foreign Minister at the Royal Court.237 Marshal Rydz-
Smigly was less enthusiastic, not least because, regardless of their final outcome, 
Arciszewski's unsubtle maneuvers alienated France.238  
Interestingly, according Wiktor Drymmer (Personnel Director at the Foreign 
Ministry), Arciszewski's nomination had less to do with his Romanian 'success' and 
more with Polish intelligence concerns that his Russian wife, Eugenia, was a Soviet 
informant.239 The suspicions were allegedly confirmed by a Soviet defector Fyodor 
Butenko in February 1938.240 But, instead of being removed from the Foreign 
Service, Arciszewski was asked to divorce his wife and brought back to Warsaw so 
                                                            
235  Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach, 161. 
236  Romania and Poland had an anti-Soviet alliance dating back to 1921. 
237  In his statement to the Winiarski Commission, Beck's predecessor August Zaleski suggested that 
the Polish government financed the fascist Iron Guard during this period. However, this statement 
is not backed by existing records and thus likely to be just malicious gossip. PISM, August 
Zaleski's, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, statement to the Winiarski Investigative 
Commission, 24 Feb. 1941, A.11.49/Cz/3/III. 
238  Komarnicki, (ed.) Diariusz i Teki,  360, 364 and 379. 
239  Wiktor Tomir Drymmer, W sluzbie Polsce [In Poland's service], (Warszawa, 1998), 176;  For 
information on Soviet agents in Polish administrative and military structures refer to Pawel 
Wieczorkiewicz, 'Uwagi o dzialalnosci agentury sowieckiej na odcinku polskim  po roku 1921' 
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Piotr Kolakowski and Andrzej Peplonski (ed.), Polski wywiad wojskowy 1918-1939 [Polish 
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240  Lukasz Ulatowski, 'Niezbrzycki – Wybrane aspekty biografii wywiadowczej kierownika Referatu 
'Wschod'' ['Niezbrzycki – Selected elements of intelligence biography of the head of the 'Eastern' 
Department'], Proceedings of the Kadry decyduja o wszystkim [Personnel is crucial to everything] 
Conference in Wroclaw, 22 September 2012. 
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the authorities could 'keep and eye on him'. It is possible that he owed this 
favourable treatment to good relations with Beck, who reportedly supported him as a 
Minister of Propaganda candidate in summer of 1939.241 Arciszewski quickly lost the 
Minister's favour when it transpired that he never finalised his divorce and secretly 
maintained his relationship with his wife.  
 
Two deputies in tow, Beck eventually came to regard someone else entirely as an 
adviser and confidant – a de facto deputy. This someone was Count Michal 
Lubienski, the Minister's Chef de Cabinet and an author of a 1939 memoir we 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. Micio, as he was known to friends, was, like 
Szembek and Arciszewski, a career diplomat. Previously a Charge d'Affaires in 
Riga, he was handpicked by the Minister and took office in April 1935.  
Always pleasant, smiling, charming and intelligent Lubienski made an excellent 
gatekeeper and his contemporaries were unanimously complimentary about him.242 
However, it was under his directorship that Beck's private office became the 
universal, central department of the Foreign Ministry. Indeed, it was there, not in the 
Political Department, that Poland’s foreign policy doctrine was really developed. 
This, as observed by Beck's personal secretary Starzenski, meant that all issues could 
be swiftly dealt with in one central place.243 But the system had one big drawback – 
it gave Beck an excuse to keep the Ministry's senior civil servants at arms’ length.  
                                                            
241  Drymmer, W sluzbie, 177. 
242  Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach  i ludziach, 258; also Stanislaw Schmitzek and Stefan Lubomirski 
quoted in Piotr Lossowski, Dyplomacja, 203. 
243   Starzenski, 35 
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For although the Minister did organise briefings for his 'General Staff', they were 
irregular and sporadic, called only in times of crisis or heightened activity.244 Day to 
day, Beck's interaction with even the most senior civil servants in the ministry was 
minimal. This, as pointed by Miroslaw Arciszewski, meant that  '[t]hey were never 
able to understand Beck's way of thinking, ask him questions and coordinate the 
work of different departments.'245  
 
When Beck's secretary Pawel Starzenski completed the draft of his manuscript 
Trzy lata z Beckiem, he asked four men whom he considered closest to and most 
familiar with the minister and his policy to comment on it.246 We have already 
discussed two of the four, Michal Lubienski and Edward Raczynski. The remaining 
two – Juliusz Lukasiewicz and Jozef Lipski, were, like Raczynski, Poland's 
representatives in the capitals of European great powers: Lukasiewicz in Paris and 
Lipski in Berlin. Paris was Lukasiewicz's first and last foreign posting. He originally 
arrived there in 1922, alongside a young military attaché - Jozef Beck – and although 
Lukasiewicz’s time as the First Secretary of the Polish legation was less tumultuous 
that that of his future boss, he did not stay on the Seine for much longer. After 
leaving in 1923, he would not return for over a decade.  
Back in Poland, Beck’s and Lukasiewicz's professional paths parted slightly but 
their friendship struck in Paris continued. Indeed, in 1932, after becoming the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Beck recommended Lukasiewicz to Pilsudski as a 
                                                            
244  Miroslaw Arciszewski's, former Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, statement to the 
Winiarski Investigative Commission, 27 Feb. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/I. 
245   Miroslaw Arciszewski's, former Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, statement to the 
Winiarski Investigative Commission, 27 Feb. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/I. 
246   Starzenski, Trzy lata. 11. 
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candidate for a new ambassador in Moscow. Three years later, he was hand picked 
again. This time the destination was Paris.  
 
Lukasiewicz's return to Paris coincided with Marshal Rydz'-Smigly’s attempts to 
rejuvenate the ailing Franco-Polish alliance. And considering that the previous 
ambassador, Alfred Chlapowski, was quite inactive and reportedly held in poor 
regard a in the Quai d'Orsay, the Marshal Rydz-Smigly probably approved of Beck's 
decision to recall him.247 Indeed, with well-known socialist sympathies, Lukasiewicz 
could have been considered the perfect representative to France governed by the 
Front Populaire. 248  And France, having recently been taken aback by the 
remilitarisation of Rhineland, became more interested in its eastern ally. But Rydz-
Smigly’s September 1936 visit quickly showed that the new ambassador saw more 
eye-to-eye, with his Foreign Minister than with the distinguished guest he was 
escorting. Lukasiewicz not only disliked French high-handedness; he also doubted 
France's overall reliability as an ally.249  
 
                                                            
247  Jan Szembek's diary suggests that Rydz-Smigly made his displeasure with Chlapowski known as 
early as October 1935. As on 29 October Rydz-Smigly's associate Adam Koc bemoaned 
Chlapowski's 'narrow-mindedness' and preoccupation with the interests of Polish landed 
aristocracy which made him an 'obstacle' to Franco-Polish financial agreement. Komarnicki, (ed.) 
Diariusz i Teki, 389-390. 
248  Lukasiewicz's Socialist sympathies dated back to his student days in St Petersburg where he was 
active in a number of left-leaning organisation and an editor of a socialist newspaper Glos 
Mlodych. Waclaw Jedrzejewicz  and Henryk Bulhak, Dyplomata w Paryzu 1936-1939: 
Wspomnienia i dokumenty Juliusza Lukasiewicza ambasadora Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej [Diplomat 
in Paris 1936-1939: Memoir and papers of Juliusz Lukasiewicz Ambassador of the Polish 
Republic], (London, 1989), 8. 
249  Refer to Chapter Three, 124 – 125, for a detailed account of the visit. For thorough studies of 
French policy in the 1930s and Franco-Polish relations based on the French archives, see Martin 
Alexander, The Republic in Danger. General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French 
defence, 1933 – 1940, (Cambridge, 1992) and Peter Jackson, France and the Nazi Menace. 
Intelligence and Policy Making 1933 – 1939, (Oxford, 2000). 
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Lukasiewicz never managed to forge a good working-relationship with the French 
Foreign Ministry, something that can be only partly attributed to his minister's 
hostility to France. Another Polish diplomat with Parisian experience, Waclaw 
Zbyszewski, suspected that the ambassador's abrupt and somewhat patronising 
manner was also to blame.250 Georges Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister between 
1938 and 1940, seemed to particularly dislike Lukasiewicz, who of course 
reciprocated the feeling.251 Misdemeanours like the publication of his pamphlet 
Polska jest mocarstwem,252 in the eve of the Czechoslovak crisis naturally did 
nothing to reduce the tension between the ambassador and Bonnet. The latter 
eventually all but banned Lukasiewicz from the Quai d'Orsay and, using the pretext 
of a unified Anglo-French response to German aggression, started dealing with 
ambassador Raczynski in London.253  
 
Unlike his counterpart in Paris, the Polish ambassador in Berlin, Jozef Lipski, did 
not write pamphlets supporting Beck's foreign policy doctrine, but his hard work and 
professionalism nevertheless made him one of the minister's favourite 
ambassadors.254 Born in Breslau in Lower Silesia, Lipski, like Raczynski, was a 
Prussian subject. As a youth, he flirted with the Polish independence movement but 
was not a Pilsudskite.255 Indeed, he spent most of the First World War in Switzerland  
- studying law in Lausanne. Having graduated in 1919, Lipski joined the newly 
                                                            
250   Zbyszewski, Gawedy o sprawach i ludziach, 124. 
251   In conversation, on 27 August 1939, with the French Premier Daladier, Lukasiewicz reportedly  
described working with Bonnet as 'extremely difficult.' Jedrzejewicz  and Bulhak, Dyplomata w 
Paryzu, 314-315. 
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253  Zbyszewski, Gawedy o sprawach i ludziach, 124. 
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255  Lipski was a member of Towarzystwo Tomasza Zana (TTZ) a non-militant Polish movement 
named after the poet Tomasz Zan – one of the founders of the 19th c. Philomatic movement.  
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formed Polish diplomatic service where he remained an apolitical civil servant until 
1939.256 
 
Readers will have noticed that Lipski's arrival in Berlin coincided with Adolf 
Hitler's accession to power and an ostensible thaw in Polish-German relationship. 
The Polish embassy suddenly found the Auswartiges Amt easier to deal with and 
Pilsudski seized the opportunity to 'normalise' Warsaw's relations with Berlin. An 
experienced and skilled negotiator, Lipski played an important part in drafting the 
1934 Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact and was, alongside Beck, one of its 
Polish signatories.257  
 
Interestingly, like his Paris-posted, counterpart Lukasiewicz, Lipski too 
overlapped with Beck during his first brief foray into diplomacy. Unlike 
Lukasiewicz, however, Lipski did not seem to strike the same kind of friendship with 
the future minister.258 And while Beck valued Lipski's skills and experience, he did 
not see the ambassador as more than just an executor of his, Beck's, directives.259 
That this was a misjudgment will become evident in later chapters.  
 
                                                            
256  Immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War, Lipski volunteered for the Polish Army 
in France and, in 1940, was transferred to the Staff of the Commander in Chief, Wladyslaw 
Sikorski. Notebook. Considering Sikorski's and his government's hostility the openly pro-Sanacja 
Lukaszewicz, this staffing decision could be seen as a tribute to Lipski's professional integrity.  
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1930) and Lausanne (1932). For the details of the negotiations for the 1934 Polish-German Non-
Aggression Pact, see Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany. Diplomatic 
Revolution in Europe 1933 – 36, (Chicago, 1970), 57 – 73; and Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the 
Dark. European International History 1933 – 1939, (Oxford, 2013), 62 – 65. 
258  Perhaps this could be attributed to Lipski being a more seasoned diplomat by then. Before coming 
to Paris, he had already completed a three year posting in London. 
259  Jadwiga Beck, widow of Minister Jozef Beck in London, to Jan Weinstein, retired Polish diplomat 
and archivist in London, 5 Jan. 1972, JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/35. 
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As early as in July 1937, Lipski had started disagreeing with certain aspects of 
Beck's policy towards Germany.260 The differences between the Minister and his 
ambassador sharpened in 1938 around Munich and the Polish action in 
Czechoslovakia. Lipski repeatedly attempted to resign but Beck consistently refused 
to accept these resignations. Indeed, it was not until May 1939 – long after direct 
contact between the Polish ambassador and the German Foreign Minister all but 
ceased - that Beck started looking for a replacement. But, as we now know, he did 
not manage to find one in time. 
*** 
 
At the onset of this chapter, the author compared the complex interplay of 
personalities in interwar Poland to an exposition. It’s purpose has been to enable 
readers to follow the analysis this doctoral thesis, to appreciate the organizational 
complexity of the Polish military leadership, and to understand how personal clashes 
could contribute to the breakdown of civil-military relations in the critical second 
half of the 1930s. The two leading personalities, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly and 
Jozef Beck, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, were introduced by way of character 
sketches. And the juxtaposition of their different backgrounds, career paths and, 
most importantly, relationships with Jozef Pilsudski give an insight into the origins 
of their future conflict which we see develop in the following chapter. 
As well as with the main subjects of this study, the readers have become 
acquainted with a selection of their closest associates and some key players in Polish 
                                                            
260  Over the bilateral, Polish-German minority treaty. The negotiations are described in more detail in 
Chapter Four, 153 – 157. 
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politics in the second half of the 1930s. A glossary of personalities mentioned is 




Chapter Three: Cracks in the system: May 1935 – 1936 
 
In the previous chapters, I described the events following Marshal Pilsudski's 
May 1926 Coup, the key Sanacja personalities who came to dominate the Polish 
political scene for the decade afterwards and the Pilsudskite reorganisation of public 
life. This included the militarisation of Poland's Civil Service and changes to the 
organisation of the Armed Forces. I have also outlined the significance of the Polish-
German Non-Aggression Pact concluded on 26 January 1934.  
By May 1935, the Sanacja movement had been in power for almost a decade and 
Poland's Pilsudskite regime seemed firmly in place. However, this chapter will show 
that while the state functioned smoothly when all the power was concentrated in 
Marshal Pilsudski's hands, once he was gone it took only few months for the system 
he had created to become inoperable because of the rupture between Poland’s 
Foreign Ministry and the General Inspector of the Armed Forces. 
 
The views of Beck's adversaries who joined the government in exile came to 
dominate Polish post-war émigré historiography of the 1930s. People like General 
Sikorski, Wincenty Witos and even Beck's predecessor and successor August 
Zaleski did not agree with Jozef Beck's foreign policy and laid most of the blame for 
the disaster of September 1939 on his shoulders.261  
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The Communist era historians adopted a similarly critical attitude, the only 
difference being that their criticism extended to the entire Sanacja establishment. Out 
of a political motivation to discredit the pre-war regime, scholars condemned the 
previous rulers' lack of foresight and character flaws. 262  Ryszard Mirowicz's 
comprehensive biography of Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly was one such study and 
the author's allusions to a conflict between the General Inspector of the Armed 
Forces, Rydz-Smigly and Beck were later dismissed as insignificant by 
contemporary historians. 263  However, archival sources analysed in this chapter 
demonstrate that, contrary to the orthodox view (1) a rift between Rydz-Smigly and 
Beck developed between 1935 and 1936 and (2) this conflict continued until the 
break out of the Second World War and contributed to the break-up of the 
authoritarian regime built by Pilsudski following the May 1926 coup.  
The break up of the relationship can be analysed in three phases: (1) 'The War of 
Succession', which outlines the formation of General Rydz-Smigly's, President 
Moscicki's and Prime Minister Slawek's cliques and their subsequent squabbles 
which led to the formation of the Koscialkowski government; (2) the period between 
November 1935 and September 1936, which witnessed the marginalisation of 
Slawek and the 'Colonels', Rydz-Smigly and Moscicki's assault on the 1934 
Constitution, the former's growing political appetite and an open challenge to Beck 
and finally (3) the first months of what Cat-Mackiewicz described as ‘Rydzelite – 
                                                            
262 See, for example, Olgierd Terlecki, Pulkownik Beck [Colonel Beck], (Krakow, 1985) or Stefania 
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quarter-totalitarianism’,264 which begins with Rydz-Smigly’s visit to Paris – his first 
open foray into Polish foreign affairs - and his rapid promotion from Divisional 
General to Marshal in 48 hours. 
However, let us start before the system became dysfunctional, in early 1935, 




Pilsudski's failing health had begun to get the attention of foreign diplomats in 
January 1935. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador to Warsaw, for instance, mused 
that month over the possible scenarios that would ensue following Marshal 
Pilsudski's death or retirement.265 By then, the bad state of the Polish leader's health 
was common knowledge and he had, by and large, withdrawn from public life 
following his collapse during the Independence Day celebrations of the previous 
year and even though very few people realised just how dire the Marshal's condition 
really was, speculation about Poland without Pilsudski became one of the favourite 
conversation topics of the foreign representatives accredited in Warsaw. According 
to Kennard's dispatch, the majority of diplomats believed that Pilsudski, aware of his 
own impending demise, would nominate a successor. Were that the case, they 
argued, the most likely man to take over as Poland's new military dictator would be, 
Pilsudski's old POW (Polish Military Organisation) comrade, General Sosnkowski. 
Some also feared that in the event of Pilsudski's sudden death, the Minister for 
                                                            
264 Phrase coined by Cat-Mackiewicz in his papers. Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz, Polityka Becka, 
(Kraków, 2009), 118. 
265 Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to John Simon, Foreign Secretary in London, 29 Jan. 
1935, TNA, C 8228755, FO 417/35. 
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Foreign Affairs Jozef Beck might attempt to seize power in a 'coup de main’.266 
Polish observers regarded such a power grab as extremely unlikely, citing Beck's 
overall lack of popularity and the likely opposition from the Army as the main 
obstacles. As this chapter will demonstrate, while they were correct in their 
assessment of Beck's capabilities, no one foresaw the power struggle that would 
follow the Marshal's death or indeed, its unlikely victor.  
 
Pilsudski had been Poland's dictator since 1926 and his death on 12 May 1935 left 
a power vacuum in Polish politics. Even during his last days, when the old Marshal 
was reportedly only fit to converse or attempt work for an hour or so a day, his 
closest collaborators were ultimately able to seek his advice or approval for their 
policies. It was still Pilsudski's authority that gave his associates' actions credibility. 
Indeed, some of the Marshal's critics, such as Beck's dismissed predecessor Zaleski, 
argued that following his first bout of illness in 1931, Pilsudski's role was reduced to 
that of merely a smokescreen for the Colonels' Clique.267 Naturally, given his 
circumstances, Zaleski's opinion cannot be regarded as fully objective. As a matter 
of fact, one could argue that Pilsudski's decision to entrust the management of 
foreign policy to someone whom, unlike Zaleski, he trusted completely was a sign 
that he did not forfeit his power over Poland and wanted to ensure a continuity of 
Polish policy that would extend beyond his life.268 As we shall see, Jozef Beck, who 
                                                            
266 Ibid. 
267 Jerzy M. Nowakowski, Walery Slawek (1979-1939): Zarys Biografii Politycznej [Walery Slawek 
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sometimes alluded to being the bearer of Pilsudski's political 'last will', strongly 




The War of Succession 
'My Child... – the Commandant only used this phrase in moments of great 
emotion or his own weakness – My Child... What will they do to Poland after 
my death..? […] My Generals... My Generals...'269 
 
With their leader gone, infighting broke out among the Sanacja elite. People 
whose positions within the system were directly linked to their close relationship 
with the Marshal, like Prime Minister Slawek and, to a lesser extent, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Beck, lost a great deal of their influence almost overnight, whereas those 
who, like President Ignacy Moscicki, were supposedly on their way out, could 
(successfully) fight for survival.  
Very quickly, a clique – sometimes referred to as the Castle clique – formed 
around President Moscicki, who, relatively unmoved by the death, emerged as a true 
political and national leader. According to the diary of Jan Szembek, Beck's deputy, 
the very bereaved Beck was initially pleased with the way Moscicki had handled the 
crisis. He even commented that the President had 'lately been very privy' with the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
1940, Kolekcja Becka, Zes. 20/5/3/3. 
269 Excerpt from a conversation between Premier Janusz Jedrzejewicz and Pilsudski when the former 
presented his resignation. JPI-London, Irena Sokolnicka, Ambassadress in Istanbul, note, 13 Aug. 
1940, Kolekcja Ambassadora Michala Sokolnickiego, Zes. 52/1. 
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Marshal and, was therefore entrusted with detailed guidance and instructions about 
the future of the national administration and lines of policy.270 
Beck's approval of Moscicki's conduct withered away, however when the 
President used his newly strengthened position to challenge Walery Slawek. The 
reason why he was determined to neutralise Prime Minister Slawek was related to 
Pilsudski's widely known plans to replace the President with his old friend as soon as 
the new 1935 Constitution, which weakened the legislative branch of government, 
was passed.271 Instead, Moscicki quickly made it clear that he was not, in fact, 
considering cutting his second term short and would serve until its end in 1940. An 
opportunity to marginalise Slawek presented itself when, following the summer 1935 
parliamentary election, the Prime Minister presented the President with a customary 
resignation letter. Moscicki, having previously secured the support of the Marshal's 
successor at the head of the Armed Forces, General Rydz-Smigly, then, to 
everyone's surprise, accepted it and proceeded to form his 'own' government.272  
 
As the resultant 'interregnum' infighting raged through the Sanacja circles, Beck 
managed to avoid choosing sides. He owed this special status to his close 
relationship with Pilsudski, something that was underwritten by being the last 
official to have spoken to the dying Marshal. Called out of a reception in honour of 
the visiting French Foreign Minister, Pierre Laval, Beck hurried in his white tie to 
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the Belvedere. 'Aren't you chic, my boy!' - the Marshal, who then proceeded to give 
the Minister his last advice, greeted him. According to Beck himself it went like this:  
'Well, my boy, aren't you afraid?' I replied: 'Commandant, men whom you have 
honoured with your confidence are never afraid.' - 'Good that you are not afraid – 
your task is difficult.' […] 'Well, my boy, for a certain time better stay idle and wait 
and see what all the others are going to do.'273 
To some this conversation marked Beck out as the 'anointed' one - a bearer of 
Pilsudski's political 'last will'. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that had he been 
forced to declare his sympathies, he would have supported Slawek and the Colonels. 
Indeed, following the 1935 change of government, Beck initially refused to join the 
newly formed cabinet of Zyndram-Koscialkowski, appalled by Moscicki's and Rydz-
Smigly's unceremonious deposition of Walery Slawek and unwilling to work in 
government with Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, with whom he often disagreed, and as we 
will see in later chapters, would continue to disagree with on foreign and domestic 
policy.274 It was only after much soul searching, discussions with Rydz-Smigly, a 
heated exchange with President Moscicki and, significantly, a plea from the 
'deposed' Slawek that he stay on that Beck agreed, albeit grudgingly, to remain at the 
helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.275 The shrewd collector of political gossip 
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and establishment priest, Bronislaw Zongollowicz, who had somehow obtained 
details of the late night conversation at Warsaw's Royal Castle, claims that Beck told 
Moscicki that he was only staying in the government on the President's orders but 
will take no responsibility for the policies it dictates.276 Following his entry into 
Koscialkowski's government Beck collapsed from exhaustion and he likely suffered 
a minor breakdown. For the first month after he had officially taken office Beck was 
substituted by Szembek, something that fuelled a wave of gossip about the Minister's 
imminent departure. These rumours were no doubt greatly magnified by the indecent 
speed with which Rydz-Smigly was promoted.  
 
To Warsaw's diplomatic community, Rydz-Smigly – who shied away from public 
life and whom they rarely met – seemed a member of Pilsudski's inner circle and a 
devoted follower of the Marshal's policy; Howard Kennard, for one, thought that 
Rydz-Smigly might take over Pilsudski's post of Minister of War. In hindsight, 
Rydz-Smigly's appointment as General Inspector of the Armed Forces appears 
natural, yet his position on the political periphery at the time meant that his rise came 
as a surprise to many.277 
 
Despite Rydz-Smigly's brilliant victories during the Polish-Bolshevik war, the 
archives reveal that Pilsudski had not, for a long time, necessarily seen him as a 
potential future Commander in Chief. In 1922,  writing his commendation of Rydz-
Smigly in support of his proposal to award the young general the order of Virtutti 
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277  Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 
Leading Personalities in Poland, 1 Jan. 1935, TNA, C 52257555, FO 417/35. 
 114 
Militari, Pilsudski praised Rydz-Smigly's strong and responsible character but 
worried about three things: whether Rydz-Smigly had the ability to curb the other 
generals' grandiose ambitions, whether he had the ability to be an effective 
Commander in Chief and finally whether he could assess not just military strength 
but the 'nation's and the enemy's strength too'.278 Moreover, as some historians point 
out, even in later years, Pilsudski was occasionally very critical of Rydz-Smigly 
whom he thought had no political talent.279 The Marshal had even temporarily 
banished Rydz-Smigly to Vilnius in the aftermath of his involvement in the Lublin 
government.280 
 
It was, of course, possible to win back Pilsudski's favour (that the Marshal had 
described Beck as an 'idiot' in 1926 did not stop Pilsudski from calling him 'dearest 
Beck' in 1934).281 Rydz-Smigly’s support of Sanacja during the May 1926 coup 
allowed him to return to Warsaw and be appointed as the regional Inspector of the 
Armed Forces. He did not, however, became one of the Marshal's 'nearest and 
dearest' and after his ill-fated early venture into politics Rydz-Smigly preferred to 
stay away from public life until Pilsudski died. It is quite possible that Pilsudski 
approved of Rydz-Smigly 's aversion to political intrigue, which, dormant under the 
Marshal's watchful eye, erupted in the battle to succeed him.282 Janusz Jedrzejewicz 
recalls that, shortly before Pilsudski's death, Boguslaw Miedzinski organised a 
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meeting of prominent Pilsudskites including Antoni Matuszewski, Adam Koc and 
Henryk Flojar-Reichman, who asked Jedrzejewicz to lobby Moscicki in favour of 
making general Sosnkowski General Inspector of the Armed Forces. Jedrzejewicz 
declined on the grounds that choosing the nominee was solely the President's 
prerogative,283 but would later admit that he already knew that the post would be 
entrusted to Rydz-Smigly on Pilsudski's instructions.284 This was widely believed 
and the Marshal's widow Aleksandra agreed that her late husband had intended for 
Rydz-Smigly to succeed him at the head of the Polish Army.285 He might have also 
mentioned it once to Slawek.286 
In the end, whether on Pilsudski's orders or not, Edward Rydz-Smigly was 
appointed the next General Inspector of the Armed Forces within hours of the 




Once the colonels had been neutralised, the initial truce between Moscicki and 
Rydz-Smigly evaporated and, using his high standing within the Army, the General 
started to gain the upper hand over the President. Indeed, as we shall see later, one 
could even say that he underwent a transformation from soldier to politician during 
those first few months in office.   
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One of the ways in which this new rivalry between the Castle (Moscicki's 
residence) and Wierzbowa (the General Inspectorate) manifested itself was in 
relation to the Foreign Ministry, and more specifically, both men's attitude to Beck. 
Moscicki wanted the Foreign Minister to stay in office and attempted unsuccessfully 
to limit Rydz-Smigly's ability to interfere in international affairs by reserving for 
himself the right to take executive foreign policy decisions and hold private council 
with Beck.287  
The rapport between the Minister and the Inspector was obviously not as good. 
Indeed, soon after Rydz-Smigly's nomination, Beck admitted, in his typically 
indirect way,288 that he worried that the relationship between the general and himself 
might be ‘difficult’; and stressed to Szembek that the establishment of a mutual trust 
between the two of them was not something in which he took pleasure but ‘a matter 
of national security’.289  
 
According to the diary of Mieczyslaw Lepecki, Pilsudski's adjutant,  Beck was the 
only official to whom ‘the doors of the GISZ (General Inspectorate of the Armed 
Forces) always remained open’ when the Marshal was still alive.290 Once Rydz-
Smigly took over at the institution, however, Beck's visits to the GISZ become more 
sporadic and this loosening of institutional ties filtered down to both men's 
subordinates. In the previous chapter we discussed the post-May Coup influx of 
young officers into public institutions and the irritation it caused among civil 
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servants. We must, however, remember that having left the Armed Forces, those 
officers in mufti were also looked down upon by their former colleagues. This 
suspicious attitude did not make for good working relations between the two 
departments and a reshuffle at the head of the General Staff exacerbated the conflict. 
The gregarious General Janusz Gasiarowski, who was swiftly replaced by Rydz-
Smigly's supporter Stachiewicz, complained that the cordial and close relationship 
between the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry was bound to change given his 




As I have already alluded to, and will later discuss in detail, one of the reasons why 
Beck and Rydz-Smigly's relationship could have been rocky was the general's 
ruthless purge of many of Beck's friends and confidants. One must also highlight 
their differing attitude to Pilsudski. Unlike Beck, Rydz-Smigly did not revere 
Pilsudski. Indeed, sources suggest quite the opposite. In his diary, Janusz 
Jedrzejewicz recalls a 1934 conversation with Rydz-Smigly that made him wonder 
whether the general was harbouring ‘strong negative feelings towards the 
Marshal’.292 While the diary does not elaborate on the subject, an explanation can be 
found in the papers of Ambassador Sokolnicki with whom Jedrzejewicz spent some 
time during World War II. Apparently, as late as 1934, Rydz-Smigly appeared to 
harbor resentment of an incident that took place in mid 1920s, when he felt Pilsudski 
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had embarrassed him in front of other generals. 293  Rydz-Smigly had been so 
unsettled that he even attempted to challenge Pilsudski to a duel!294 What is more, as 
soon as the Marshal's health began to falter, Rydz-Smigly began, discreetly, to 
oppose his authority. Furthermore, according to the diary of General Kordian 
Zamorski, in a conversation in July 1932, Rydz-Smigly appeared to resent 
Pilsudski's rule and argued that 'he is obviously a mad-man, which once discovered, 
will make us [the regime?] a laughing stock for not realising this.’295 Around the 
same time, Rydz-Smigly might have also been involved with a secret militaristic 
organisation called ‘Orzel Bialy’ (The White Eagle), which was ordered dissolved 
after Pilsudski found out about its existence.296 
Beck, on the other hand, was one of Pilsudski’s closest (if not the closest) 
associates and held his commander in high esteem. What is more, as we have seen in 
earlier chapters, until the Marshal's death Beck had near-autonomy in conducting 
Polish foreign relations. Indeed, a fellow diplomat Kajetan Morawski, argued that 
Beck had became 'a dictator, taking all foreign policy decisions and responsibility 
upon himself.'297 Virtually unrestrained, the Minister had, much to the chagrin of 
some of his contemporaries, became Pilsudski's sole source of foreign policy 
information. With the exception of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, when he relied on 
himself, the Marshal trusted Beck's interpretation of international events.298  
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Just once a year Beck presented the Sejm with a report on the aims and 
achievements of Polish foreign policy and seemingly had, whenever possible, tried 
to restrict the flow of diplomatic information within both the Foreign Ministry and 
the government. This became apparent when he was due to prepare a foreign policy 
brief for Premier Koscialkowski's first parliamentary speech. Since Beck was ill and 
unavailable at that time, his chief of staff, Lubienski, suggested that the PM refrain 
from talking about international problems until the Minister's return, but this was 
rejected by Szembek and the other Foreign Ministry directors. In the end it was 
decided that each of the department heads should prepare a briefing but when 
Szembek mentioned the speech while visiting the convalescing Beck, the Minister 




Beck's immediate absence after his entry into the Koscialkowski government set 
Warsaw's tongues wagging and many, correctly, took it as a sign that the minister's 
position was weakening. Some even went as far as saying that his days in the 
Foreign Ministry were numbered. And although those expecting a change of Foreign 
Minister were proven wrong, one could argue that the fact that even after returning 
from his sick leave in November 1935, Beck continued to spend long periods of time 
away from Warsaw greatly aided Rydz-Smigly's successful foray into Polish 
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diplomacy.300 One of Beck's fellow Pilsudskites – Kazimierz Switalski – had even 
once pointed out to Beck that the Foreign Ministry might suffer as a result of internal 
tension that had developed when he was attending to League of Nation's business.301 
Moreover, although Beck did not really seem to want to listen to Switalski, he was 
reportedly upset by Rydz-Smigly's uncertainty about the direction of Polish foreign 
policy.302  
One area where Rydz-Smigly and Beck openly disagreed was the Polish position 
on Danzig. The Foreign Minister wanted to treat the problem of Danzig as separate 
from Polish-German affairs whereas Rydz-Smigly was convinced that relations with 
the Free City would remain a contentious issue between Warsaw and Berlin and that 
a German-Polish war was likely to result from a local conflict in the city.303 This was 
not of course the only bone of contention. According to Witos's diary, Rydz-Smigly 
also disapproved of Beck's harsh foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia, 304 
something that echoes in the reports of the Czechoslovak emissary to Warsaw, Juraj 
Slavik.305 Slavik's close relationship with the French Ambassador Leon Noel might 
perhaps explain why the French hoped that Rydz-Smigly would be sympathetic 
towards their efforts to forge a Polish-Czechoslovak alliance. Furthermore, in the 
winter of 1935-36, Rydz-Smigly openly criticised the Foreign Ministry's passive 
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acceptance of the dirty tricks and intrigue employed by the Polish emissary to 
Bucharest to remove the anti-Polish, Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu.306  
 
If Rydz-Smigly's constant criticism of Beck's policy was not enough to undermine 
the Minister, his position in the government was further weakened by the tension 
that had developed in Polish-German relations by summer 1935. Beck attempted to 
maintain stability in Poland's external affairs, but foreign governments' reaction to 
the news of Pilsudski's death, which could be described as a mixture of apprehension 
and hope, did not make his task easy.307 In Paris, the French authorities made clear 
their hope that Pilsudski's death and the subsequent weakening of Beck would lead 
to better Franco-Polish relations and hoped that they might use Rydz-Smigly as a 
counterbalance for the unpopular Polish Minister.308  
In Berlin, where services held in honour of the late Polish Marshal were 
particularly grand, the mood could not have been different and the authorities made 
it clear to Ambassador Lipski that they were worried about the possibility of a 
sudden turn-around in Polish-German relations.309 Indeed, despite reassurances that 
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German insecurity may have been exacerbated by their unsuccessful attempt to persuade the Poles 
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Warsaw would not abandon her line of Polish-German rapprochement, Goering  - 
who headed the German delegation to Pilsudski's funeral – requested meetings with 
both Moscicki and the newly nominated Head of the Armed Forces, Rydz-Smigly.310 
Soon after that the Polish authorities came into conflict to with Hjalmar Schacht who 
refused to settle the overdue German rail-transit fees.311 Indeed, the situation was so 
bad that, on 6 July 1935 Szembek felt it necessary to issue a communiqué to all 
Polish diplomatic outposts, informing them that Beck had recently had a meeting 
with Hilter during which both men reasserted their mutual commitment to friendly 
Polish-German relations.312 
What is more, evidence suggests that the differences between the Foreign 
Minister and the Chief of the Armed Forces must have quickly became common 
knowledge among Warsaw's elite circles, and found their way through to diplomatic 
reports. Mrs Beck, for example, recalls that when she and her daughter stayed behind 
in the German town of Reichenhall following her husband's July 1935 official visit 
to Berlin, she was showered with courtesies, attention and invitations to Goering and 
Hitler's villas.313 During one such weekend, spent sailing with Goering, the German 
had surprised her with a question about Rydz-Smigly's supposed dislike of her 
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husband. Naturally, she disagreed.314 And although Goering never mentioned Rydz-
Smigly to Mrs Beck after this incident, the fact that he tried to verify the rumours 
indicates that the German leadership took them seriously and was worried about 
Beck's position weakening opposite Rydz-Smigly.315 
 
Nevertheless, despite his mistrust of Germany, even Rydz-Smigly was initially 
interested in preserving the continuity in Polish-German relations, as demonstrated 
by his behaviour during the 1935 nomination crisis.316 The General had repeatedly 
indicated that he did not believe a dramatic change of foreign policy doctrine would 
have been good for Poland.317 
Some participants in the debate on Beck's and Rydz-Smigly's relationship see 
this, as well as the fact that Edward Rydz-Smigly did not push for Beck's removal, as 
indicating that he was not, overall, hostile to the Foreign Minister's line of policy.318 
Arguably, both men seem to have had a long and, to quote Beck himself, ‘an 
extremely important and reassuring discussion’ during the tense weekend of 12-13 
October when he was uncertain about accepting his ministerial nomination.319 
However, we must try not to look at the events of late summer 1935 through the 
prism of the general's future popularity and remember that at the time of the first 
change of government after Pilsudski's death, Rydz-Smigly had barely been in office 
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for three months and his position had yet to be established. Indeed, he was not even 
consulted about the proposed composition of the Koscialkowski government and 
was extremely displeased with some of the nominees, including the PM himself.320 
This lack of support would later directly contribute to the fall of Koscialkowski's 
government and the elevation of Rydz-Smigly 's protégé Skladkowski to the 
Premiership. 
Notwithstanding Rydz-Smigly's lack of time in post, the aloof Colonel Beck was 
doubtless aided by the special relationship he enjoyed with Pilsudski. Beck clearly 
had Pilsudski's mandate to manage Polish diplomacy and for Rydz-Smigly to be seen 
to be openly disregarding the leader's instructions so soon after his death would have 
been foolish. According to one of his university friends, 'Edzio321 was not very clever 
[...]'322 but he certainly was not the total imbecile his critics like the late Mackiewicz 
would like us to believe. Indeed, another reason why Rydz-Smigly would have had 
little inclination to dispose of Beck laid in the fact that, despite his friendship with 
former Foreign Minister Zaleski, he had, at that point, limited ideas not just about 
Polish foreign policy but also concerning wider international relations.323 Having 
spent his last few years as the regional General Inspector for the Armed Forces in 
Warsaw, he was doubtless aware that he was completely unprepared to immediately 
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take control over Polish foreign policy. However, if one looks at the behaviour of 
Marshal Rydz-Smigly in the later part of the 1930s, it is obvious that he had been 
learning and insisted on being well informed about Poland's foreign policy. Indeed, 
the following pages refute Marek Kornat's argument that Beck's position in the 
driving seat of Polish diplomacy remained relatively strong not only because there 
was no one good enough to replace him but also because no other Polish leader 
possessed sufficient knowledge and understanding of the country's foreign 
relations.324  
 
In this country political developments of the first magnitude usually come 
unheralded325  
 
In a private letter of 25 November 1935 to Ambassador Edward Raczynski, 
Beck's Chief of Staff, Michal Lubienski, updated the London-based diplomat on the 
most recent developments in Poland's internal policy and shared the latest political 
gossip. Noting the continuing decline in the levels of public and parliamentary 
support for the Koscialkowski government, Lubienski told the Ambassador:  
A new power centre has started forming around general Rydz-Smigly. It 
would take too long to explain why this is happening but the most 
important reason is, certainly, the fact that out of all the people holding 
the key offices in Poland, e.g.: the President, Prime Minister, ministers 
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[and] parliamentary leaders, general Rydz-Smigly has the most 
remarkable character and most outstanding personality. One is even 
worried that, once again, Polish civilian authority will find themselves 
subordinate to military authority. Therefore the scenario the Marshal, 
who always criticised 'the governing by Second Divisions', so tried to 
avoid would became reality.326  
 
Despite himself holding a dual office as the Head of the Army and the Minister of 
War, Pilsudski had always explicitly claimed that he wanted the Armed Forces to be 
freed from any external (political) pressure. In order to achieve this independence, he 
included a special clause safeguarding the separation of the military and civilian 
spheres in the 1935 Constitution. Thus, when Moscicki and Skladkowski decided to 
elevate Rydz-Smigly to the position of a 'second person in the state' (First Citizen) in 
November 1936, they openly circumvented it. This raised eyebrows among the few 
still politically active 'Colonels', as well as some of the more conservative Sanacja 
figures.327 Rydz-Smigly’s subsequent promotion to Marshaldom was received even 
more critically.328 Indeed, many saw it as an indication of Rydz-Smigly's appetite for 
dictatorship, or to succeed Moscicki as President.329  
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Unfortunately, the security conscious Jozef Beck did not keep a diary, and his 
wife's memoirs make no mention of the Minister's reaction to Rydz-Smigly's 
political advancement. The minister was absent from Warsaw in July 1936, when 
Moscicki's decree was publicised and later, in November, only issued a lapidary 
notice to the Polish diplomatic outposts informing them of Rydz-Smigly's promotion 
and requesting they keep the official government line when commenting on it.330 
Nevertheless, if the reaction of his friends is anything to go by, it is not hard to see 
how Rydz-Smigly's instant transformation from Major-General to Marshal in one 
day must have contributed to the growing rift between Rydz-Smigly and a Beck who 
saw himself as the keeper of Pilsudski's flame.  
Both brothers Jedrzejewicz, as well as Slawek, criticised this elevation as tactless 
and illustrative of negative changes in Rydz-Smigly's character. Indeed, it was 
around this time that Rydz-Smigly apparently stared alluding to his own strategic 
genius. 331  A process that would result in, to quote Cat-Mackiewicz’s slightly 
exaggerated view, the creation of ‘a false idol so incapable that he had to be pushed 
around in a cart-wheel.’332 In the end Janusz Jedrzejewicz refused to attend Rydz-
Smigly's promotion ceremony and Slawek was tempted not to do so either.  
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Indeed, Rydz-Smigly's 'usurping' of Pilsudski's title was likely at the heart of the 
tense atmosphere that existed between Beck and Rydz-Smigly in 1937 and which 
eventually prompted the Minister to visit the General Inspectorate with a 'peace 
offering'. In the sceptical Beck's own words: '[both men] shook hands and agreed to 
better coordinate the work of their respective institutions.'333 Nevertheless, Beck’s 
refusal to join the new Oboz Zjednoczenia Narodowego party (OZN) that Rydz-
Smigly created in place of Slawek's dissolved BBWR (cross-party pro-government 
bloc) spoke rather more loudly. 
 
The elite's mood following Rydz-Smigly’s promotion to General Inspector could 
be described as 'out with the old, in with the new' and some of the most prominent 
post-May politicians would find themselves facing a very different and quite rude 
individual instead of the warm and polite Rydz-Smigly they were used to.334 Beck 
for one, seems to have been rather put out by the brutality with which Rydz-Smigly 
shut former Premier Slawek out of politics. Indeed, he was the only key political 
figure who still had close contact with Slawek and those associated with him. In his 
memoir, Waclaw Jedrzejewicz emphasises that the Becks were the only ones who 
still kept the Jedrzejewiczes on their invitation list and thus provided a link with the 
political world.335 Moreover, Beck still sought Slawek's council, but he took care to 
be secretive about those meetings. Count Szembek recalls that on occasion when one 
November 1935 evening, he went to Beck's apartment to brief the minister about the 
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Economics Committee meeting he had just attended. Upon arrival, he was told by 
the servant that the minister had been dining with Slawek and that they are still 
talking. Still, Beck himself tried to conceal Slawek's presence, insisting on seeing his 
Deputy in the hallway, and failing to mention the former Prime minister's name.336  
Lacking a protector and uncertain about Pilsudski's successor, Beck's weakening 
position opposite Moscicki and Rydz-Smigly quickly became apparent. Owing to the 
shake-up that followed Pilsudski’s death, Moscicki was able to decide on the new 
government on his own, and although Beck's (and Rydz-Smigly's) opposition to 
Kwiatkowski becoming Finance Minister was noted, the minister failed in his 
attempt to bloc Kwiatkowski's nomination.337 Just twelve months later, the President 
and newly dominant General Inspector of the Armed Forces would successfully 
restrict Beck's ability to participate in the formation of Poland's internal and financial 
policies. When in September 1936 Beck found himself in Geneva during the 
devaluation of the Swiss and French francs, and tentatively requested that the 
planned meeting on currency and financial matters be postponed until his return, 
Skladkowski the current Premier and Rydz-Smigly's protégé, refused.338  
*** 
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As we have mentioned before, Pilsudski's death was greeted in Paris with hope of 
Beck's speedy departure.339 Many in the Quai d'Orsay, as well as the French 
Ambassador to Warsaw, Leon Noel, despised Beck, who had frequently frustrated 
their plans in Eastern Europe.340 One of the many ways in which this manifested 
itself was by criticizing the Minister in the French press and attacking him in 
Geneva.341 The feeling was, of course, mutual. Nowhere did it manifest itself more 
than in the difference in tone and character between Beck's communications with the 
British and those with the French. The diplomatic notes delivered to the Foreign 
Office and Quai d'Orsay on 21 September 1938 are perfect examples. Writing to 
London, Beck was firm but polite in his insistence that Polish territorial demands be 
treated equally with those of other states. In his communiqué to Paris, he dropped the 
frills and expressed his lack of confidence in France’s ability to deal with the 
crisis.342 However, even before that bristling exchange of notes, Noel orchestrated an 
attempt to by-pass Beck. Following Minister Pierre Laval's May 1935 visit to 
Poland, Beck tried to organise a return visit to Paris in early 1936 but the French 
discouraged it.343 Instead, taking advantage of the Minister's absence on League 
business in Geneva, Quai d'Orsay decided, in August 1936, to send another high-
ranking official, General Maurice Gamelin, to Warsaw.344 It was either during this 
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visit or immediately after that general Rydz-Smigly received a preliminary invitation 
to Paris. And although there exists some confusion about where the French invitation 
originated from – whether it came from Noel, who was trying to exploit the rivalry 
between Beck and Rydz-Smigly or, as argued by Lukaszewicz the Polish 
Ambassador and minister Szembek, directly from Paris – what is clear was that this 
was the first time when Rydz-Smigly emerged as a truly alternative foreign policy 
decision-maker. Not only did he know about the invitation (through the General 
Staff) before the Foreign Ministry did, he also accepted it before discussing the 
details with either Beck or Szembek.345  
 
As we have seen before, Rydz-Smigly's propulsion into the centre of Polish 
political stage gave rise to much speculation that by the sheer virtue of being a 
supporter of a closer Franco-Polish alliance, he would be able to 'correct' Beck's pro-
Berlin line. However, while his sentiments were shared by the majority of the public 
that did not approve of Beck's apparent policy of intimacy with Hitler; this might 
have not been true of the Armed Forces. Indeed, in his annual report on the state of 
the Polish Army in 1934, ambassador Kennard stressed the anti-Gallic bias among 
the officer corps.346 What is more, the absence of French acknowledgement of the 
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Polish readiness to carry out her allied obligations following the German re-
militarisation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, did nothing to endear Paris to the 
Polish army. Even Rydz-Smigly was reportedly very put off.347 
Nevertheless, despite Polish political and military elites' usual preoccupation with 
real or imaginary offence and Rydz-Smigly's record of holding grudges (see page 
133), the French slight did not cause Rydz-Smigly to change his mind.348 He literally 
could not afford to. As one of the key decision makers, Rydz-Smigly was very much 
aware of the dire financial situation Poland found herself in. As far back as 
November 1935, having just undergone complex negotiations with the Hague, the 
Polish Military Command had to withdraw the majority of their submarine order due 
to financial problems.349 A further example of the dire financial situation of the 
Polish Army was the decision taken in July 1936 to cut-back on the air-force 
building plan due to its cost:  1,153,000,000 zlotys.350  
Bearing this in mind, one can argue that Rydz-Smigly came to view a Franco-
Polish rapprochement as the only way to strengthen Poland's diplomatic position vis-
a-vis Germany, which he mistrusted, while also improving her own defence, as he 
believed the cooperation would eventually yield military credits from Paris. Indeed, 
when Count Szembek expressed to Rydz-Smigly scepticism about the likelihood of 
obtaining credits, the general replied that he was being constantly asked by French 
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agents to make such an agreement.351 During the same conversation, Rydz-Smigly 
asserted that while he did not want to radically change the Polish foreign policy and 
saw the policy of rapprochement with Germany as currently necessary, he was wary 
of Berlin and believed that the Nazis might attack Poland in the next two to three 
years if they reached combat readiness. When confronted with one of Beck's main 
arguments for the Polish-German détente, namely that Hitler was not a Prussian and 
was, therefore, more interested in southward rather than eastward expansion; Rydz-
Smigly remained unconvinced. He cited the heavy fortifications in East Prussia and 
the possibility that the unfortified Silesia was meant to act as a 'gate' for future 
German attack, in his support.352 
 
On 30 August 1936, Rydz-Smigly duly arrived on the Seine. There, focused on 
his goal of obtaining credits, Rydz-Smigly remained unmoved by the allusions to a 
possible Polish-Soviet-Czech cooperation made to him by general Gamelin.353 He 
declined to get involved in political negotiations and advised his counterpart to 
present such initiatives to the Polish government through proper diplomatic 
channels.354  
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Following its feeble attempt to broker a Polish-Czechoslovak détente, the Quai, 
now aware of Rydz-Smigly's attitude to foreign interference in internal Polish 
affairs, did not try to openly undermine Beck again.355 Instead, it agreed to give 
Warsaw an armaments loan, knowing that the mere fact that Rydz-Smigly's first 
foray into diplomacy would be seen as a great success would deliver a blow to the 
Foreign Minister's internal position. Paris had also correctly guessed that the 
general's burnished reputation would diminish the Minister's standing in Rydz-
Smigly's eyes and encourage the newly powerful and ambitious general to become 
more involved in Poland's foreign relations.  
Thus, on 6 September 1936, Gamelin and Rydz-Smigly concluded the Treaty of 
Rambouillet that apart from renewing the Franco-Polish alliances of 1921 and 1925 
also granted Poland an armaments loan of 2 billion francs. Rydz-Smigly returned to 
Warsaw basking in the glory of his easy diplomatic success and his choice to come 
back through Venice and Vienna, unlike Beck who usually returned from Western 
Europe via Berlin, indicated that he was usurping at least some power over Polish 
foreign relations. Rydz-Smigly was trying to strengthen the Franco-Polish alliance 
and purposefully gave Berlin the cold shoulder. All that was left to the Foreign 
Minister was to desperately try to reassure Germany that Poland was not going to 
drastically change her foreign-policy line. 356  And while Beck might not have 
explicitly expressed his displeasure at Rydz-Smigly's arbitrary act, his attitude to the 
visit was clearly disapproving. He repeatedly emphasised the military, as opposed to 
                                                            
355 In his communication with Quai d'Orsay prior to Rydz-Smigly's visit, Ambassador Noel (possibly 
acting on an inspiration from general Wladyslaw Sikorski) suggested that France should make any 
potential loans to Poland, conditional on a cabinet reshuffle and the removal of Beck.  See Piotr 
Wandycz and Anna Cienciala, 'Polonia Restituta – czyli Noel Redivivus' ['Poland reborn – or Noel 
revived'], Zeszyty Historyczne, 72, (1985), 150. 
356 Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Diplomat in Paris, 1936-1939: Papers and Memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz, 
Ambassador of Poland,  (New York, 1970), 13. 
 135 
political, character of the visit and presented his own visit to London as of much 
greater importance.357 Moreover, the Minister also clearly resented Rydz-Smigly's 
attempts to capitalise on his Parisian success and even complained to Premier 
Skladkowski that the public should fête Rydz-Smigly's return from military games 
not Paris.358 This sentiment was also obvious to ambassador Kennard who reported: 
One wonders what M. Beck's real feelings on the subject may be. In 
conversation with me he has expressed a rather reserved enthusiasm for 
the success which has attended these negotiations and he was the first to 
welcome the general on his return from Paris. There are rumours that 
one of the results of the visit will be an early reconstruction of the 
Government involving a change at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such 
talk, however, has been heard so often in the past that one is disinclined 
to place much credence in it...359 
*** 
 
A Rydzelite - quarter-totalitarianism360 
One of Beck's predecessors in the Foreign Ministry, Kajetan Morawski, described 
the situation in Poland after Pilsudski's death as 'a dictatorship of multiple dictators' 
with Beck being the sole architect and decision-maker responsible for Polish foreign 
policy while Rydz-Smigly was the military and national defence chief.361 Yet the 
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evidence from the archives and the diaries reviewed in this chapter shows that that 
division was not quite as clear cut. The success of Rydz-Smigly's self-promotion 
efforts – Marshaldom, forming his own political party and eagerness to participate in 
political rallies362 - is reflected in the dozens of letters Rydz-Smigly received from 
members of the public and institutions. He certainly managed to carve himself out a 
special position within the society and, revered by the public as Pilsudski's 
successor, they wrote to him about matters that fell outside his remit: such as reform 
of the state and political system. 363  Interestingly, a fair proportion of the 
correspondence indirectly appealed to Rydz-Smigly’s vanity and complained about 
the inadequacy of the other leaders, most notably president Moscicki and Prime 
Minister Skladkowski. Even though Cat-Mackiewicz one of the general's 
contemporaries described Rydz-Smigly in less favourable terms, as 'having no idea 
about political or diplomatic matters. […] [H]e was as naive about them as a 
newborn baby or a middle sized calf. He didn't like or trust Germany, he didn't like 
or trust Beck, he didn't even want to consider talking to the Soviets...”364 That the 
general appeared to be quite open about his foreign policy beliefs demonstrates 
Rydz-Smigly's encroachment into up to then Beck's sole domain.   
We saw that Rydz-Smigly's first foray into diplomacy and the successful 
conclusion of the Treaty of Rambouillet with France was the culmination of a 
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gradual process. Rydz-Smigly began his insinuation into foreign policy by actively 
participating in organising Polish official delegations in his capacity as Head of the 
Army. First, he attempted to veto the suggestion to send General Sosnkowski to the 
funeral of King George V. At the time he was persuaded to do otherwise by Beck 
who had already agreed the matter with ambassador Raczynski and Anthony Eden, 
the Foreign Secretary. Barely a year later, Rydz-Smigly appeared a lot more 
'decisive' in his opposition to sending General Regulski to the funeral of Hungarian 
Prime Minister Goemboes. In this case too, the Hungarian authorities had already 
been notified about Regulski's arrival, but during a squabble between the Ministry of 
War and the General Staff, Rydz-Smigly intervened on behalf of the Staff, Regulski 
was dropped from the delegation and the Foreign Ministry was left to pick up the 
pieces.365 By the autumn of 1936, Rydz-Smigly 's position had become so strong that 
he started intervening in Foreign Ministry's staffing decisions and had successfully 
blocked Beck's decision to post Waclaw Jedrzejewicz to Tokyo. 366  A former 
Education Minister, Jedrzejewicz had experience in working in both the Foreign 
Office and Intelligence Service and was a Japanese-speaker, so Rydz-Smigly's 
motives for striking down his candidature are not clear while Beck was obviously 
quite embarrassed and annoyed about the situation.367 So much so, that he never 
again mentioned his offer to Jedrzejewicz, who only found out about Rydz-Smigly's 
opposition from the Ambassador to Paris, Lukasiewicz. Given that soon after those 
events, Rydz-Smigly forced Jedrzejewicz to resign from his post at the Polish 
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Telephones Agency, one could infer that the General was either avenging some past 
feud, or determined to eliminate old Pilsudskites from public affairs. Jedrzejewicz 
himself seems to believe that Rydz-Smigly was under the influence of a group of 
disgruntled officers who felt that they were excluded during the last years of 
Pilsudski's life.368 Soon, the new Marshal would became the person who would 
reprimand Ambassador Wieniawa for not paying him a visit during his stay in 
Warsaw and irritably state that 'nothing in this country could happen without my 
knowledge.’369 
 
As for Beck himself, the Minister had, despite persistent rumours to the contrary, 
managed to survive in his post not just through the brief period of Koscialkowski 
government but up until the very end. Some have even seen Beck's invitation to join 
the cabinet of Koscialkowski's successor Skladkowski as indicative of the 
strengthening of the Foreign Minister's domestic position.370 However, this was 
actually symptomatic of precisely the opposite. Despite his apparent dislike of Beck 
and distrust of Germany, Rydz-Smigly had no intention of severing all contacts with 
Berlin.371 He alluded to this a number of times and had even explained to general 
Gamelin that Beck could not be removed from office due to his good contacts with 
Hitler's entourage. Moreover, the policy of rapprochement between Warsaw and 
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Berlin was buying Poland time, presumably, to prepare for the inevitable future 
confrontation with Germany.372  
 Rydz-Smigly therefore found himself somewhat stuck with Beck in the Foreign 
Ministry. Although he became increasingly involved in all other Polish diplomatic 
matters he initially shied away from the Polish-German relations. In conversations 
with his contemporaries he appeared, and indeed sometimes admitted, to not 
knowing a great deal about the Polish-German relationship and was rather reluctant 
to establish contacts with German political figures. Indeed, the German Ambassador 
von Moltke had even complained, in Autumn 1936, that Rydz-Smigly seemed to be 
avoiding him. 373 
 
This chapter focused on the growing conflict between Marshal Rydz-Smigly and 
Minister Beck.  Rydz-Smigly 's persistent efforts to exert his authority over Beck 
eventually allowed him to have a decisive say in all but one foreign policy matter. 
The day-to-day conduct of Polish-German diplomatic relations remained solely 
Beck's domain and one whose independence he would guard fiercely. The following 
chapters will show how this small personal conflict among a tightly knit elite had a 
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Chapter Four: 1937 – too damn quiet? 
 
Approaching Polish history from a pan-European perspective, one might find 
oneself drawing a blank in 1937. Unlike its predecessor, 1937 saw no public 
declarations of Warsaw's support for a France humiliated by the remilitarisation of 
the Rhineland. Neither did it witness the stirring ultimatum directed at Lithuania or 
invited popular outrage at the unceremonious partitioning of Czechoslovakia as it did 
in 1938. Indeed, Polish squabbles with the Senate of the Free City of Danzig, an 
exchange with Berlin of declarations on minority rights and attempts to strengthen 
peripheral Balkan alliances would have hardly attracted much attention in a year 
when a proxy war on the Iberian Peninsula was fought between Europe's fascist and 
communist powers and a Sino-Japanese conflict raged in the Far East. Unlike the 
British coronation, the French general strike or the Irish constitution, nothing 
happened in Poland that would even briefly propel the country to the world's front-
pages.  
 
And yet, it would be a mistake to think of 1937 as the year that nothing politically 
significant happened. Far from abating, the internal conflict, the emergence of which 
I charted in the previous chapter, intensified, prompting the British Ambassador to 
bemoan the obscurity and complexity of the Polish contemporary political scene.374 
The Foreign Office's recipients of his dispatches were even more blunt. One of them, 
Third Secretary, Patrick Hancock, even remarked that the Sanacja regime was 
'disintegrating' and thought Rydz-Smigly 'manifestly incapable of carrying on 
                                                            
374  Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 2 Nov. 1937, TNA, C76292455, FO 371/20760.  
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Pilsudski's work.'375 The perceived stillbirth of Rydz-Smigly's political initiative: the 
Camp of National Unity (OZN), being the reason for such a damning assessment.  
 
The OZN's emergence might have been the most obvious sign of the increasing 
fragmentation of the Polish political scene, but it was far from unique. Corridors, 
drawing rooms and cafés of power buzzed as conflicts were stoked, new factions 
formed and old alliances splintered. The conflict central to my thesis, between the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Jozef Beck and the newly minted Marshal Edward Rydz-
Smigly, was no exception and of critical importance.  
In the first part of this chapter I will follow its progress through the petty crises of 
Poland's 1937 domestic politics. This will allow me to show, in the later part of this 
chapter, that the seemingly quiet and nondescript year of 1937 determined Poland's 
behaviour during the pivotal moments of 1938. 
*** 
 
Strong, ready and collected376 
In a retrospective piece for Gazeta Polska written in the last days of 1936, 
Boguslaw Miedzinski remarked that, structurally, the Sanacja regime had completely 
decomposed.377 One of the first signs of this decomposition was, as we saw in the 
last chapter, the dissolution of Sanacja's parliamentary grouping – the Non-Party 
                                                            
375  Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 2 Nov. 1937, TNA, C76292455, FO 371/20760. 
376 One of the slogans used by official Polish propaganda (posters, leaflets, etc) in the run up to the 
Second World War. Also used in the title of Jacek Majchrowski's book about OZN's ideology. 
See, Jacek Majchrowski, Silni, zwarci i gotowi. Mysl polityczna Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego 
[Strong, ready and collected. The political thought of the Camp of National Unity], (Warszawa, 
1985). 
377 Quoted after Andrzej Garlicki, Piekne lata Trzydzieste [The beautiful Thirties], (Warszawa, 2008), 
269. 
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Bloc of Cooperation with the Government (BBWR) on 30 October 1935. Six months 
after it achieved its goal of ushering through a new constitution, its front man, 
Walery Slawek, decided that the organisation’s existence could no longer be 
justified. Sidelined from the new government, Slawek instead focused on drafting 
the programme of a new Sanacja organisation. This broader 'BBWR 2' was to be 
called Powszechna Organizacja Spoleczna, 378  focus on upholding the new 
constitution and thus be fit for Poland post-Pilsudski.  
As we already know, Rydz-Smigly thwarted Slawek's ambitious plan with a few 
lines of his scraggly writing. This did not of course mean that Rydz-Smigly 
disagreed with the principle that Pilsudski’s death required some political 
readjustments from the regime; indeed, he had already floated the idea of uniting the 
Polish society under the banner of national defence during the Annual Congress of 
the Legionaries' Associations in May 1936, and in July of the same year, he asked 
Colonel Adam Koc to help him set up a new political group, the OZN.379 The chief 
difference in programme between Slawek's and Rydz-Smigly's organisations was 
that the latter did not make explicit references to the constitution’s authority. Instead, 
the Camp of National Unity fancied itself a direct successor of the BBWR's Jozef 
Pilsudski cult. But, its gushing assessment of the First Marshal's 'great qualities and 
intuitive capacity for taking wise decisions in state affairs,'380 hid an important 
caveat, namely that now that Pilsudski was dead his posthumous authority would 
                                                            
378 The name could be translated as an Organisation for the Whole of the Society. 
379 National defense and 'driving the will of the people' were the central themes of Rydz-Smigly's 
rapturously received speech. 'Przemowienie Naczelnego Wodza' ['Commander's in Chief Speech'], 
Gazeta Lwowska, 26 May 1936, 1.     
380 A report from his conversation wit Adam Koc, British Ambassador Kennard, is particularly useful 
in shedding some light on the rationale and strategy behind the creation of the OZN. Howard 
Kennard's report from his conversation with Adam Koc. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in 
Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 24 Dec. 1936, TNA, C 242455, FO 
371/20759.  
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legitimise the government 'promptly' taking 'whatever action was considered 
necessary in the State's interest.'381 In other words, the OZN wanted Poland to 
become an altogether more authoritarian state.  
 
And, despite the OZN's apparent abhorrence of both Communism and Fascism 
and Koc's insistence that Warsaw was purely trying to match the speedy decision-
making of totalitarian Berlin and Moscow, as time went on one could not help but 
distrust its assurances that it did not aim to bring the Polish system closer to those of 
its Eastern and Western neighbours.382 Preaching national unity and cross-party 
cooperation, the OZN was nonetheless reluctant to admit Jewish members and 
unwilling to lift the controversial electoral laws that discriminated against young 
voters.383 Another way in which the Camp wanted to differentiate itself from the 
dominant movements in Italy, Germany and the USSR was its denunciation of the 
'Furher' principle. The OZN's Head and creator, Marshal Rydz-Smigly was to only 
serve as a 'moral leader [of the movement], an impartial [sic!] arbiter.'384  
 
Although intended to be very quick, in the end the process of OZN's development 
took nearly a year. Koc's right-wing leanings made his initial programme declaration 
                                                            
381 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 24 Dec. 1936, TNA, C242455, FO 371/20759. 
382 Ibid.  
383 The April 1935 Constitution excluded younger people from participating in politics. Voting age 
was increased to 24 from 18 years and a minimum age limit of 30 was introduced for 
parliamentary candidates. Full text of the Constitution can be found in Dziennik Ustaw, issue no. 
30 (1935), position 227, 497-508. The regulation was denounced by all parties of the Polish 
opposition who boycotted the parliamentary debate on the new law. Their absence was exploited 
by the Speaker of the Sejm, Stanislaw Car, who called a surprise vote to adopt the new 
constitution. Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918-1939, (New York, 1982), 
336-337. 
384 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 24 Dec. 1936, TNA, C242455, FO 371/20759. 
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so unpalatable that it had to be completely rewritten. By the time the Colonel 
completed his second draft Rydz-Smigly fell ill. So it was already 1937 when, two 
surgical operations and a convalescence period later, he finally approved the final 
programme proposal.385 The failure of the project could be directly linked to this 
delay. It allowed the peasants' Polish People's Party (PSL) to get one step ahead and 
steal the OZN's thunder by issuing a call for a version of national unity of their 
own.386 Worse, it permitted many 'old Pilsudskites' to close ranks and resist the 
movement. The controversy surrounding the annual Legionaries' Congress held on 8 
August 1937 in Krakow illustrates this growing dissent.387  
Although held under the auspices of the new Marshal, Edward Rydz-Smigly, and 
officially hosted by Colonel Koc, the Congress always was, as we already know 
from a previous chapter, something more than a reunion of old comrades in arms.388 
It was the Sanacja equivalent of a party conference. An event where policies could 
be floated, stands could be taken, new initiatives launched.389 For the event to be 
shunned by regime grandees was unheard of and yet that was precisely what, the 
former Prime Minister Walery Slawek, the serving Speaker of the Senate Aleksander 
                                                            
385 Edward Rydz-Smigly suffered first from angina and then from appendicitis. Howard Kennard, 
British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 24 Dec. 1936, 
TNA, C242455, FO 371/20759. 
386 OZN's unique cross-partisanship was one of its key 'selling' points so PSL's public declaration 
dealt a serious blow to the initiative. Howard Kennard, Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, 
Foreign Secretary in London, 26 Jan. 1937, TNA, C7612455, FO 371/20759. 
387 The General Congress of Legionary Associations. 
388 Adam Koc officially became the Commandant of the new Legionaries' Association on 25 May 
1936.  The new Association emerged from an amalgamation of the Legionaries Association 
(headed until May 25 by Walery Slawek) and the Regimental Circles (Kola Pulkowe) headed by 
Edward Rydz-Smigly. Gazeta Lwowska after PAT (Polish Telegraphic Agency), (129), 25 May 
1937, 1. 
389 For example, Edward Rydz-Smigly first floated his plans for the OZN during the 1936 Delegates' 
Congress held in Warsaw 
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Prystor and one of the most senior of Polish generals Kazimierz Sosnkowski, did in 
August 1937.390  
Considering the sensational rumours circulating among Warsaw's high society 
prior to the event, a no-show looked like a rather tame protest. People had reportedly 
been expecting arrests and a demonstration against Colonel Koc.391 A few weeks 
before the Congress, on 19 July 1937, Pilsudski's former chief of security, major 
Kazimierz Kaciukiewicz telephoned the Chief of Police Zamorski with ‘worrying 
intelligence’ and the Congress organisers even cancelled a remembrance march to 
the newly completed Pilsudski Mound.392 But, while unobtrusive, Slawek's and 
Pilsudstkite 'old guard's' absence was no less damning to Rydz-Smigly than a mass 
rally would have been – a sign that the regime was well and truly split.  
 
Despite his pro-Slawek sympathies, Beck's position in the government made it 
difficult for him to openly criticise the Camp of National Unity. Accidentally, 
although rather conveniently, the Minister was absent from Warsaw when the OZN 
was finally launched. Just as Rydz-Smigly was recovering from his illness, Beck 
succumbed to the flu, which spurred a relapse of his lung condition. To restore his 
ailing health he spent the next two months in the South of France where he missed 
                                                            
390 Arthur Francis Aveling, Counselor in the British Embassy in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Leader 
of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal in London, 11 Aug. 1937, TNA, C58872455, FO 
371/20759. 
 Considering Sosnkowski's long-standing support for the idea of reconciliation with the opposition, 
his snub of the OZN was particularly damning.  
391 Arthur Francis Aveling, Counselor in the British Embassy in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Leader 
of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal in London, 25 Aug.1937, TNA, C 61152455, FO 
371/20759. 
392 Kordian Zamorski, Dzienniki (1930 – 1938) [Diary (1930-1938)], (Warszawa, 2011), 402; Arthur 
Francis Aveling, Counselor in the British Embassy in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Leader of the 
House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal in London,  25 Aug. 1937, TNA, C 61152455, FO 
371/20759. 
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the launch of Rydz-Smigly's initiative and after delaying his decision to join he 
eventually chose not to become a member. This, according to people close to Beck, 
added to the animosity between the Minister and Rydz-Smigly and made the 
former's work more difficult.393 
 
In the previous chapter we already mentioned that Beck's autonomy was under 
increasing pressure. However, as the last of 'the Colonels' with any real power, he 
alone was in a position to take steps to slow down the erosion of Pilsudskite 
ideology. One of such steps was to keep Rydz-Smigly away from the Polish-German 
relations, a task which became more strenuous with every passing month. The 
bilateral minority and Danzig negotiations, which will be covered later in this 
chapter, show how the pressure mounted on Beck as Berlin tried to bypass the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry and communicate directly with the Marshal. Rydz-Smigly, 
meanwhile, had become confident enough to publicise his own foreign policy 
doctrine.  
 
One particular example of this occurred in April 1937, shortly after Easter. Kurjer 
Poranny, one of the two main pro-regime dailies, which had by then became closely 
associated with Colonel Koc and the OZN, published a hardline article in which 
stated that Poland would never agree to the changes to the Danzig's constitution 
proposed by the local Nazi party. The Foreign Affairs Ministry, which wanted a 
                                                            
393 Tadeusz Schaetzel, former colonel and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm in London, to Wladyslaw 
Pobog-Malinowski, historian in Geneva, undated. The letter concerned possible editing of or 
excluding from print parts of Beck's manuscript describing the internal situation in Poland. Jozef 
Pilsudski Institute of America (thereafter JPIoA), Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
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peaceful resolution of the matter was understandably displeased with this 
unprecedented and disruptive interference.394  
Such a blatant appeal to the Poles' nationalist sentiments was symptomatic of the 
OZN's determination to collaborate with (some) of the National Democrats, a move 
that would have been opposed by Beck on two levels.  
Beck as 'Minister' disliked it on the grounds that it made his work of maintaining 
good Polish-German relations harder. The aforementioned article in the Kurjer 
earned a strong-worded response in the Free City's Danziger Verposten. Indeed, as 
spats multiplied and each side responded in a 'tit-for-tat' 395  to the other's 
provocations, minor issues grew out of proportions and Beck's pro-German stance 
became harder to justify at home.  
Beck as 'Colonel' was naturally aggrieved by the marginalisation of his friends 
and long-term colleagues by Rydz-Smigly, but, more importantly, he disagreed with 
the OZN's now obvious diversion from the old Pilsudskite policy doctrine. Indeed, in 
his memoir, Beck bemoaned both the Camp's nationalism – which he thought 
manifested through ‘grand colonial plans’ and growing anti-Semitism, and the 
‘skewing of the principles of the regime’.396 
 
                                                            
394 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 7 Apr. 1937, TNA, C 270855, FO371/20757. 
395  Examples of this ranged from relatively mild: repeated mutual confiscation of the Polish daily 
Dziennik Baltycki in the Free City and Danzig's Danziger Verposten in Gdynia to regular clashes 
between the Polish and German inhabitants of East Prussia. See for example, Howard Kennard, 
British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 3 Nov. 1937, 
TNA, C 7631555, FO371/20758 and Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to 
Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 16 Nov. 1937, TNA, C 7966555, FO371/20759. 
396 Although the Minister did not specifically mention the OZN, both the time, autumn 1937, and the 
context suggest that the fledgling organisation was Beck's target.  Wspomnienia [Memoir] 
(manuscript in Polish),  141. Kolekcja Jozefa Becka, Zes. 034/7. 
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The National Democrats were not Rydz-Smigly’s first choice of partner. He 
originally attempted to win over the largest social group397 - the peasants.398 But the 
fiasco of his already mentioned June 1936 visit to a peasant rally in Nowosielce and 
the SL's January 1937 competing call for national unity left no doubt that the peasant 
party was not interested in propping up the regime without receiving significant 
concessions in return.399 Chief among them were demands for an amnesty and the 
right of safe return for its exiled leaders.400 This was naturally not granted. Indeed, 
the regime wanted the Opposition leaders to stay away and, as we will see further in 
this chapter, Prague's sheltering of the exiles further soured the already poor Polish-
Czechoslovak relations.  
Thus, by mid-1937 the idea of sharing a platform with the SL was discarded. A 
botched attempt on Adam Koc's life on 20 July 1937 (the bomb exploded 
prematurely, killing the assassin) saw some members of the OZN trying to lay the 
blame on the peasants' movement.401 The episode remains a mystery but even at the 
                                                            
397  According to official statistical data from 1938, approximately 70% of the Polish population lived 
in rural areas and 60% of Poles lived of the land. (Glowny Urzad Statystyczny [National Office of 
Statistics], Maly Rocznik Statystyczny [Concise Statistical Yearbook] (Warszawa, 1938), 473). 
And while support for the Peasants' (People's) Party (SL) was spread unevenly – peasants from the 
former Prussian partition leaned to the right and Dmowski's National Democrats – it had the 
support of the majority of the Polish peasant population. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in 
London, to the Foreign Office in London, Annual Report on Poland for 1937, TNA, C83542455, 
FO 371/20760. 
398 Meaning both support of the rural population and cooperation of their People's Party (SL). 
399 See page 132. 
400 Two years into the first post May Coup Parliament, in August 1930, the Pilsudskite regime 
dissolved the government and called a snap election for November. Two months before the 
election, in September 1930, fifteen leaders of the opposition parties, (including PSL's former 
three-time Premier Wincenty Witos) were accused of treason, arrested and confined in the Brest 
Litovsk fortress. After a series of political trials during which they were sentenced to between 3 
years and 18 months of imprisonment, several of the opposition figures including Witos went into 
exile. A detailed account of the trial can be found in Garlicki, 'Brzesc', Piekne lata trzydzieste,  
103-176. See also, Norman Davies, God's Playground: A history of Poland, Vol. 2, (Oxford, 
2005), 313-314; W. J. Rose, 'Wincenty Witos', The Slavonic and East European Review, 25 (64), 
(November 1946), 50-52 and Adam Ordega, 'Herman Liberman', The Slavonic and East European 
Review, 23 (62), (January 1945), 148. 
401 According to Pilsudskite historian, Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, following the attack the 
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time, the peasant connection seemed unlikely to many Sanacja figures and 
commentators. The Chief of Police, Zamorski, focused on the assassin's 'French 
connections', possibly implying that he suspected General Wladyslaw Sikorski and 
other opposition figures associated in his Front Morges alliance, while Prime 
Minister Skladkowski blamed Sanacja's left-wingers led by Henryk Kawecki and the 
deputy Interior Minister Jerzy Paciorkowski.402 On this rare occasion, even the 
publicist Cat-Mackiewicz agreed with Skladkowski. 
 
Soon, the peasants' General Strike called on 16 August would leave the OZN's 
leaders seething and make reconciliation neigh impossible.403 By then, however, 
Rydz-Smigly and Koc already made the highly controversial decision we alluded to 
earlier and invited a radical, and previously de-legalised, faction of the National 
Democratic movement to join their Camp.  
                                                                                                                                                                        
unlucky bomb was traced back to the local locksmith from the assassin's village. Questioned, the 
locksmith allegedly incriminated peasant leaders Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and Stanislaw Kot. After 
Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza Historia Polityczna Polski [The Modern Political 
History of Poland], vol. 2, (London, 1956), 527; Rydz-Smigly's biographer Ryszard Mirowicz 
also suspected that the attack was an anti-opposition provocation organised by people close to the 
marshal. Ryszard Mirowicz, Edward Rydz-Smigly. Dzialalnosc wojskowa i polityczna [Edward 
Rydz-Smigly and his political and military activity], (Warszawa, 1988), 137. 
402 Zamorski, Dzienniki,  402. 
403 The strike went on for 10 days, until 25 August and involved cutting off food supplies to towns 
and cities. Armed peasant 'militias' enforced the bans with road blockades and violence. The state 
responded by throwing numbers at the problem and with equal brutality. The overall reported 
peasant death toll was 40+. Szembek's contemporary account talks about 41 victims: Jozef 
Zaranski, (ed.), Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka [Diary and Papers of Jan Szembek], vol.3, 
(London, 1969), 355. Most history texts, however, talk about 44 dead. See for example: Ludwik 
Malinowski, Politycy II Rzeczpospolitej. Sluzba i zycie prywatne [Politicians of the Second 
Republic. Their service and private lives], Vol. 2, (Torun, 1995), 124. 
 However, repressions (e.g.: house searches which ended in damage and demolition) continued 
until the end of the year. Kordian Zamorski, who wanted to resign from his office as Chief of 
Police describes the events in his diary: Zamorski, Dzienniki,  403-414. For more detailed 
information about the strike refer to: Kazimierz Przybos, Jozef Hempel and  Boleslaw Deren (ed.), 
Strajk chlopski w Malopolsce w sierpniu 1937 r. [The peasants' strike in Lesser Poland, August 
1937], (Warszaawa, 1988); Wilhelmina Matuszewska and Stanislawa Leblang (ed.), Strajk 
chlopski w 1937 roku: dokumenty archiwalne [The 1937 peasants' strike: A review of archival 
sources], vol. 1 & 2, (Warszawa, 1960); Felicjan Slawoj-Skladkowski, Nie ostatnie slowo 
oskarzonego [The accused's one but last word], (London, 1964). 
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Until the summer of 1937, any cooperation between Pilsudskites and the National 
Democrats had been unthinkable. Indeed, to quote Sir Howard Kennard 'it [was] 
notorious that Pilsudski and his closer collaborators always hated the National 
Democrats more fiercely than any of the other political opponents and that the very 
mention of Dmowski was enough to throw the Marshal into a rage.'404 According to 
some, the rivalry between Pilsudski and Dmowski dates back to 1890s. When, upon 
his return to Vilnius, Pilsudski met, and later married, Dmowski's love interest Maria 
Juszkiewicz.405 However, the movement-wide hostility could be traced back to 
ideological differences during the struggle for Polish independence.406 It was further 
exacerbated after November 1918 when Pilsudski's seizure of control over the newly 
                                                            
404 Arthur Francis Aveling, Counselor in the British Embassy in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, 
Foreign Secretary in London, 11 Aug. 1937, TNA, C 58872455, FO 371/20757. 
405 Roman Wapinski, Roman Dmowski (Lublin, 1989), 65. 
406 Although he was an ideological opportunist, Pilsudski's vision for an independent Poland 
remained broadly unchanged throughout his life. Brought up in a very patriotic household, the 
future Marshal was inspired by Polish history and armed struggle for independence. He held a 
romanticised vision of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which, he believed, could be 
reconstructed in the form of the Intermarium (Miedzymorze). A Polish-led federation stretching 
from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Black Sea, and including Lithuania (and other Baltic 
states), Ukraine, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Romania. Watt, Bitter Glory, 
67-68; a detailed analysis of Pilsudskite federalist ideas can be found in Piotr Okulewicz, 
Koncepcja 'Miedzymorza' w mysli i praktyce politycznej obozu Jozefa Pilsudskiego w latach 1918-
1926, [The Concept of 'Intermarium' in the ideological thought and politics of Jozef Pilsudski's 
camp between 1918 and 1926], (Poznan, 2011). 
 In contrast to Pilsudski's bellicosity and his dream of an ethnically diverse and territorially vast 
Poland, Dmowski's proposals were much more modest. Prior to the outbreak of the First World 
War, his National Democrats' goal was Polish autonomy within the Russian Empire. After the 
outbreak of the war, while Pilsudski initially fought under the auspices of the Central Powers, 
Dmowski settled in Paris where his Polish National Committee promoted the idea of an 
independent Polish state among the Entente powers. Unlike Pilsudski's, however, Dmowski's 
Poland was to be smaller and ethnically homogeneous. Roman Wapiniski, 'Idea narodu w mysli 
spolecznej i politycznej endecji przed rokiem 1918,' ['The nation as an idea in National 
Democratic social and political thought before 1918'] in Janusz Gockowski and Andrzej Walicki, 
(ed.), Idee i koncepcje narodu w polskiej mysli politycznej czasow porozbiorowych [The concepts 
and ideas of nationhood in Polish post-partition political thought], (Warszawa, 1977), 224; 
Andrzej Walicki, The Three Traditions in Polish Patriotism and Their Contemporary Relevance, 
(Bloomington, 1988), 23-24. 
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independent Poland took the Paris based Dmowski and his Polish National 
Committee by surprise.407  
 
However, unlike their older comrades, the new generation of nationalists who 
formed the National Radical Camp (ONR-Falanga)408 were not repulsed by the 
prospect of collaboration with Old Pilsudskites.409 On 18 May 1937, one of the ONR 
leaders, Aleksander Heinrich was delighted to welcome Marshal Rydz-Smigly to the 
annual congress of the student corporation 'Arconia.'410 The hall was full to bursting. 
This traditionally national and conservative organisation had by then moved to the 
right and was dominated by militant nationalists. Thus, considering that he was not 
an 'old Arconian', Rydz-Smigly’s presence at the corporation's commers was a clear 
indication that the Camp of National Unity was extending an invitation to the 
National Democrats. The practical-minded ONR leader, twenty-two year old 
Boleslaw Piasecki, accepted this proffered hand and on 22 June 1937, OZN's youth 
organisation: the Union of Young Poland, was born. 
 
                                                            
407 Taking advantage of the absence of his chief competitor, Pilsudski bullied the Prusso- Austro-
Hungarian Regency Council into declaring him Chief of State and then forced the body's 
dissolution. This resulted in protestations and accusations of illegality from Dmowski. Davies, 
God's Playground, 286. 
408 The precise name of the organisation was the National Radical Movement (RNR) – Falanga. It 
emerged in 1935 after the ONR split into the predominantly young RNR-Falanga and an older 
ONR – ABC. However, since the amalgamation 'ONR-Falanga' is generally used to describe 
nationalist youth collaboration with the OZN in the historiography of the period, this author will 
also use this name.  
409 Indeed, despite conservative and nationalist orientation, the arrival of the OZN was greeted with 
hostility by many National Democratic circles and the party's official newspaper Warszawski 
Dziennik Narodowy [Warsaw's National Daily] published a critique of the OZN's programme 
declaration condemning the Camp's 'soft' stance on 'the Jewish problem'. Edward D. Wynot Jr., 'A 
Necessary Cruelty': The emergence of official anti-Semitism in Poland 1936-39', The American 
Historical Review, vol. 76 (4), (October 1971), 1040. 
410 Andrzej Garlicki, Piekne lata trzydzieste  [The beautiful Thirties], (Warsaw, 2008),  230; 
Photographs of the event are available in Polish National Digital Archive. NAC Zespol: Doroczny 
komers korporacji studenckiej Arconia w Warszawie, 1/N/3614/1-5. 
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Unwittingly, instead of broadening the regime's support base, cosying up to the 
National Democrats, meant that the OZN locked itself in a vicious cycle. For, as one 
Foreign Office recipient of Francis Aveling's August dispatch quickly recognised: 
'The Legionaries are unwilling to share their power with the National Democrats, 
and the stronger their unwillingness become the more Koc is forced to depend on the 
National Democrats (…).'411 Indeed, Koc's new deputy, a young National Democrat 
called Jerzy Rutkowski, who presided over the Young Poles, was allowed to openly 
question the Piludskite tradition, causing first the alienation of the pro-Sanacja youth 
and later412 forcing the resignation of Koc's Chief of Staff, a Pilsudskite, Colonel Jan 
Kowalewski.413  
Another ready consequence of the inclusion of the volatile ONR-Falanga in the 
political process was a growing fear of a violent coup among the regime's elite. The 
Falangists' were partial to violent outbursts and their chief ideologue, Boleslaw 
Piasecki, believed that a systemic change could only be ushered in in the aftermath 
of a violent 'breakthrough'.414 The panic reached its peak in late October 1937 when 
whispers about an upcoming 'St Bartholomew's Night' of Rydz-Smigly's political 
opponents swept through Warsaw like bush fire. Foreign diplomats reported that 
                                                            
411 Arthur Francis Aveling, Counselor in the British Embassy in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, 
Foreign Secretary in London, 11 Aug. 1937, TNA, C 58872455, FO 371/20759. 
412 Andrzej Micewski, 'Polish youth in the Thirties', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 4, No. 3 
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413 In protest against the regime's detente with the National Democrats, Kowalewski threatened to 
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President Moscicki, Slawek and Pilsudski's widow Aleksandra headed the alleged 
list of five hundred targeted individuals. The sense of hysteria that night is conveyed 
in the diary of the Chief of Police Kordian Zamorski, which records a flurry of 
contradicting reports.  Some warned him that 40.000 'Young Poles' were receiving 
illicit paramilitary training while others accused him of overseeing it.415 In the end, 
the coup did not materialise and no documents have been discovered that would 
confirm that the OZN did indeed plan to violently overthrow the regime.  
What is certain, however, is that before leaving on his official visit to Romania,416 
Marshal Rydz-Smigly confronted President Moscicki and demanded the dismissal of 
the current Skladkowski cabinet. Sources are not unanimous in identifying the 
proposed new Prime Minister, but considering that his proposed replacements were 
Justice Minister Grabowski or Military Affairs Minister Kasprzycki, one could be 
certain that the new government would have been a more hardline one.417 To escape 
the pressure, Moscicki feigned illness and left Warsaw. And while the coup never 
materialised, it did nevertheless slightly damage Rydz-Smigly's reputation. Thus, it 
was presumably on Rydz-Smigly's strict instructions that Koc publicly disassociated 
the Camp from the Falangists as soon as the marshal returned home from Bucharest 
                                                            
415 Zamorski, Dzienniki, 430-434. 
416 Edward Rydz-Smigly visited Romania between 24 and 27 October 1937. 
417 According to Tadeusz Jedruszczak, Grabowski believed in the disposal of political opponents, de-
legalising the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), appropriation of Jewish property and an introduction of 
a Polish version of the Nuremberg Laws. Tadeusz Jedruszczak, Pilsudczycy bez Pilsudskiego: 
Powstanie Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego w 1937 roku [The Pilsudskites without Pilsudski: 
The Raise of the Camp of National Unity in 1937], (Warszawa, 1963), 197. British dispatches, 
which pointed to Kasprzycki as Skladkowski's replacement also noted that Polish diplomats 
suggested that Poland's possible new regime would be 'strong'. Howard Kennard, British 
Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 2 Nov. 1937, TNA, C 
76292455, FO 371/20760; also William Strang's memo on the cover page of the above cited 
document. 
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on 27 October 1937. The Colonel would himself be pushed out at the end of the year 
and replaced by the reportedly more placid General Stanislaw Skwarczynski.  
 
Earlier, we mentioned the opinions of Beck's contemporaries who indicated that 
the minister struggled to come to terms with the OZN and Rydz-Smigly’s attempts 
to dismantle the Pilsudskite Sanacja. The brief overview of the Camp's activity 
showed the reader that Beck was not only right but also not alone in decrying the 
increasing importance of militant nationalism and anti-Semitism which came to 
dominate the political discourse in Poland. As an old Pilsudskite, it is unlikely that 
the Minister would ever find cooperation with the National Democrats justified and 
the fact that its aim was to further weaken the likes of Slawek must have made it 
even harder. But, judging by his reaction, nothing could have set Beck any more 
against the OZN and raised his suspicions of Rydz-Smigly than the seemingly trivial 
matter of Pilsudski's coffin. 
 
On 23 June 1937, incensed by the endless crowds trampling over his church, the 
archbishop prince Adam Sapieha - bishop of Krakow and deacon of the Wawel 
cathedral - unilaterally decided to move Jozef Pilsudski's coffin from its temporary 
resting place in St Leonard's crypt to the remodeled Silver Bells tower.418 Barely two 
years after the Marshal's death, this indelicate act, about which Sapieha informed the 
family and authorities only afterwards, was considered 'an earthquake.'419 Swaths of 
                                                            
418 The initial plan was to relocate the coffin but there was no official permission to do so. Neither 
was one forthcoming. Neal Pease, 'The 'Unpardonable Insult': The Wawel Incident of 1937 and 
the Church-State Relations in Poland', The Catholic Historical Review, vol.77, no.3 (July 1991), 
426-427. 
419 Parliamentary debate on 20 July 1937, quoted after Peal, 'The Unpardonable Insult', 423. 
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the public responded with disgust, anger and even, in the case of Pilsudski's 
staunchest supporters, violence. 420  The reactions of the regime's elite were, 
sometimes, no less extreme. Prime Minister Skladkowski was so overcame by the 
cleric’s offending deed that he tended in his resignation just 24 hours later.421 Beck, 
who as we already know was not one for histrionics, behaved more calmly but was 
no less shocked. Indeed, according to his secretary Pawel Starzenski, the Minister 
was momentarily stunned by the news. Seemingly perturbed, Beck arrived at the 
office earlier than usual: 'Sapieha's gone mad' was apparently all he could muster 
leaving the staffers to find out what exactly happened and which of the members of 
the Sapieha dynasty had upset their boss.422  
Ever loyal, Starzenski goes on to say that although Beck remained quietly angry 
with the archbishop, he was able to rise above the quarrel and focused on averting an 
open conflict between the Catholic Church and the state.423 However, another 
account suggests that the Minister was a little less generous. Walerian Meysztowicz, 
a priest, who was at the time working as Councilor at the Polish Embassy in the 
Vatican, recalls in his memoir that the Foreign Ministry actively sought to remove 
Sapieha from Krakow and the local Charge d'Affaires Stanislaw Janikowski was 
instructed to intervene with the Pope to this effect.424 But even though Pius XI knew 
Sapieha from his time as the Nuncio to Poland and was no friend of his, the pontiff 
did not want to demote the archbishop. A compromise had to be agreed speedily – in 
                                                            
420 A demonstrating mob smashed the windows in the archbishop’s palace on 26 June. Peal, 'The 
Unpardonable Insult', 430. 
421 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 24 Jun. 1937,TNA, C 46412455, FO 371/20759. 
422 Pawel Starzenski, Trzy lata z Beckiem [Three years with Beck], (Warszawa, 1991), 48. 
423 Ibid., 48. 
424 Waclaw Zbyszewski, Gawedy o czasach i ludziach  przedwojennych, [Stories of times and people 
of the Second Polish Republic], (London, 1983),  308. 
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time for the visit of Romanian King Karol that was to include a stop at Pilsudski's 
sarcophagus.  
 
As we know, Poland's image was high on Beck's list of priorities, but it is possible 
that on this occasion he was also pressurised by the Camp of National Unity to reach 
a swift compromise with the church. Through a brilliant stroke of luck, Sapieha, a 
self-declared National Democrat, committed his 'transgression' just a day after the 
formation of the Union of Young Poland formalised the alliance between Rydz-
Smigly's Camp and the Falangists. Unwilling and, as noted earlier, increasingly 
unable, the OZN could ill afford to alienate either the National Democrats or Roman 
Catholics. After the nationalist and conservative press criticised the authorities' 
handling of the affair,425 Colonel Koc's condemnation of Sapieha's hasty action was 
rather less strong that those of prominent Old Pilsudskites.426 Most significantly 
however, Marshal Rydz-Smigly maintained utter silence on the matter. For a man as 
devoted to Pilsudski as Beck was, this lack of reaction from the Marshal's self-styled 
heir must have seemed not only disrespectful but also served as another reminder 
that Sanacja's legacy was under threat.  
 
From a burial, to a bombing, to a Congress, to a peasant revolt and an attempted 
coup, the tribulations of the next few months caused the rift between Beck and Rydz-
Smigly to reopen. Indeed, the 'truce' and shaking of hands of the previous summer all 
                                                            
425 In his report, ambassador Kennard mentions the reaction of Nationalist Kurjer Warszawski 
[Warsaw's Courier] and conservative Czas [Time]. Two issues of Czas were confiscated by the 
authorities, the paper forced to retract its first editorial. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in 
Warsaw, to  Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 30 Jun. 1937. TNA, C 482621355, FO 
371/20764.     
426 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to  Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 30 Jun. 1937. TNA, C 482621355, FO 371/20764.     
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but forgotten, in November 1937 the growing tension forced Beck to reassure senior 
Ministry officials that 'no differences exist[ed] between him and Marshal [Rydz-] 
Smigly.'427 There were to be no further truces. 
 
As readers will remember from the introduction, the key argument put forward 
against the existence of a significant conflict between Beck and Rydz-Smigly is that 
their differences were minor and few. Indeed, the dearth of diaries and private 
correspondence makes it more difficult to track the progress of their disagreement. 
But, as this thesis has already illustrated, looking at other available sources, a 
researcher can reconstruct enough of Beck and Rydz-Smigly’s views to understand 
the essence of their conflict, which was, to a large extent, domestic, with Pilsudski's 
legacy at its core. Of course, we have already seen that it had some effect on Polish 
foreign policy. On the positive side, Rydz-Smigly’s determination to reactivate the 
Franco-Polish cooperation kick-started that stalled alliance. Its negative effect was 
that Rydz-Smigly's growing interference in diplomatic matters only added to Beck's 
resolve to adhere to the Marshal's directive to perform a 'balancing act' even as that 
became less and less feasible.  
Yet it is likely that it was a domestic, if not downright personal, matter that stoked 
Beck's desire to protect his independence from the increasingly invasive Rydz-
Smigly.  
From the previous chapter we already know that the Minister was the last person 
seen by the dying Pilsudski. After years of grooming for the post, Beck enjoyed 
Pilsudski's unequivocal support as Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs. So 
                                                            
427  Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki,  402. 
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unequivocal, that even on his deathbed the Marshal imprinted a seal of approval on 
his pupil. And although it was initially widely acknowledged by the Sanacja 
adherents that Polish diplomacy should stay in Beck's hands, Rydz-Smigly’s 
increasing interest in the matter was yet another indication that some within the 
regime were moving beyond strict application of Pilsudskite directives. In other 
words, although more discreet, to a devoted old-Pilsduskite like Beck, the quiet 
struggle for control over Polish foreign policy doctrine was no less an ideological 
transgression than the shift of the OZN towards the right.  
 
Both men's attitudes to Pilsudski's legacy aside, there naturally existed particular 
issues on which the two simply did not see eye to eye. One of these, which we have 
already covered, was their perception of France. Another was their attitude to Hitler, 
upon which we have already briefly touched in the previous chapter. General 
Gamelin's clumsy efforts to get Edward Rydz-Smigly to commit on Czechoslovakia 
during his September 1936 visit to France resulted from the French intelligence that 
Rydz-Smigly disagreed with the pro-German orientation of Beck's foreign policy.428 
And of course, Beck's perception of Hitler was at the centre of this diplomatic 
doctrine.  
 
During the 1920s and very early 1930s Polish-German relations were very poor. 
Although the severity of incidents varied from major (the 1925 customs-war) to very 
                                                            
428 See Chapter Three, page 117. 
 159 
minor (the abrupt 1933 dissolution of independent Port Police in Danzig and plans to 
replace it with the city's Schutzpolizei).429  
This last incident served as a pretext to reinforce the Polish military contingent 
based on Danzig's Westerplatte peninsula. Sometimes interpreted as an indication 
that Jozef Pilsudski wanted a preventive war with Germany, the deployment took 
place overnight between 5 and 6 March 1933 – just as votes in the German post-
Reichstag-Fire election were being counted. Indeed, far from being a bellicose 
action, the reinforcement was more likely an attempt by Marshal Pilsudski to test the 
Nazi leadership's reaction.430 Their silence and lack of support for the protest the 
Danziger Authorities lodged in Geneva seemed different and encouraging. Less than 
a year later, on 26 January 1934, Warsaw and Berlin would sign a Non-Aggression 
Pact.431  
 
In fact, as we will see in the following chapters, Minister Beck did not abandon 
this idea that Hitler was 'different' until the summer of 1939. For how else could the 
future Minister, who prior to this 'game-changing' agreement, experienced open 
German hostility of the Stresseman era, describe an Austrian with a clear dislike of 
Prussian aristocracy who was making conciliatory gestures to Poland? 
 
                                                            
429 Wlodzimierz Moderow, former Danzig civil servant, in a statement to the Winiarski Investigative 
Commission, 12 Jan. 1942, PISM A11.49/cz/3/12; Waclaw Jedrzejewicz (ed.), Diplomat in Berlin 
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Feb. 1941, PISM A.11.49/cz/3/10. 
431 Anna Cienciala, 'Polish Foreign Policy, 1926-1939. 'Equilibrium'; Stereotype and Reality' The 
Polish Review, 20 (1), (1975), 42-57; Gerhard Weinberg, The foreign policy of Hitler's Germany. 
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Researching Polish foreign policy in the 1930s one is repeatedly reminded that 
Beck thought he could trust Hitler. This of course was partly due to the Fuhrer's 
diligence in sticking to the letter of the Pact and the charm offensive launched by 
him and other high-ranking Nazis. The official German reaction to Marshal 
Pilsudski's death mentioned in chapter three was one example of this charm 
offensive, but there were plenty of other manifestations of the Nazis' sympathy 
towards Poland.  
Hitler's apparent recognition that Warsaw was an important and equal partner in 
Europe was another example of his unparalleled ability to push Beck's buttons,432 
while frequent official and private visits, where Polish and German dignitaries were 
treated to shooting parties433 or granted special access to art collections, naturally 
helped to maintain the friendly atmosphere.434 But pleasantries and Hitler's apparent 
distance from the 'excesses of some junior Nazis’,435 were not the sole reason why, in 
early March 1939, Beck supposedly felt confident enough to have the following 
exchange with his Romanian counterpart Grigore Gafencu.  
Asked about the Polish-German relations the Minister reportedly replied: 
                                                            
432 Pawel Starzenski gives us an excellent example of this technique recounting Beck's conversation 
with Hitler during the Minister's July 1935 visit to Berlin, in which the Fuhrer told the minister 
that Germany's two most important international partners are Britain globally and Poland in 
Europe. Significantly, France – so disliked by Beck for its patronising attitude toward Warsaw – 
was not mentioned. Starzenski, Trzy lata,  125. The Poles were also still angry with France after 
the Stresa conference and concerned about it's renewed ties with Soviet Russia. Weinberg, The 
foreign policy of Hitler's Germany, 208-209.   
433 Personally, Beck loathed hunting but the Ministry helped to stage Presidential shoots for visiting 
Goering and Himmler. The MFA also organised, and paid for, the staggeringly expensive shoots 
on private estates for Goering. According to Chief of Police Zamorski, a passionate shot, in 1938 a 
private shooting party at an aristocratic estate cost 1500 zloty per head. Zamorski, Dzienniki, 446; 
This was equal to the monthly salary of a Major General. Ministry of Military Affairs, 
'Announcement of a unified military pay-scale' from 4 January 1937 published in Dziennik Ustaw 
1937, vol. 8, item 66, 79. 
434 Upon meeting Hitler and telling him that he was a fellow painter, the Chief of Police Zamorski 
was granted special access to all art collections and public buildings in Munich. Zamorski, 
Dzienniki, 497. 
435  Beck quoted in Starzenski, Trzy lata,  54. 
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- Everything is fine. We have no disagreements. 
- What about Danzig? 
- It doesn't matter. 
- And the German re-armament? 
- It's not directed against Poland. 
- You sound as if you have an agreement with Germany. 
- I have no agreements, but I trust Hitler. He has some large 
ambitions for Europe.436  
 
The secret to Beck's misplaced confidence was in fact that he thought that Hitler, 
like himself, was committed to pursuing a single coherent line of policy. In other 
words, that Bolshephobia was Hitler's equivalent of Beck's Pilsudskite commitment 
to maintaining a diplomatic equilibrium.  
As we will see in the next chapter, this underlying conviction became more 
apparent just as Hitler started to undermine it. But even as Hitler renounced the 
Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact and a steady flow of intelligence warning 
about a possible Nazi-Soviet détente arrived in Warsaw, (leading the Minister to cry 
                                                            
436 As quoted by Miroslaw Arciszewski, fromer second Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, in his 
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'Where is Hitler's foreign policy now?') he was still inclined to blame the dictator's 
decisions on Ribbentrop's poor advice and manipulation.437  
 
Just as he would come to realize, we now know that Beck's assessment of Hitler 
was off the mark. In his defence one could only say that, compared to other 
contemporary statesmen, his was not an unusual view.  
Edward Rydz-Smigly was, however, one of the few exceptions to this norm. 
Upon assuming his position at the head of the Armed Forces, Rydz-Smigly, despite 
his limited knowledge of Germany,438 was nonetheless suspicious of the country's 
motives.439 This attitude goes some way to explain the Marshal's reluctance to forge 
a relationship with Ambassador Hans von Moltke and the German Embassy in 
Warsaw.440 A phenomenon that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, paradoxically 
helped the pro-German Beck to stay in office.441 
 
The Nazi authorities were of course aware of Rydz-Smigly’s distrust. Their 
previously fool proof tactic of praising Marshal Pilsudski, was, unsurprisingly, less 
                                                            
437 Beck cited in Starzenski, Trzy lata, 125. 
438 Even after a year in the GISZ and a few weeks before his promotion to marshal, in late October 
1936, Rydz-Smigly reportedly had a very limited idea about the current state of Polish-German 
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441 Jan Szembek's diary suggests that Rydz-Smigly’s prejudices were reinforced by people hostile to 
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(Beck's predecessor August Zaleski) informed him that Moltke received general Sikorski. 
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effective with Rydz-Smigly than it was with Beck. To combat this, the leadership in 
Berlin was at pains to charm and personally engage with the new marshal and 1937 
was the height of this 'campaign'.  
When Rydz-Smigly was ill early in the year, Hitler enquired about his health and 
sent his best wishes through ambassador Lipski. 442  In mid-February, marshal 
Goering visited Rydz-Smigly and during their first conversation tried to convince 
him of Germany's commitment to good relations with Poland. Hinting not only at a 
media campaign that would change the public perception of Poland in Germany but 
denying all territorial claims including the corridor.443 
  
Undoubtedly, gauging the new Marshal's attitude towards Germany was the sole 
purpose of Goering's visit. Its most important part was the floating of the idea of 
Poland joining the Anti-Commintern Pact. Unsurprisingly, Rydz-Smigly was not 
overly enthusiastic about the proposal and it appears that from that point onwards, 
instead of trying to win Rydz-Smigly over, the German authorities attempted to use 
his rift with Beck to their advantage, applying more pressure on the Minister while 
reassuring the Marshal.444  
 
                                                            
442 Jozef Lipski, Polish Ambassador in Berlin, to  Jozef Beck, Foreign Minister in Warsaw, 11 Jan. 
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The German pressure had three sources: Danzig, minorities and the Poles’ hatred 
of the Soviet Union. In Danzig, although the Polish authorities had previously 
resigned themselves to the fact that ‘the totalitarian Nazi system would govern the 
life of the Free City’ and concluded that ‘no useful purpose would be served by 
endeavouring to hinder or delay it,’ subtle Nazi attempts to undermine the status quo 
incited the Camp of National Unity into the nationalistic outburst described above.445  
First came the aforementioned attempts to amend the Free City's constitution. 
This was followed by a flurry of anti-Polish outbursts in Danzig and neighbouring 
villages. This time the targets extended beyond the usual students to include ordinary 
adult Poles and, most controversially, children whom new regulation compelled to 
attend German schools.446 The plight of a number of Polish school children who 
were either forcefully removed from their houses or kidnapped by policemen and 
Nazi activists and taken to German schools attracted extensive coverage in Polish 
press and outraged the public.447  
Like Rydz-Smigly, Polish opinion had always been suspicious of Minister Beck's 
pro-German policy line and condemnation of repeated racist excesses coming from 
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all journalistic directions including the conservative Czas and Sanacja-mouthpiece 
Gazeta Polska put the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an unwelcome spotlight. And, 
for all their flattery, their praise of Beck's qualities and statesmanship, and their 
singling out ambassador Lipski as the first among equals in Berlin's diplomatic 
circles, the German authorities only paid lip service to Polish requests to curb 
Gauleiter Albert Forster448 and his Danzig Nazi Party, and proved unwilling to 
bilaterally settle the minority problem.449 Indeed, the first Polish attempt to organise 
an exchange of notes about Danzig was unsuccessful. The Berlin's authorities' 
refusal was communicated to Beck in a top-secret, 'For the Minister's eyes only' 
message from Jozef Lipski.450  
The rising ethnic tensions in Danzig coincided with constant German allusions to 
Poland acceding to the Anti-Commintern Pact. The author deliberately describes 
Berlin's attempts to get Warsaw to join the anti-Soviet grouping as 'allusions' 
because they were somewhat secretive. They involved veiled warnings about 
dangers lurking in the east and visions of a vast, nearly pre-partition-like Poland 
stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea.451 However, that Poland was not formally 
invited to join the anti-Soviet grouping suggests that the German obstruction was an 
attempt to take advantage of the tension in Poland's internal politics. No matter how 
pressurised, Beck could never accept an open invitation to join an alliance directed 
                                                            
448 Albert Forster was, since 1930, the Nazi Party Leader (Gauleiter) in the Free City of Danzig. 
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against a neighbour because, among other things, it ran counter to Pilsudski's line. A 
rejection would have naturally embarrassed the Reich and complicated relations 
between Warsaw and Berlin. It is plausible therefore to assume that the Nazi 
authorities fabricated and prolonged the Danzig minority crisis to further weaken 
Beck's position within the Sanacja regime in the hope of pressing him into forging an 
ever-closer collaboration with Berlin and align himself, possibly covertly, against the 
Soviet Union.452  
 
In the end, and despite efforts by certain Russian historians to have us believe 
otherwise, the tactic failed.453 In early November 1937, just days after Beck marked 
his fifth year in office, Warsaw and Berlin agreed to coordinate the issue of separate 
declarations in which each side agreed to respect the rights of their respective 
minorities.454  
The media coverage of Beck's ministerial anniversary focused on international 
tributes to the Minister and emphasised his devotion to the principles of Marshal 
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Polish-Soviet relations: Slawomir Debski and Marius Wolos. A recent controversial and highly 
critical of Minister Beck publication by Piotr Zychowicz argues that such an agreement should 
have existed. Piotr Zychowicz, Pakt Ribbentrop-Beck, czyli jak Polacy mogli u boku III Rzeszy 
pokonac Zwiazek Sowiecki [Ribbentrop – Beck Pact, or how Poland could have defeated the 
Soviet Union by the Reich's side], (Warszawa, 2012). 
454 For a more detailed account of these negotiations, see Gerhard Weinberg, 'German Foreign Policy 
and Poland, 1937-1938', The Polish Review, 20 (1), (1975), 12-14. 
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Pilsudski.455 But the recent crisis's notoriety clearly undermined Beck's prestige. In a 
bid to reassert the validity of his line, the Minister issued one of his rare 
communications to all Polish diplomatic representatives in which he reassuringly 
presented the declaration as part of a gradual process of improvement in Polish-
German relations rather than the contingent reaction to a crisis it actually was.456 An 
additional editorial aimed at restoring Beck's credibility before the public appeared 
in Gazeta Polska within a fortnight of the declarations.457 It took the line expressed 
in Beck's communiqué and exaggerated the declaration's importance.  
For a secretive man who shrank away from having to explain his foreign policy to 
others – be they people from outside his MFA inner-circle or parliamentarians – 
inspiring such a legitimising editorial seems completely out of character and can 
only be explained as political maneuvering, especially if we consider that Beck not 
only attempted to rally his subordinates and communicate with the wider public but 
also engaged with a specific influential group. According to a semi-private letter 
from Roman Debicki458 to Jan Szembek, the Minister had in late autumn 1937 met 
up with young aristocrats 'to exchange thoughts',459 prompting Debicki to enthuse 
about the benefits Poland would reap if Beck developed these bright young things' 
potential and 'created a moderate centre'.460 Information about further meetings or 
                                                            
455 Beck assumed the Foreign Affairs portfolio on 2 November 1932. Foreign and domestic response 
to Beck's jubilee are described in British diplomatic reports.  Howard Kennard, British 
Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary in London, 9 Nov. 1937, TNA, C 
79602455, FO 371/20760. 
456 Jozef Beck, Foreign Minister in Warsaw, to all senior Polish diplomats abroad, 5 Nov. 1937 
PISM, A.11.49/N/6. 
457 'Sprawy Gdanskie' ['The matters in Danzig'], cutting from Gazeta Polska, 17 Nov. 1937 PISM, 
A.11.49/N/6. 
458 The Polish Envoy to Yugoslavia between 1935 and 1939.  
459 Roman Debicki, Polish Envoy in Belgrade, response to Jan Szembek, Deputy Foreign Minister in 
Warsaw, 18 Nov. 1937, PISM, A.11.E/1494. The author was unable to locate Szembek's original 
letter.  
460 Roman Debicki, Polish Envoy in Belgrade, response to Jan Szembek, Deputy Foreign Minister in 
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whether other groups were approached could not be found, and a moderate centre 
never emerged.461 Nevertheless, the episode perfectly demonstrates the shift in 
Beck's and Smigly-Rydz's relations over the course of 1937. Sudden and 
uncharacteristic concern about public opinion and attempts to engage with the 
conservative ruling classes suggest that Beck felt increasingly threatened and 
isolated by the rising Rydz-Smigly.  
 
Beck's weakening was exacerbated by the decline in the President's power relative 
to the Marshal's.  In the previous chapter we saw that President Ignacy Moscicki was 
a useful counterweight to the new Marshal. However, as the rivalry between the 
Castle and the General Inspectorate intensified in the aftermath of OZN's 'fascist 
coup' attempt, the President became more concerned with reinforcing his own 
position rather than someone else's. Indeed, in his attempt to populate the 
government with 'his people', Moscicki even suggested Michal Grazynski, the 
Voivode of Upper Silesia, for Prime Minister.462 He was in the end unsuccessful but 
proposing Grazynski meant acquiescing in removing Beck from the Cabinet. The 
two men allegedly hated each other and could not work together. So even if, unlikely 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Warsaw, 18 Nov. 1937, PISM, A.11.E/1494  [you can use Ibid] 
461 According to the former Industry and Trade Minister, Henryk Floyar-Rajchman, Beck 'intrigued' 
with a different wing of the National Democrats. Foreign Office minute by Reginald (Rex) 
Leeper, Head of the Foreign Office News Department in London, to Orme Sargent, Assistant 
Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and William Strang, Head of the Central 
Department of the Foreign Office in London, 17 Nov. 1937, TNA, C 79192455, FO 371/20760; 
However, Howard Kennard discredited Rajchman's credibility on the grounds of the latter's 
intense dislike of Beck and his 'evident [desire] to blacken him as much as possible.' Howard 
Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Orme Sargent, Assistant Under Secretary of State at 
the Foreign Office in London, 30 Nov. 1937,  TNA, C 83542455, FO 371/20760. 
462 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary in 
London, 2 Nov. 1937, TNA, C 76292455, FO 371/20760. 
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as it was, Grazynski invited Beck to join his cabinet, the Minister was hardly going 
to accept it.463 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, 1937 was dubbed the 'quiet' year, but upon closer 
examination it proved to have been anything but quiet in terms of Polish domestic 
politics. Indeed, defined by the formation of the Camp of National Unity, it was a 
year of increasing discord and profound political change. A manifestation of and a 
vehicle for Rydz-Smigly's newly found political ambition, the OZN never gained the 
Old Pilsudskites' favour. Beck was particularly put off by the Camp's chauvinistic 
nationalism, fuelled by its flirtation with the radical ONR, which ran counter to 
Pilsudskite ideology. His refusal to join Rydz-Smigly’s new movement only 
worsened the already poor relations with the Marshal. This flaring up of the conflict 
coincided with the German manipulation attempts their direct approaches to Rydz-
Smigly and a manufactured crisis in Danzig that showed Beck up in front of the 
establishment. As the Minister's weakness was exposed, Marshal Rydz-Smigly made 
his first, timid, but nonetheless open interference in the process of Polish-German 
policy making – until then Beck's sole domain. And despite being able to stave off a 
confrontation with Berlin over Danzig, no amount of 'success propaganda' could hide 
that, as 1937 drew to a close, the Foreign Minister was entering the New Year 
weaker than he had been 12 months earlier. His efforts to rebuild his position would, 
as we shall see in the following chapter, result in several diplomatic initiatives being 
given a populist spin.  
                                                            
463 According to Gawronski, Mosciki returned to his idea of making Grazynski PM in February 
1938.Gawronski, Moja Misja, 479. 
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Marshal Rydz-Smigly was not on the other hand much affected by the initial 
failure of his venture. He remained popular with the Armed Forces and, owing to his 
ongoing campaign of personal propaganda, a large section of the public. Despite the 
confrontation with Moscicki, the Marshal was still regarded as his natural successor 
and was expected to assume the powerful Presidential office in 1940. But events 
would prove otherwise. 1937 was also a quiet year in European diplomacy because 




                                                            
464 Jonathan Wright and Paul Stafford, 'Hitler, Britain and the Hossbach Memorandum', 
Militaergeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 42, (December 1987), 77 – 123. 
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Chapter Five: 1938 – the year of the Jackal465 
 
Historians of Poland's interbellum acknowledge that the country's war with 
Bolshevik Russia is essential to understanding the October 1938 occupation of 
Czechoslovak Teschen Silesia.466 If one were an extreme 'determinist' a plausible 
argument could be made that the key to poor relations could be found even further 
back, in the 17th century Battle of White Mountain and the 18th century partitions of 
Poland. As the readers will see in the later part of this chapter, this author agrees that 
the perceived Czech sabotage and use of Poland's embattlement with invading 
Bolshevik forces to extract territorial concessions in 1920 were factors in Warsaw's 
decision to march troops into Teschen. Anti-Czech sentiment helped to justify the 
action but was not the sole rationale behind it. Moreover, far from being an example 
of rare, and in this case particularly ill timed, unity in the Polish ruling class, 
Czechoslovakia was in fact, a rather (un-) lucky coincidence. 
 
Once the tension over Danzig abated in the aftermath of Polish and German 
declarations on minority rights, the last two months of 1937 passed relatively 
peacefully. But this quiet winter was background to a flurry of General Staff activity. 
                                                            
465 Winston Churchill likened the Polish action in Czechoslovakia to a jackal picking on carrion: see 
Waldemar Kowalski's interview with Marek Kornat for the Polish Press Agency, 4 Nov. 2012. 
http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/prof-marek-kornat-sojusz-z-hitlerem-uczynilby-z-polski-kolonie-
niemiec (last accessed on 15 November 2014). 
466 See for example Jerzy Wiechowski, Spor o Zaolzie [The quarrel over Zaolzie] (Warszawa, 1990), 
Henryk Batowski, Kryzys dyplomatyczny w Europie. Jesien 1938 – Wiosna 1939 [The diplomatic 
crisis in Europe, Autumn 1938 – Spring 1939] (Warszawa 1962) or Jerzy Pozenski, 
Czechoslowacja w polskiej polityce zagranicznej w latach 1932-1938 [The question of 
Czechoslovakia in Polish foreign policy between 1932-1936] (Poznan, 1964); Zara Steiner, The 
Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933 – 1939, (Oxford, 2011), 587; 
Margaret MacMillan, Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World, (London, 2002), 251. 
For brief an English language review of Polish-Czech relations, see: Zygmunt J. Gasiorowski, 
'Polish-Czechoslovak Relations' 1918-1922', The Slavonic and East European Review, 35 (84), 
(1956), 172 -193. 
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Polish military strategists assessed German capability, concluded that it was unlikely 
to start a war before 1942-45, and identified the north (Pomerania and East Prussia) 
as the direction from which a possible attack could come. The Poles’ belief that the 
Third Reich was still too weak to start a war meant that the work on the defensive 
plan Wschod (East) was to continue unhindered. Of course, the strategists grossly 
underestimated the speed of German rearmament and the impact of the arms race on 
German decision-making.467 Worse still, as we will see later in this chapter, the top 
brass allowed their nationalist sentiment to cloud their judgment during the 
Czechoslovak crisis, leading to a further strategic weakening of Poland's strategic 
position. However, before these events took place in the autumn, Jozef Beck scored 
a diplomatic coup and Poland unexpectedly improved her strategic position. 
 
Despite his distrust of public opinion, which he characterised as 'impulsive', 
'emotional' and 'ignorant of political reality’, in the previous chapter we saw that, 
faced with the escalation of his conflict with Marshal Rydz-Smigly, Minister Beck 
engaged to a somewhat greater extent with the media and tried, for the first time, to 
explain some of his objectives to the Polish society.468 This did not prove a lasting 
change. Beck remained a firm believer that 'good policy is the best propaganda', and 
                                                            
467 In this aspect, the Poles were a polar opposite of their main ally, France. Peter Jackson argues that 
the French intelligence grossly overestimated the speed of German rearmament. Nevertheless, the 
Poles were not alone in their misjudgments. Different perceptions of Nazi military might among 
Britain's soldiers and civil servants are woven into the narrative of Joe Maiolo's monograph Cry 
Havoc. Joseph Maiolo, Cry Havoc: How the Arms Race Drover the World to War, 1931-1941, 
(New York, 2011). And neither the under- nor the overestimates fully grasped the degree of 
interdependence between German economic output (including that of the arms' industry) and 
Hitler's decision-making. As argued by Adam Tooze, the material needs of German manufactures 
were central in the Fuhrer's drive to expand eastwards. Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: 
The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, (London, 2006), 99 - 134. 
468 Pawel Starzenski, Trzy lata z Beckiem [Three years with Beck], (Warszwa, 1991), 59. 
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never emulated Rydz-Smigly, who actively sought personal popularity and 
engagement with the public.469  
As we know from previous chapters, the Minister's policy at best baffled and at 
worst angered the staunchly anti-German Polish public. However, on the rare 
occasions that Beck's goals coincided with public's sentiments, the Minister proved 
adept at riding the wave of support to win popular backing for his policies. The 
Polish-Lithuanian crisis of March 1938 is an excellent illustration of this approach. 
The autumn Polish-Czechoslovak crisis is not, and the reasons why will be explained 





Late in the evening on 10 March 1938, just as Germany readied itself for the 
Anschluss with Austria, two Border Protection Corps (KOP) officers, Stanislaw 
Wolanin and Stanislaw Serafin, stationed on the outskirts of a small village of 
Wierszeradowka on the Polish-Lithuanian border prepared themselves for a patrol of 
a patch of deep forest in the checkpoint-less border-zone. Poland and Lithuania did 
not maintain diplomatic relations following the Polish annexation of the Vilnius 
region in the aftermath of 1920 General Lucjan Zeligowski's 'mutiny'. Ostensibly an 
                                                            
469 Beck's natural dislike for publicity was doubtless influenced by Pilsudski. Not only was Pilsudski 
famously secretive, he also supposedly foresaw the increased difficulties the Minister would face 
from the public after the Marshal's death.  Starzenski, Trzy lata, 27 and 59. 
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act of willful insubordination by a senior Pilsudskite officer, it was in fact sanctioned 
by the Marshal himself.470  
The particular stretch patrolled by Wolanin and Serafin had previously proved 
popular with smugglers and spies, and that night they ran into a man trying to cross 
illegally into Lithuania.471 The guards fired in an attempt at apprehending the 
runaway but, surprisingly, their Lithuanian counterparts responded in kind. One of 
the KOP officers, Stanislaw Serafin, was severely wounded, seized by the 
Lithuanians and later died of his injuries.472  
The Polish-Lithuanian border had, by then, been 'dead' for nearly eighteen years 
and though similar incidents had occurred before, this one earned an unusually 
strong reply. 473 The diplomatic communiqué which was edited by the Deputy 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jan Szembek, who was filling in for Beck as the 
Minister vacationed in Italy, accused Kaunas of a deliberate attack on a serving 
Polish soldier and sent ripples through an already edgy Europe.474  
 
                                                            
470 Piotr Lossowski, Konflikt polsko-litewski 1918-1920 [The Polish-Lithuanian conflict 1918-1920], 
(Warszawa, 1995), 161-166. 
471 According to the Polish authorities the man, who was later captured, was a Lithuanian agent 
intending 'to carry out subversive actions on Polish territory.' Howard Kennard, British 
Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 18 Mar. 1938, TNA, 
N 1387159, FO 417/38. 
472 Polish Telegraph Agency communiqué from 13 March 1938, reprinted in Howard Kennard, 
British Ambassador to Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 14 Mar. 1938, 
TNA, N 1332159, FO 417/38. 
473 Reprinted in Howard Kennard, British Ambassador to Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign 
Secretary in London, 14 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1332159, FO 417/38.  
474 By mid-March 1938, Europe was already rocked by the sudden changes to the German leadership 
(including the replacement of Foreign Minister von Neurath with von Ribbentrop) and the 
possibility of an Anschluss. Thus, the Western Powers found Polish veiled threats of violence 
extremely disconcerting. See for example, Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, to 
Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, 15 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1290159, FO 417/38. 
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The timing was, indeed, unfortunate. In fact, Beck learnt of the skirmish from the 
same cable from which he found out about the Anschluss.475 But the firm response 
was long coming. Already in November 1937, Minister Beck warned the British 
Ambassador Howard Kennard that another serious border incident would make the 
Poles take matters into their own hands. 476  Moreover, the Lithuanians' abrupt 
breaking-off of promising negotiations just a few weeks earlier, in February 1938, 
highlighted the necessity to change strategy.477  
Beck cut short his holiday and immediately returned to Warsaw which was 
buzzing with nationalistic frenzy. 478  The public, cheered on by the National 
Democrats and the OZN (who attempted to hijack the demonstrations to drum up 
support for Rydz-Smigly) demanded ‘resolution'. This, depending on one's 
interlocutor, could mean anything from a normalisation in relations to a military 
campaign. 479  As the Minister found out during an emergency session of the 
Committee for the Defence of the Republic, the attitudes of Poland's key decision 
makers mirrored those of the public. President Moscicki and his protégé 
Kwiatkowski proposed a gentle approach while Rydz-Smigly and Premier 
                                                            
475 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 76. 
476 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 23 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1519159, FO 417/38. 
477 According to Beck's secretary Pawel Starzenski, the Minister was disappointed and worried when 
Lithuania abruptly walked away from these secret, semi-official talks. Starzenski, Trzy lata,  76. 
Also mentioned in Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, 
Foreign Secretary in London,  report 18 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1387159, FO 417/38.  
478 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 18 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1387159, FO 417/38. Also, George Sakwa, 'The Polish 
Ultimatum to Lithuania in March 1938', Slavonic and East European Review, 55 (2), (1977), 213. 
479 Robotnik, the press organ of the Polish Socialist Party, called for the establishment of bilateral 
relations, the PSL tacitly agreed, patriotically inclined crowds called to Rydz-Smigly to lead them 
to Kaunas and the odd punter mused that the 'old Marshal' would have done without all the 
ceremony and 'been in Kaunas the day Hitler entered Vienna.' Howard Kennard British 
Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 23 Mar. 1938, TNA, 
N 1519159, FO 417/38.  
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Skladkowski favoured a swift military action. In the end, it fell to Beck to appease 
everyone.  
 
The Minister had long considered the Lithuanian issue harmful and absurd. He 
also thought that he was honour bound to resolve it at the earliest opportunity.480 
Considering that all previous attempts at talks ended in stalemates, Beck agreed with 
Rydz-Smigly and Skladkowski that the time for gentleness has passed.481 Indeed, 
before he left for Sorrento, the Minister discussed 'the unfinished business' of 
Lithuania with Jan Szembek and indicated that he would get back to the problem 
upon his return.482 At the same time, however, Beck was aware that the Western 
Powers, especially Britain, would not look kindly at a forceful intervention in 
Lithuania. 483  Moreover, with the Anschluss still fresh on people's minds, 
comparisons with Hitler's intimidation of the Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg 
were unavoidable, and could create the impression that Poland had chosen to move 
into the German orbit. Indeed, the British Foreign Secretary Halifax had already 
wondered if Warsaw and Berlin had struck a deal and Lithuania was 'Colonel Beck's 
price for acquiescence in German action against Austria and Czechoslovakia'.484 
                                                            
480 Pilsudski died before he was able to resolve either of Poland's two outstanding border disputes and 
Beck felt these were left for him to deal with. Starzenski, Trzy lata, 53. 
481 According to Miroslaw Arciszewski, in October 1932, Pilsudski even considered bribing some 
Lithuanian officials to solve the problem. Miroslaw Arciszewski, former Second Deputy Foreign 
Minister of Poland, in a statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 27 Feb. 1941, 
PISM, A 11.49/Cz/3/1. 
482 Jozef Beck's Wspomnienia (Original Polish manuscript), 138, JPIoA, Kolekcja Jozefa Becka, 
034/7.  
483 Earlier in this chapter, we have already mentioned that the Foreign Office worried about 'that the 
Polish Government will  (…) aggravate the already critical situation in Europe by making this 
unimportant incident an excuse for an attempt to settle the Vilna question by force or threat of 
force.' Indeed, lord Halifax even instructed ambassador Kennard to seek from Beck assurances of 
Lithuanian inviolability. Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London,  to Howard Kennard, 
British Ambassador in Warsaw,15 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1290159, FO 417/38.  
484 Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, to Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in 
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There was as we now know no such agreement or even tacit coordination. In fact, as 
readers will remember from previous chapters, Beck was extremely cautious and 
unwilling to take sides openly. Indeed, later in this thesis (see pages 205-207) we 
will see just how difficult it was to get him off the fence.  
In short, if at all possible, a military intervention had to be avoided. To appease 
the bellicose Rydz-Smigly who might have hoped that a 'short victorious war' would 
cement his popularity, Beck ingeniously suggested an 'exploding' ultimatum to 
Kaunas.485 The implicit threat of violence appealed to the public, which obviously 
hankered after a show of Polish strength. At the same time, Poland's restraint – its 
sole demand being the establishment of diplomatic relations – meant that Western 
capitals could do nothing but urge Lithuania to accept.486  
 
Poland’s modest ultimatum was communicated to the Lithuanians on 17 March, 
nearly a week after the border incident. Ambassador Kennard described the text as 
'rather polite' but the Minister would later admit that 'he had been pressed (…) to 
make a further demand in the ultimatum of a much more serious nature, but had 
refused to do so'.487 Discretion prevented Beck from divulging the source of pressure; 
he was after all speaking to a foreign representative. However, it is not unreasonable 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Warsaw,15 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1290159, FO 417/38.  
485 This could explain why the participants of the two 200,000 strong marches organised by the OZN 
in Warsaw on 17 and 19 March cried for a Polish march on Kaunas and carried banners calling for 
an immediate invasion. Wlodzimierz Kalicki, '17 marca 1938. Wodzu prowadz na Kowno!' ['17 
March 1938. Commander lead us on Kaunas!], Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 Mar. 2010. 
486 According to Sir Howard Kennard, not doing so would have been 'impolitic'. Howard Kennard, 
British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 18 Mar. 1938, 
TNA, N 1373159, FO 417/38; Similarly, the British Charge d'affaires in Lithuania, Thomas 
Preston, agreed that there was a consensus among Western Powers (including the US) that the 
Polish demands were fair. Thomas Preston, British Charge d'Affaires in Kaunas, to Viscount 
Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London,1 Apr. 1938, TNA, N 180244659, FO 417/38.  
487 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 18 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1387159, FO 417/38.  
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to assume that the advocates of a forceful action (Marshal Rydz-Smigly, Premier 
Skladkowski and possibly the OZN) would also want greater Lithuanian 
concessions.488 That Beck bartered with Rydz-Smigly looks even more plausible 
when we consider the relatively short time – two weeks – allowed for Kaunas' 
decision and substantial troop movements into the Vilnius region which culminated 
with Rydz-Smigly’s triumphant arrival in the city on 18 March, barely 24 hours after 
the ultimatum was issued. Lithuania yielded soon after, on 19 March. The public was 
jubilant. A large victory parade complete with an air display and attended by Edward 
Rydz-Smigly took place in Vilnius on 20 March.489 And all over Poland crowds 
gathered to cheer the second Marshal who was credited with bringing down 'the 
artificial wall of hatred which had for twenty years divided [Poland from] 
neighbouring Lithuania' and 'making Marshal Pilsudski's dream a reality'.490 
 
Meanwhile, in the shadows, Jozef Beck also enjoyed a moment of triumph. Not 
only did his action bring him one step closer to realising his plan of creating a buffer 
zone between Germany and the Soviet Union; better still, the Lithuanian 'success' 
temporarily deflected the criticism layered on his policy by the OZN, the Opposition 
and the public. This was important because, if we believe Michal Lubienski, the 
                                                            
488 According to Kennard, the gossip in Warsaw said that Beck and Rydz-Smigly clashed over the 
ultimatum. However, conflicting information made it impossible to discern who was mitigating 
whom. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary 
in London, 23 Mar. 1938, TNA, N 1519159, FO 417/38.  
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zlikwidowaniu zatargu' ['In the aftermath of the skirmish, Vilnius gave a festive welcome to the 
troops returning from the Lithuanian border'], 21 March 1938, No. 79, 3. 
490 Ibid, 3 
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Minister had by then became convinced that he had to defend his office through 
occasional populist interventions.491  
 Better still, he managed to fulfill Pilsudski's wish on the late Marshal's name 
day.492 According to, his Chef de Cabinet, Beck was 'touchingly happy' that he was 
able to 'gift' Lithuania to his dead Commandant, whom he imagined sitting in 
Heaven smiling with delight.493 
*** 
 
However, neither Rydz-Smigly nor Beck remained jubilant or on good terms for 
very long. By late June news of new conflicts in Warsaw alarmed the envoy in 
Belgrade, Roman Kazimierz Debicki, who mentioned in a semi-private letter to Jan 
Szembek 'your brief analysis of the politics at home have left me worried. Now, 
more than ever we need unity and to maintain the current, the only possible, course 
in our foreign policy'.494 The author was unable to locate Szembek's original letter. 
Nevertheless, other documents from the period suggest that Beck's policy once again 
run afoul of the army. This time over Czechoslovakia.  
 
                                                            
491 Lubienski goes on to say that this attitude could have made Beck more reckless in the final years 
of his ministership. Michal Lubienski's Memoir, 12, JPIoA Archiwum Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 
103/28. 
492 Pilsudski's name day which fell on 19 March – St Joseph's day – was always lavishly celebrated 
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Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
494 Roman Kazimierz Debicki, Polish Envoy in Belgrade, to Jan Szembek, Deputy Minister for 
Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, 23 Jun. 1938, PISM, A.12.49/6II. 
 180 
Although the two countries acknowledged each other's existence and exchanged 
emissaries, the Polish-Czechoslovak relations had been generally poor throughout 
the inter-war period.495 The origins of this animosity lay with the events surrounding 
the 1920 Spa Conference.496 Held to address German delays in fulfilling the terms of 
the Versailles Treaty, it was attended by the then Polish Prime Minister Wladyslaw 
Grabski who wanted to appeal to the Entente powers for material aid and to press for 
peace with Bolshevik Russia. The Allies agreed but their price was the settlement of 
Poland's outstanding border disputes such as the Teschen Silesia.497 Russian forces 
were advancing towards Warsaw, so Grabski had no choice but to agree to 
Czechoslovak demands however disadvantageous they were to Poland.498 Some of 
the more industrialised parts of Teschen Silesia, inhabited by over a hundred 
thousand ethnic Poles were lost.499 The Czech exploitation of Poland's embattlement 
by the Red Army left a sour taste in Warsaw and the fate of the Polish minority in 
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1962), 151-160; Mieczyslaw B. Biskupski, 'Paderewski, Polish Politics  and the Battle of Warsaw, 
1920', Slavic Review, 46 (3), (1987), 503-512; F. Russel Bryant, 'Lord D'Abernon, the Anglo-
French Mission and the Battle of Warsaw, 1920', Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 38 (4), 
(1990), 526-547; Norman Davies, 'Sir Maurice Hankey and the Inter-Allied Mission to Poland, 
July-August 1920', The Historical Journal, 15 (3), (1972), 553-561. 
497 Other names of the region: Zaolzie and the Trans-Olza region will be used interchangeably in this 
text. 
498 Lifting of the transit blockade on military aid transports to Poland was contingent on Poland's 
acquiescence to the border deal. Although in reality the ban was not lifted until after the Battle of 
the Vistula. Michael Jabara Carley, 'Anti-Bolshevism in French Foreign Policy: The Crisis in 
Poland in 1920', The International History Review, 2 (3), (1980), 414-416. 
499 MacMillan, The Peacemakers, 250-251. 
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Silesia provided a source of constant friction between the two countries.500 Thus, it 
was not unusual to hear Czechoslovakia referred to as the 'bastard child of Versailles' 
or more politely 'an artificial body […] disregarding the reality of rights and needs of 
[other] Eastern European nations' in Warsaw's corridors of power.501  
 
Polish-Czechoslovak tension over Teschen Silesia peaked in September 1938 and 
will be discussed in a later part of this chapter. However, the course of that crisis was 
be influenced by an important development that occurred in the spring, namely the 
radicalisation of the military's attitude towards Prague. The British Military Attaché, 
Colonel John Talbot Godfrey, first observed it during a conversation with the Head 
of the Second Bureau of the Polish Ministry of Military Affairs: 
                                                            
500 In a conversation with Minister von Neurath, Beck complained that 'Despite their liberal 
constitution, the Czechs treat their minorities like the harshest police state would.' Minutes from a 
meeting between Jozef Beck, Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Konstantin von Neurath, 
Germany's Minister for Foreign Affairs, 18 Jan.1938, PISM, A.12.59/6II. 
 One of the areas where this manifested more clearly was the labour market. Ethnic Poles who 
were active in national organisations or enrolled their children into Polish schools were often 
made redundant and replaced by Czechs brought in from other regions. Documents gathered for 
the 'Zaolzie 1938. Dokumenty-relacje-opinie' ['Zaolzie 1939. Documents – Accounts - Opinions'] 
exhibition organised by Ksiaznica Cieszynska, 2 October 2003 – 24 January 2004. 
 Naturally, Teschen Silesia was only one of many regions with substantial foreign minority. 
According to the 1931 census, just over 30% of Poland's citizens considered themselves of a non-
Polish ethnicity. Henryk Zielinski, Historia Polski 1914-1939 [Polish History 1914-1939], 
(Wroclaw, 1985), 124. Which meant that Warsaw found itself just as frequently having to 
intervene in defence of Poles abroad as being berated for mistreatment of its own minorities. For 
more on the Polish Minorities Treaty (revoked by Warsaw in 1934) and an overview of the 
European minority problem, see Mark Mazower, 'Minorities and the League of Nations in 
Interwar Europe', Daedalus, 126 (2), (1997), 47-63. For an overview of the role of the League of 
Nations in the international framework of minority rights protection (including case studies) see, 
Susan Pedersen, 'Back to the League of Nations: Review Essay', American Historical Review, 112 
(4), (2007), 1091-1117, Carole Fink, 'The League of Nations and the Minorities Question', World 
Affairs, 157 (4), (1995), 197-205. Contemporaneous perspectives on minority issues can be found 
in Joseph S. Roucek, 'The Problem of Minorities and the League of Nations', Journal of 
Comparative Legislation and International Law, 15 (1), (1933), 67-76 and Helmer Rosting, 
'Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations', The American Journal of International Law, 
17 (4), (1923), 641-660. 
501 Beck's instruction for Ambassador Lipski before the latter's meeting with Hitler. Jozef Beck, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Jozef Lipski, Polish Ambassador in Berlin, 19 Sept. 
1938, PSIM, A.11.49/N/7. 
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(...) It seems clear from this and from other indications which have 
reached me that military circles in Poland would, on the whole, 
welcome the establishment of a common frontier between Poland 
and Hungary which would, they think, strengthen the resistance of 
the States between Germany and Russia and would have the 
additional advantage of eliminating the danger for Poland of 
possible Russian military influence in Czechoslovakia. In my 
opinion, such a view goes considerably further than the official 
policy of the Polish Government.502 
 
A conversation with the Chief of the General Staff, Waclaw Stachiewicz, some two 
weeks later reinforced Godfrey’s suspicions that the Polish military started to harbor 
aggressive intentions against Czechoslovakia.503 Soon, it became clear that the 
impulse for the about-turn came from the very top. After meeting Edward Smigly- 
Rydz-Smigly, the French Ambassador Noel was distressed to find out that 'the 
Marshal referred to Czechoslovakia in a very different tone than during his 1936 
visit to Paris'.504 Indeed, the French might have even considered withholding the next 
tranche of the Rambouillet loan because of this.505  
                                                            
502 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 19 Apr. 1938, TNA, C 3348247055, FO 417/38. 
503 Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 5 May 1938, TNA, C 397247055, FO 417/38. 
504 Noel's words as recounted to Ambassador Juliusz Lukasiewicz by the French Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Georges Bonnet. Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador in Paris, to Jozef Beck, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, 18 Jun. 1938, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/1. 
505  In a conversation Howard Kennard, Ambassador Leon Noel remarked that if Poland does not 
provide “suitable reassurances towards Czechoslovakia he will recommend to his government that 
they should make use of the Rambouillet for French Military Credits to Poland to bring pressure 
to bear.” Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to William Strang, Head of the 




It is possible that one of the reasons behind this change was increased fear of 
Soviet Russia. During both the Anschluss and the Polish-Lithuanian crisis, Moscow 
limited its response to words – communiqués, stern warnings, and even press 
articles.506 But when in early spring 1938 it became increasingly clear that Hitler's 
next target would be its ally Czechoslovakia, a military intervention by the Soviet 
Union that may, or may not have, become a vehicle for occupying Czechoslovakia’s 
neighbours looked more realistic.507 
By then, the strategic work on the defensive plan 'Wschod' (East) was drawing to 
a close and suddenly all the threats the Polish planners had long worried about – the 
security of the Caucasian border or the presence of the Soviet Air Force at modern 
Czechoslovak airports – became more real.508 Thus, as crude anti-Czech propaganda 
appeared in the Armed Forces' daily Polska Zbrojna and Polish officers started 
'longing for an opportunity to have a go at the Czechs and get back Teschen Silesia'; 
the matter of establishing a common Polish-Hungarian border was raised with 
increased urgency.509  
                                                            
506 For example, the telling off of the Polish Ambassador Waclaw Grzybowski by Litvinov in the 
aftermath of the Polish ultimatum to Lithuania. Sakwa, 'The Polish Ultimatum', 223. 
507 Indeed, in September 1938, the Czechoslovak Representative in Moscow, Zdenek Fierlinger, 
warned President Benes that the Soviet Union could be looking to establish common border with 
Czechoslovakia by, possibly, seizing parts of Poland. Gerhard L. Weiberg, William R. Rock and 
Anna M. Cienciala, 'Essay and Reflection: The Munich Crisis Re-Visited', The International 
History Review, 11(4), (1989), 670.  
508 General Tadeusz Malinowski, to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 13 Feb. 1940. PISM, 
A.11.49/Cz/3. Romanian documents discovered since by Jiri Hochman disproved Malinowski's 
view, by proving Soviet leadership's unwillingness to send aid to Czechoslovakia through 
Romanian territory in September 1938. Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of 
Collective Security, 1934-1938, (New York, 1984), 194-201. 
509 Capitan T.A.H. Coltman, Officer at the War Office in London, to William Strang, Head of the 
Central Department in the Foreign Office in London. 14 Jun. 1938, TNA, C 379558555, FO 
371/21806. For analysis of Warsaw's attempts to coordinate approach with Budapest see Gerhard 
L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting Wolrd War II, 1937-1939, 
(Chicago, 1970), 401-402. 
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Beck was, of course, also no friend of the Czechs. Not only did he remember the 
'beastly way' they behaved during the Polish Bolshevik war, he also saw Prague as 
an obstacle that 'got in the way of his policy' and had a personal dislike for Benes 
whom he thought 'small' and 'a know-it-all'.510 The authorities in Prague were, quite 
correctly, 511  convinced that no rapprochement was possible for as long as he 
remained Foreign Minister.512 Yet an April 1938 'fact-finding' mission to Warsaw 
showed the Czechs that Beck's policy line of acknowledging the Polish right to 
Zaolzie without using inflammatory language and making aggressive gestures was 
widely popular with the public. 513  Indeed, one of the leaders of the Peasant 
movement, Maciej Rataj was even reported as saying that '[were he] to become 
Foreign Minister today, [he] would not really be able to act differently from Beck' 
towards Czechoslovakia.514  
 
                                                            
510 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 52-53. 
511 After a Slovak, Milan Hodza become Czechoslovak Prime Minister in 1935 some in the Polish 
Foreign Ministry looked at ways of improving relations between Warsaw and Prague. However, 
when Lubienski showed Beck his draft analysis he was told “But, my dear, we don't really want to 
improve our relations with the Czechs.” The Chef the Cabinet interpreted this to mean that the 
Minister saw Czechoslovakia as a convenient 'problem' shared with Berlin. Michal Lubienski's 
Memoir, JPIoA Archiwum Jana Weinsteina, Zes. 103/28. 
512 On 26 March 1938, the Czech representative in Warsaw, Juraj Slavik wrote: 'As long as there is 
no change of regime in Poland and as long as Beck directs Polish foreign policy, there is no hope 
for a Polish-Czechoslovak agreement (...)' quoted in Anna M. Cienciala, Poland and the Western 
Powers 1938-1939: A Study in the Interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe, (London-
Toronto, 1968), 66.  
513 Aided by the ill disposed towards Beck ambassador Leon Noel, a Czechoslovak expert on Polish 
affairs, dr Vaclav Fiala, travelled to Poland and met with the leaders of the Opposition parties and 
persons close to general Sikorski. Anna M. Cienciala describes this visit in some detail. Cienciala, 
A Study, 66-68. 
514 Cienciala, A Study, 67. 
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Naturally, the fact that the Minister did not want to commit publicly to pursuing a 
border with friendly Hungary did not mean that he was averse to the idea.515 In fact, 
it was quite the contrary. According to Pawel Starzenski, Beck saw the common 
border as a key element of Poland's defence 'embankment' and discussed its benefits 
with Miklos Horthy during the latter's visit in Poland in February 1938.516 He did, 
however, want the flexibility to pursue this elusive goal at a convenient time, free 
from Western hostility or German scepticism.517 Poland's territorial demands were 
something altogether different and, hence, were clearly defined from the beginning. 
In Beck's view they were constant and just. Warsaw wanted nothing more or less 
than the parts of Teschen Silesia inhabited by the Polish majority and which Marshal 
Pilsudski promised to bring back into the Motherland.518 As we will see, this would 




When the first wave of Czechoslovak crisis swept through Europe in May 1938, 
Beck removed himself from Warsaw and went to Sweden. Some saw it as a 
smokescreen that ensured that ‘he should not appear to be engrossed in the affairs of 
                                                            
515 When asked if he endorses the army's position Beck categorically denied it and assured 
Ambassador Kennard that the Polish government harbours no aggressive intentions towards 
Czechoslovakia. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw. to Viscount Halifax, Foreign 
Secretary in London, 4 May 1938, TNA, C 397247055, FO 417/38.  
516 Starzenski, Trzy lata,  83; also Weinberg, The Foreign Policy, vol. 2, 404-405. 
517 Clifford Norton attributed Beck's unwillingness to discuss a Polish-Hungarian border to Berlin not 
seeing 'these facile dreams (…) en coleur rose.' Clifford Norton, British Charge d'Affaires in 
Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 24 Aug. 1938, TNA, C 8764267655, 
FO 417/38; interestingly, writing with hindsight, Zara Steiner argues that both Warsaw's and 
Budapest’s territorial designs were carefully planned and choreographed by Berlin. Steiner, The 
Triumph of the Dark, 614-615. 
518 According to Beck, this solemn promise was made in Belvedere to a delegation of Polish Trans-
Olzan activists at  some point between 1926 and 1935. Despite efforts to do so, the author was 
unable to confirm the actual date. Starzenski, Trzy lata, 52-53. 
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Czechoslovakia.’519 In reality the visit had long been planned and Beck, who was 
convinced nothing much would come of the Czech affair, decided not to cancel.520 
The Stockholm trip was first in what became the Minister's 'grand tour of the North' 
as he travelled to Tallinn in June, to Riga in July and to Oslo and Copenhagen in 
August. The common purpose of all the visits was to improve relations and, 
implicitly, Poland's strategic position.521  
Beck returned to Warsaw on 4 August and had an almost immediate run in with 
Rydz-Smigly who, once again put the Minister down over his pro-German policy. 
The two men clashed over a German aircraft that attempted to fly over Polish 
airspace sometime in late July. 'Attempted' because as soon as it entered the Polish 
Corridor, an anti-aircraft battery fired shots and forced it to turn back. Later, 
intrusions onto the Polish sky became quite a common nuisance but in 1938 they 
were relatively rare so when the German government protested, Beck intervened on 
their behalf in good faith. According to accounts he 'asked Marshal Rydz-Smigly to 
give instructions to avoid possibility of a repetition'.522 But if Beck the Minister 
hoped for understanding he did not get it. Instead, 'the Marshal is reported to have 
replied that, on the contrary, Polish commanders would have to answer to him if they 
did not carry out his instructions, which were to open fire in such cases'.523 The 
                                                            
519 Clifford Norton, British Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 24 Aug. 1938, TNA, C 8764267655, FO 417/38.  
520 According to Lubienski, Beck doubted the French and Soviet predictions that a German attack on 
Czechoslovakia was impending. Michal Lubienski's Memoir, JPIoA Archiwum Jana Weinsteina, 
Zes. 103/28. 
521 Beck saw the, broadly defined, Scandinavian countries as potential allies; elements of an effective 
buffer zone between Germany and the USSR. Starzenski, Trzy lata, 76; Steiner, The Triumph of 
the Dark, 587. 
522 Clifford Norton, British Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 9 Aug. 1938. TNA, C 822526718, FO 417/38. 
523 Clifford Norton, British Charge d'Affaires in Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in 
London, 9 Aug. 1938. TNA, C 822526718, FO 417/38. 
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censure might have been indirect, but the snub was very clear and aimed not just at 
the Foreign Minister but also the German leadership.  
 
The proverbial knives were out once again and, in late August, Warsaw's society 
speculated that Beck's days at the Ministry were numbered. The source of the gossip 
was so credible that even other European Foreign Ministers excitedly and, no doubt, 
in 'greatest confidence' spoke about Marshal Rydz-Smigly's upcoming ‘action’, 
which would change Polish foreign policy.524 As it happened, Poland did nearly 
loose its Foreign Minister on the eve of the Czechoslovak Crisis but the 
circumstances were somewhat different.  
 
On 13 September 1938, just a day after Adolf Hitler publicly announced 
Germany’s demand for the Sudetenland in Nuremberg, President Moscicki 
dismissed the Parliament and called and early election for November 1938. The 
action was directed against Beck's friend, the former Prime Minister, Walery Slawek 
who had, beating the official OZN candidate, just taken over as the Speaker of the 
Sejm following the death, in June, of the previous Speaker Stanislaw Car. As 
Speaker Slawek, would have held considerable influence over the selection of 
members of the Electoral Council the body responsible for selecting the new 
president. Slawek (see pages 124 – 125) was a vocal critic of both the new Marshal 
and his Camp of National Unity and there was a risk that he would upset Rydz-
                                                            
524 Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen shared this intelligence with his Czech 
counterpart, Kamil Krofta, during the Entente Foreign Ministers' Conference in Bled in late 
August 1938. Krofta then recounted it to the British Ambassador to Prague Newton. Basil 
Newton, British Ambassador in Prague, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 25 
Aug.1938, TNA,  C 8843247055, FO 371/21809. More generally on Romanian-Soviet actions and 
reactions during the Crisis, see Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of 
World War II (Cambridge, 2009).  
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Smigly's electoral chances.525 A campaign launched by the OZN against Slawek 
immediately after the Parliament's dissolution ensured that he would not re-enter the 
Sejm.526  
 
Moscicki's move seems to have been unexpected, at least in the Foreign Ministry. 
Beck, who obviously did not see it coming, reportedly found out about it from the 
radio and reacted with considerable anger. 527  On 13 September, days before 
Chamberlain's journey to Berchtesgaden, the Minister tended his resignation. In his 
letter to Moscicki, Beck implied that he had no choice but to quit: ‘the fact that you, 
Mr President, issued directives which affect the country's external standing – at a 
time of extremely high international tension and without requesting my prior 
assessment of the situation – suggests lack of trust in your Foreign Affairs 
Minister.’528 Reading between the lines, it is unlikely that the ruthless removal of 
Slawek did not weigh on the Minister's threat. After all, Slawek was also at the 
centre of events on the previous occasion that Beck attempted to give up his post.529 
This time too, the resignation was not accepted, and, after a long discussion with the 
President, Beck decided to withdraw it.530  
 
                                                            
525 Ignacy Moscicki's second term finished in 1940 and by 1938 Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly was 
openly groomed to replace him. Slawomir Koper, Zycie prywatne elit II Rzeczpospolitej [The 
private life of the elites of the Second Polish Republic], (Warszawa, 2005), 295. 
526 A number of other prominent 'Colonels', including two other former Prime Ministers Janusz 
Jedrzejewicz and Kazimierz Switalski, also failed to get in. Andrzej Garlicki, Piekne lata 
trzydzieste [The beautiful Thirties], (Warszawa, 2008), 269. 
527 Kornat, Polityka rownowagi, 403. 
528 Letter of resignation, from Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, to Ignacy 
Moscicki, President of Poland, 13 Sept. 1938, JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weisnteina Zes. 103/34. 
529 We discussed these events in Chapter 3. See 110. 
530 Wladyslaw Pobog-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski [Poland's modern political 




The Jackal's feast531 
Speaking on 14 October 1944to the ill-fated Polish Prime Minister in exile, 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Winston Churchill remarked that ‘had Pilsudski lived, things 
would have taken a different turn. Although I did not have the opportunity to meet 
him, I have the greatest respect for his person and am convinced that if he [Pilsudski] 
had been alive, Beck would not have done what he did to the Czechs.’532 Almost 
exactly six years previously Adolf Hitler also invoked the dead Marshal when 
talking about the Polish action in Teschen Silesia. He also never met Pilsudski but he 
believed that the Marshal would be very pleased with his 'good lads’' conduct during 
the Czechoslovak crisis.533 Naturally, we cannot know how Marshal Pilsudski's 
foreign policy doctrine would have evolved had he lived past 1935 but in relation to 
his last known policy we can safely say they were both wrong. Churchill was wrong 
because Pilsudski disliked the Czechs deeply and was adamant that the Trans-Olza 
region should be returned to Poland. Hitler was wrong because the poor tactics and 
discord among the 'good lads' would have likely infuriated the old Marshal.  
 
                                                            
531 Winston Churchill likened the Polish action in Czechoslovakia to a jackal picking on carrion. 
Waldemar Kowalski, Interview with Marek Kornat, Polish Press Agency, 4 Nov. 2012, 
http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/prof-marek-kornat-sojusz-z-hitlerem-uczynilby-z-polski-kolonie-
niemiec (last accessed on 15 November 2014).  
532 Note on a conversation between Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister in Exile, and 
Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, about Soviet territorial claims and the 
reconstruction of the Polish government, 14 Oct. 1944. JPIoA, Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina Zes. 
103/34. 
533 Joachim von Ribbentrop passed Hitler's approving comment ('Die Polen sind ganze Kerls. 
Pilsudski ware mit ihnen zufrieden gewesen') to Ambassador Lipski. Jozef Lipski, Polish 
Ambassador in Warsaw, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, 24 Oct.1938, 
PISM A.11.49/N/7. 
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The Polish-Czechoslovak crisis has naturally attracted a great deal of scholarly 
attention and merited numerous monographs and many an article.534 I will therefore 
provide only a brief overview of the main events and focus on those aspects that are 
relevant to the main focus of this thesis. Namely, the conflict between Minister Beck 
and Marshal Rydz-Smigly and its effect on the German threat perception.  
 
Before he set off on his Baltic odyssey, Minister Beck managed to secure first 
Czechoslovak and later French promises that the Polish minority in Teschen Silesia 
should be extended the same concessions as any granted to the Sudeten Germans in 
the future. Thus, as the German pressure on Prague intensified once again in August 
1938, Warsaw made demands to have a seat at the table at which any multilateral 
pact, including Germany and affecting Poland might be negotiated.535 Therefore, 
when it was announced that the matter was to be resolved by a conference of the 
Four European Powers and without direct participation of Czechoslovakia, some 
Polish protest became inevitable. When it then emerged that Polish and Hungarian 
territorial claims would not be dealt with in Munich but in distant unspecified future, 
Beck – always wary of Poland's actual or perceived marginalisation – decided that 
he was left with little choice but to force Czechoslovakia to give up Teschen 
                                                            
534 Recent Polish language examples include: Joanna Januszewska-Jurkiewicz, Zaolzie: w polityce 
rzadu i opinii spoleczenstwa polskiego 1925-1937 [Zaolzie: the government's policy and public 
opinion 1925-1937], (Katowice, 2001); Jerzy Wiechowski, Spor o Zaolzie [The quarrel over 
Zaolzie], (Warszawa, 1990); Agnieszka Knyt (ed.), Zaolzie: polsko-czeski spor o Slask Cieszynski 
1918-2008 [Zaolzie: the Polish-Czech conflict over Teschen Silesia 1918-2008], (Warszawa, 
2008).  
535 Juliusz Lukasiewicz, Polish Ambassador in Paris, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Warsaw, undated, PISM, A.11/Cz/3. 
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Silesia.536 According to Minister Kwiatkowski, Beck saw Munich as a 'dangerous 
precedent' that could affect Poland's vital interests in the future. Thus, he argued, 
We must quickly and unequivocally oppose the use of these sort of 
methods in dealing with territorial conflicts (…) Poland's strong and 
determined stance on the matter could protect her from a future 
‘Munich’. Germany’s [geographic] proximity should also spur Poland 
into taking an immediate action. There is a danger that, if we wait and 
dally, the Reich could annex this valuable, highly industrialised territory 
and our claim to the region would be ignored for many years to come. 
Czechoslovakia had agreed to treat our territorial demands as equal with 
German ones. If today the Western Powers approve of Prague's ceding 
the region inhabited by a German minority to the Reich then we must 
demand that our small but justified application be dealt with 
analogically.537 
 
Another reason why Warsaw had so little room to maneuver was public 
pressure.538 Repeated news of Czechoslovak mistreatment of the Polish minority in 
                                                            
536 Steiner believes that this was choreographed by Hitler to alienate his next victim. If so, the 
strategy proved successful in the short term. Western, and in particular British, public and 
politicians were outraged at Poland's unsporting behaviour. Miroslaw Arciszewski, Former 
Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, in a statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 27 Feb. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3; also Gerhard L. Weinberg, The 
foreign policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939, (London, 1980), 478; 
Richard M. Watt, Bitter Glory: Poland and its Fate 1918-1939, (New York, 1982), 458-459. 
537 Michal J. Zacharias, 'Polityka zagraniczna Polski wobec zagrozenia ze strony Niemiec i Zwiazku 
Sowieckiego w okresie miedzywojennym' ['Polish Foreign Policy and the question of German and 
Soviet threat in the inter-war period]', in Z dziejow polityki i dyplomacji Polskiej: Studia 
posiwecone pamieci Edwarda hr. Raczynskiego Prezydenta Rzeczpospolitej na wychodzstwie 
[Studies in Polish policy and diplomacy: In memoriam of Count Edward Raczynski] edited by 
Henryk Bulhak, (Warszawa, 1994), 280. 
538 Howard Kennard's dispatch from 10 September provides an in-depth analysis of the public mood 
in Poland on the eve of the Czechoslovak crisis. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in 
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Teschen Silesia had kept the issue alive in the public’s consciousness for the past 
twenty years but in late summer 1938 the anti-Czechoslovak agitation turned into 
frenzy. Like we saw earlier during the Lithuania crisis, here too, the OZN was 
instrumental in stoking the nationalist zeal. Gazeta Polska reported hundreds of 
'spontaneous' protests during which whole factory crews, public institutions staff, 
teachers with schoolchildren and scout brigades marched against 'Czech 
imperialism'. These were often coordinated or addressed by local Camp of National 
Unity activists.539 The largest demonstration took place on 22 September 1938 when 
250,000 people (according to official figures) gathered in Warsaw. Their chant: 
'Down with Czechoslovakia' was occasionally punctuated by shouts of 'Long live 
Rydz-Smigly ' which turned to 'Lead us against the Czechs' after the Marshal 
addressed the crowds from a balcony.540 A few days later, on 27 September, 
Kazimierz Pape, the Polish envoy, would present the government in Prague with 
Warsaw's official demands.  
 
There is a tendency in the historiography of the Polish-Czechoslovak crisis to 
present it as engineered by Minister Beck who won President Moscicki and Marshal 
Rydz-Smigly over to his view. However, when it comes to Rydz-Smigly, this 
assessment may be incorrect.541 Indeed, this thesis argues that, both men cooperated 
over Zaolzie because it suited their individual agendas. Beck wanted Teschen Silesia 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Warsaw, to Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 10 Sept, 1938, TNA, C9648530218, 
FO 417/38. 
539 Piotr Oseka, 'Wodzu prowadz na Czechy – Prasa polska w 1938' ['Lead us on the Czechs 
Commander – Polish Press in 1938'], Gazeta Wyborcza, 27 Sept. 2008, 25. 
540 Ibid., 25. 
541 Beck had to battle over his plan to issue an ultimatum to Prague but his opponent was not Marshal 
Rydz-Smigly but Minister Kwiatkowski. Piotr Lossowski, (ed.), Historia dyplomacji polskiej [The 
history of Polish diplomacy], vol. 4, (Warszawa, 1995), 567-570. 
 193 
to be returned to Poland and to prove to the Western Powers that Warsaw would 
stand by and be dictated to.542 Rydz-Smigly, on the other hand, stood to benefit from 
a popular bloodless victory, and despite his 1936 Paris reassurances, the Marshal 
was not exactly sympathetic to Czechoslovakia.543 Beck's insistence that Poland 
should not formally cooperate with Germany meant that Rydz-Smigly could not 
even chastise him for that. Indeed, both men agreed that in the event of a war, which 
Beck at least considered unlikely,544 Poland would throw her lot with Britain and 
France.545  
 
For a brief moment, there existed a working relationship between the military 
command and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Throughout the crisis, Beck and 
Rydz-Smigly remained in constant contact either personally or through the so-called 
'directors' line' (a special phone line connecting the President, cabinet ministers and 
the Marshal).546 The (in)famous map of Polish territorial interests which referred to 
Oderberg rail junction as Bogumin, and which was presented to the Germans by 
                                                            
542 According to his manuscript, when the Munich agreement was published, Minister Beck told 
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Ambassador Lipski was drafted by the General Staff.547 Finally, the decision to issue 
Prague with an ultimatum was agreed with the Marshal.548 Polish demands were 
accepted. The following day, 1 October 1938, Rydz-Smigly ordered General 
Wladyslaw Bartnowski to oversee Czechoslovak withdrawal from the Trans-Olza 
region. The public was ecstatic and the press jubilant. Beck and Rydz-Smigly, who 
travelled, separately, to Zaolzie were both feted and, judging by contemporary 
photographs, extremely satisfied. 
 
The easy collaboration ended even before the jubilant patriots celebrating in 
Teschen ran out of the Czech stocks of beer and sausages.549 In the absence of a 
unifying goal, an erstwhile collaborator reverted back to being a usurper interfering 
with Beck's Slovak policy objectives.  
As much as the Poles disliked the Czechs, whom, as Boleslaw Wieniawa-
Dlugoszowski, Pilsudski's favourite, put it in 1938, they regarded as 'no longer a 
Slav nation but a mix, an amalgam of all races who cannot be relied on'; they felt a 
kinship with the predominantly Catholic Slovaks.550 Indeed, in a conversation with 
Goering on 24 August 1938, Ambassador Lipski assured him that: 'Poland enjoys a 
particularly close relationship with Slovakia due to common race and language. The 
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ties are particularly close because we have no [political or territorial] quarrel with 
Slovakia. Their national awareness had grown enormously over the last few years 
and it is becoming imperative that she is granted an autonomous status either by the 
Czechs or the Hungarians'.551 Once autonomous, the Poles assumed, Slovakia would 
become a natural ally;552 or to quote colonel Wieniawa once more:  'she would walk 
into our arms'.553  
 
The successful recovery of Teschen Silesia allowed Minister Beck to focus on the 
next item(s) on his security agenda, building partnership with Slovakia and, 
according to some sources, developing an Italo-Polish-Hungarian alliance.554 The 
new Polish Ambassador to Rome, Beck's friend Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, 
was to find out whether an agreement could be brokered with Rome.555 Budapest had 
also been approached.556 On Slovakia, the Minister had already been in contact with 
the polonophile nationalist leader Karol Sidor whom he reassured that Poland had no 
interest in Slovak territory.557 Beck was wrong. As it turned out, Marshal Rydz-
Smigly did have an interest in Slovakia.  
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Although no one in the Polish General Staff reflected on the shortsightedness of 
aiding Germany dismantle Czechoslovakia, they decided that controlling a slither of 
Slovakia's mountainous territory including Jaworzyna and part of Spisz would 
significantly improve Poland's defensive position. When he found out about it, Beck 
vehemently opposed the idea. Most likely, he realised that by annexing a previously 
unclaimed territory with a Slovak majority Warsaw would create anti-Polish 
sentiment where there previously was none. 558  Numerous, undoubtedly heated, 
phone calls with Marshal Rydz-Smigly followed. Eventually and 'under extreme 
duress', the Minister grudgingly agreed to the principle of the Staff's demand but 
tried to limit its scope as much as possible.559  
At least that is what Pawel Starzenski's laconic account tells us happened. 
However, a previously unknown letter from Bohdan Podoski to historian Piotr 
Wandycz suggests that the confrontation was a lot more dramatic.560 Writing in 
1975, Podoski claimed that the Minister was so unhappy with the military's conduct 
during the Polish-Czechoslovak crisis that he tendered in his second resignation in 
two months in November, and even briefly stopped attending Cabinet meetings. 
Podoski's letter, written nearly four decades after the crisis it alludes to, is the only 
account of Beck's supposed resignation, so we cannot determine if the events 
mentioned are described accurately. It is possible that, annoyed at Rydz-Smigly’s 
interference, Beck made a point of missing several government meetings or even 
threatened to quit in an attempt to get the Marshal to back down. However, it is clear 
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from the two other resignation attempts mentioned in this thesis so far, we saw that 
Beck had a strong sense of responsibility for his country and it does not seem likely 
that he would have abandoned his post just as Poland's international situation 
deteriorated rapidly.561  
 
As punishment for its action in Zaolzie, Warsaw received a cold shoulder from 
both London and Paris. In Britain, Ambassador Edward Raczynski suddenly found it 
very difficult to re-establish relations with policy makers and parliamentarians. He 
was denied a meeting with Winston Churchill and it was only owing to his social 
connections that the count managed to arrange a conversation with Anthony Eden.562 
In Paris, the French Foreign Minister and a number of senior officers considered 
abandoning Poland as an ally.563 In Berlin on the other hand, on 24 October 1938, 
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop approached Ambassador Lipski with a list of German 
territorial demands, chief among which was acquiescence to the construction of an 
extraterritorial highway and rail line that would connect East Prussia with mainland 
Germany.  
 
Lipski did not report the development in the cable concerning his meeting with 
Ribbentrop, which instead included a handwritten note informing the Minister that 
part of the conversation would be relayed to him in Lipski's private letter.564 The 
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letter could not be found but Beck's reply, marked as ‘extremely secret’, from 31 
October 1938 is kept in London's Sikorski Archive.565 It contains assurances that 
maintaining good Polish-German relations is very important to Warsaw and alludes 
to the possibility of strengthening and prolonging the 1934 Non-Aggression treaty. 
What is absent from the letter is any indication that Poland was willing to even 
consider German demands. But initially Poland, or at least its Foreign Minister, did. 
This can be inferred from two other documents available in London: a semi-private 
letter from Jozef Potocki to Jozef Lipski dated 27 November 1938 and an undated 
note about the practicalities of building an extraterritorial high-way through 
Pomerania.  
 
It had generally been assumed that Minister Beck hid the existence of German 
demands from Marshal Rydz-Smigly and other policy-makers because he was 
unsure if the initiative had Hitler's approval.566 Yet the two documents mentioned 
above suggest that he not only did not question the origin of the demands but 
initially at least thought them reasonable enough to engage with. In deep secrecy, a 
small team consisting of the Minister, Ambassador Lipski, the Head of the Ministry's 
Western Department Jozef Potocki and another senior diplomat Wladyslaw Kulski 
addressed the matter or extraterritorial passageways in considerable detail.567 Indeed, 
the undated note, presumably prepared by or for this secret team, considers a range 
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of issues from whose legal and traffic code should be enforced on the highway 
through extradition, troop movements, and any necessary alterations to the Paris 
Convention, to maintenance, tolls and the number of exists.568  
 
The official reason for this extreme secrecy was to keep the Germans on their toes 
during any future negotiations but the fact that neither the Staff nor the 
Communications Ministry had been consulted about the prospective route suggests 
the Foreign Ministry wanted to wait and present them the finished project for 
approval. Thus presumably minimising external interference in any future diplomatic 
negotiations.  
 
In the previous chapter we saw that in post-Pilsudskite Poland, populist 
nationalist rhetoric increasingly appealed to much of the political and military 
leadership. This continued in 1938. Indeed, on previous pages I described the press’s 
aggressive language and the exploitation of both the Polish-Lithuanian and the 
Polish-Czechoslovak crises. The Trans-Olzan success in particular gave the Poles, 
including a major part of the Sanacja political establishment, a false sense of strength 
and security that would have likely made the already questionable German proposal 
particularly unpalatable. We have also already established that Marshal Rydz-Smigly 
interfered in all aspects of Polish foreign policy. Indeed, readers will remember the 
vicious attack from the OZN press on Beck's plans to renegotiate the Danziger 
constitution. It is likely that if he, or his political advisers, found out that the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs were looking into a possible deal with the Third Reich, 
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it would have been canned amid a media campaign of muscle flexing, posturing and 
provocative rhetoric of the kind we would see in the summer of 1939.  
 
Beck's January 1939 conversation with Hitler would undermine the Minister's 
hope that Germany would not attempt to dominate Poland and would force him to 
finally disclose the Nazi territorial demands to Marshal Rydz-Smigly. That he 
relayed them to a foreign diplomat more than two weeks before informing his 
Commander in Chief is testament to the broken relationship between the men.569 As 
it would turn out, this delay would cost Warsaw precious planning and preparation 
time; on top of her having already been weakened by poor strategy. And while the 
Western displeasure with Polish 'ultimatum diplomacy' would not prevent alliances 
from being forged in time for war, these 'bloodless victories' had a detrimental effect 
on the Polish public and military who became overconfident in their country's 
offensive capability. This would filter down to policy makers such as Economy 
Minister Kwiatkowski who would prove extremely reluctant to raise military 
spending and even Minister Beck who was kept ignorant about the actual state of the 
Polish armed forces. 
 
This discrepancy between the real and imagined strength will be at the core of the 
following chapter, where we will examine its effect on intelligence analysis. This in 
turn affected Minister Beck's foreign policy formation and the perception of Poland's 
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international situation by Marshal Rydz-Smigly, the political elite and swaths of the 












Chapter Six: 1939 – The race to war 
 
Peace is a precious and a desirable thing. Our generation, bloodied in 
wars, certainly deserves peace. But peace, like almost all things of this 
world, has its price, a high but a measurable one. We in Poland do not 
know the concept of peace at any price. There is only one thing in the 
lives of men, nations and countries that is without price. That thing is 
honour.570  
 
With those words, Poland's Foreign Minister, Jozef Beck, rebuffed German 
demands to cede her territory in Pomerania in his famous speech delivered to the 
Sejm on 5 May 1939. Reaction to his defiance was tumultuous and positive. The 
chamber gave him a standing ovation and congratulatory messages, from both 
Poland and abroad, soon began flooding the Foreign Ministry. However, though his 
popularity soared, Beck was far from euphoric.571 According to his closest associates, 
in the days that followed the Minister appeared worn down by the recent events and 
even visibly distraught. One of his Deputies, Miroslaw Arciszewski, recalls that 
Beck's reaction to seeing the telegrams of support was to throw them hatefully to the 
other side of his large, sparsely decorated office.572 A highly intelligent man, Beck 
                                                            
570 Józef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, in an expose to the Sejm, 5 May 1939. 
Reprinted in Jozef Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki Jana Szembeka [Jan Szembek's Diary and 
Documents] Vol.4, (London, 1972),  727-732. 
571 According to Beck's letter to his friend Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, there were plans to 
entrust him with the   forming a new government. Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Warsaw, to Boleslaw Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski, Polish Ambassador in Rome, 10 May 1939, 
Stanislaw Sierpowski, Zrodla do historii powszechnej okresu miedzywojennego [Documents on 
modern history of the inter war period],  Vol. 3,  (Poznan, 1992), 426. 
572 Miroslaw Arciszewski, former Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs or Poland, in a  
statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission,  27 Feb. 1941, Polish Institute and Sikorski 
 203 
realised that his 5 May speech marked not only an end to his foreign policy based on 
bilateral agreements and détente with Germany but its complete failure.  
That Poland might need to reassess her foreign policy objectives became clear by 
March 1939. Interestingly, but perhaps unsurprisingly given Warsaw's hostility to its 
southern neighbour, this realisation was not caused by German occupation of Prague. 
It was Berlin's forceful imposition of a 'Protectorate' over Slovakia, followed by 
rapid construction of fortifications in the Wag valley and the occupation of the 
Lithuanian Port of Klaipeda (Memel) that shook the Polish civilian, and especially 
the military, authorities. 573  This was when Beck had decided to pursue close 
cooperation with Great Britain and even, it is alleged, attempted to leave office once 
again.574 But in the end he remained at the helm of the Foreign Ministry through the 
summer of 1939, the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, the German attack, 
British and French entry into the war and finally the evacuation of the government to 
Podole and then Romania.   
 
The Many Misjudgments of Minister Beck 
 
In previous chapters, I traced the breakdown of the relationship between the 
occupants of the Bruehl Palace and Wierzbowa. Examining the events of 1939, this 
chapter will demonstrate how the dysfunctional relationship between Beck and 
Rydz-Smigly undermined the Poles’ response to the immediate German threat and 
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prevented the Polish authorities from taking advantage of opportunities which 
presented themselves and that could possibly have improved Poland's defensive 
position in September 1939. Furthermore, the empire building that had previously 
characterised the interaction between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General 
Inspectorate of the Armed Forces had spread to other institutions such as the 
Treasury and the General Staff. As we shall see, each of these players pursued their 
own individual, usually conflicting, agendas in a fashion that often harmed Poland's 
interests on the eve of the outbreak of war. 
 
While the 5 May speech was a watershed, marking a radical change of Polish-
German relations, it was also a culmination of a process of deterioration that had 
begun seven months earlier. While Minister Beck seethed over the snub of being 
excluded from the Munich Conference, Polish public opinion believed the country 
had achieved an important international victory.  However, instead of demonstrating 
strength, decisiveness and military might, the Polish occupation of Tscheshen Silesia 
aggrieved the western great powers and seemed to place Poland firmly in the 
German-sphere of influence.575 It compromised Poland’s reputation and, while the 
French and British press overflowed with criticism of Poland, Berlin felt ready to 
extract a firm commitment from Warsaw.576 This was a crucial moment in the 
coming of the Second World War, because, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
immediately after Munich the German leadership had found itself unsure [about] 
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how to proceed. If Berlin turned East, it would have almost certainly antagonised 
Poland but if it set its sights on France, it needed Warsaw's help, or at least 
acquiescence to secure its rear.  
 
Germany had previously floated the idea of joining the Anti-Commintern pact to 
the Poles but they were unwilling to do so.577 Thus, a decision was made in Berlin to 
heighten the pressure. On 24 October 1938, the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Jozef 
Lipski, was invited to lunch at the Grand Hotel in Berchtesgaden by Joachim von 
Ribbentrop. There, the German Foreign Minister put forward, for the first time, the 
idea of Gesamtlösung – a final settlement of ongoing Polish-German issues. In 
exchange for allowing the construction of an extraterritorial rail and road connection, 
and agreeing to Danzig's reconnection with mainland Germany, Poland would get a 
guarantee of her western border and a 25-year extension of the 1934 Non-
Aggression Pact.578  
Lipski, clearly taken aback by the German proposal, promptly informed 
Ribbentrop that Polish agreement was extremely unlikely.579 He then proceeded to 
exclude the German demands from the report he drafted to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs the following day and recounted the matter in a personal letter to Beck 
instead.580 Beck's deputy Szembek became the third, and last, person privy to the 
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matter when Lipski confided in him on 29 October.581 A polite refusal was drafted 
and delivered to Ribbentrop on 19 November and the issue appeared settled. Indeed, 
Ribbentrop even confirmed Beck and Lipski's speculation that the initiative was his 
and his alone and the Polish-German relationship seemingly continued as before.582 
Indeed, during a conversation with Szembek on 3 January 1939, Ambassador Lipski 
expected another German attempt to attract Poland to join the Anti-Comintern pact 
and perhaps a timid mention of the motorway.583 Asked whether the Polish refusal to 
cooperate might result in an armed conflict, Lipski conveyed the Polish military 
propaganda in remarking that while theoretically possible, a German-Polish war 
would be too expensive for Berlin to consider it.584 
 
Unfortunately, as Jozef Beck was to discover three days later, when he visited 
Hitler in his Berchtesgaden retreat on the way back from the French Riviera (where 
he unsuccessfully tried to meet with Bonnett), Ribbentrop had not acted alone and 
the matter was far from forgotten. After reassuring the Polish Minister that a strong 
Poland was a strategic necessity for Germany and alluding to future collaboration 
between both countries against Soviet Russia, Hitler turned to Danzig.585 Much to 
Beck's displeasure, the Fuhrer stated that Danzig was a German city and that it 
would, undoubtedly, return to the Reich.586 The Polish Minister must have stiffened 
upon hearing this and Hitler reportedly returned to a more conciliatory tone. 
Promising to respect Poland's economic interests in the city. Beck, responded with 
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what he thought a firm but polite refusal. This turned out to be Beck's second great 
misjudgment. For one thing, as pointed out by Miroslaw Arciszewski, Beck's 
firmness was lost on the Fuhrer who 'took [the accompanying pleasantries] to mean 
that Poland would eventually yield'.587 Worse still, Hitler’s perceived backing down 
convinced the Minister that 'firmness and strong nerves [were] they key to 
successfully dealing with the Germans, because Germany [had] nothing to gain by 
attacking Poland.' 588 He reportedly clung to this belief until August 1939 and  
inculcated it in his department and with President Moscicki.589  
 
And yet, according to his Chief of Staff, Michal Lubienski, Beck left 
Berchtesgaden angry and determined to revitalise Polish relations with the western 
great powers.590 Indeed, when, three days later, Szembek mentioned to him that he 
planned to make a short, private trip to London, the Minister implied that he wanted 
him to speak to 'a few Englishmen' about closer cooperation.591 What is more, the 
Foreign Minister finally informed Marshal Rydz-Smigly and the President of 
German pressure. Thus, on 8 January, unbeknownst to anyone but the participants, 
five members of the National Security Council (Moscicki, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, 
Prime Minister Skladkowski and ministers Kwiatkowski and Beck) gathered in 
Warsaw's Royal Castle to assess the seriousness of German demands and the impact 
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they could have on Polish security.592 This secret meeting proved to be the first 
occasion when the possibility of a war with Germany was acknowledged and 
considered by the Polish authorities. Determined not to repeat the sad fate of 
Czechoslovakia or loose Poland's hard-won independence, the attendees agreed that 
continuing German persistence on issues of secondary importance like the 
extraterritorial highway could signal a more serious shift in the relationship between 
Berlin and Warsaw. A decision was taken to reject all German proposals and, if the 
détente had really come to an end, fight.593 At first one might think that this meeting 
marked a pivotal shift in Poland's war preparations but in reality, little changed. 
True, shortly after the 8 January meeting, Rydz-Smigly seemed to take an even 
greater interest in German matters. Indeed, demonstrating how little he understood 
the Minister, he even attempted bypassing Beck in his quest for information and 
tried to tease news out of Szembek.594 But there was no rush of planning activity in 
the General Staff whose Chief appeared more concerned with helping the 
Hungarians throttle unrest in the First Vienna Award Territories (Munkatsch).595 
Minister Kwiatkowski did not increase the military budget. Neither was there a 
change in Polish foreign policy. 
 
Perhaps Beck's anger at the Germans receded quickly and he concluded that he 
was not ready to forfeit the 1934 Agreement and thus admit that he had been wrong. 
Or, perhaps, Rydz-Smigly's heightened interest in Polish-German relations, once 
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again made the Minister afraid of losing control over his domain. Whatever his 
reasons, Beck backtracked. Two days after the Castle meeting, Beck issued a 
communiqué to all diplomatic posts that appears to confirm Arciszewski's view of 
him as 'the Optimist'. Drafted in the Minister's trademark style it read that:  
The talks in Berchtesgaden and Munich proved useful in determining 
Berlin's policy-line after the Czech crisis. Germany reaffirmed its intent 
to maintain good-neighbourly relations with Poland. 
I affirm that allegations of Hitler's new direction in Eastern Europe are 
an exaggeration. (…) German eastern policy remains extremely anti-
Russian. Colonial pursuits are at the centre of Hitler's attention.596  
 
Indeed, Beck's attempt to conceal any problems in Polish-German relations was 
so successful that the few weeks that followed saw a number of diplomatic reports 
whose authors clearly attempted to 'toe the Minister's line' and showed blatant pro-
German bias. Ambassador Jozef Potocki from Washington is one example of such a 
'Yes-Man'. In his two reports from 12 and 16 January 1939, Potocki condemned the 
‘anti-Nazi psychosis that, incited by the ‘Jewish International’ and refugees from 
Germany and Czechoslovakia, resulted in a false view that European peace is 
hanging by last threads and that war is inevitable.’597  In a thoroughly flawed 
assessment of the situation, which mirrored German assessments of American policy 
making, he went as far as to claim, that while Roosevelt thought that heightened 
American interest in international affairs distracts the public from economic 
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problems at home, he was actually being played by his political supporters, in 
particular Bernard Baruch, Governor Lehman, Justice Frankfurter and Secretary 
Morgenthau, whose chief objective is staring a world war.598 Potocki complemented 
this analysis by observations from his meeting with American Ambassador to Paris, 
William C. Bullitt, who believed that Poland was too strong to take German threat 
seriously and apparently waxed about 'the aptness of the Polish foreign policy so 
splendidly directed by the Minister, [and] which not only shielded Poland but 
granted her victory during the [recent] crisis'.599  
Similarly, Ambassador Lukasiewicz (himself a friend of Bullitt's since their time 
as Ambassadors in Moscow) reported from Paris that the realisation that the Polish-
German relation was not threatened alerted the French to the importance of their 
alliance with Warsaw. He averred that: 'in a welcome and healthy process, which 
reflects the actual balance of power in the region, Poland is rising to the position of 
France's main Eastern European ally, while Russia becomes a secondary agent […] 
tasked with protecting Warsaw's rear'. 600  The Ambassador pointed to Beck's 
independent policy as the reason for the French reappraisal of Poland. Unfortunately, 
he did not explain how this corresponded with the lack of trust in Poland's actual 
military strength that pervaded the corridors of power in Paris and London.601 In 
reality, despite Beck's earlier declaration, little was being done to improve Poland's 
relations with Western Powers. Indeed, a letter from this period, written by the 
British ambassador to Warsaw, Howard Kennard to Lord Halifax, described Beck's 
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policy as 'based on distrust' of Great Britain and France.602 Ambassadors Raczynski 
and Wieniawa-Dlugoszowski even reported on their success in reassuring the 
governments to which they have been accredited (Romanian and Italian) about 
continuing good Polish-German relation.603  
 
By then Beck was orchestrating another manifestation of Polish-German 
friendship. While in Berchtesgaden, he was approached by Ribbentrop about the 
latter's official visit to Warsaw. Annoyed and clearly unenthusiastic about the 
prospect, Beck evaded the German's prodding. However, by the time his 
communiqué went out, the Minister had changed his mind. On 11 January he 
informed the German Ambassador to Warsaw, Hans von Moltke, that he would 
welcome Ribbentrop within weeks.604 The Aswartiges Amt managed to organise the 
visit in record time, and the German Foreign Affairs Minister arrived in Warsaw on 
25 January. Just in time for the Fifth Anniversary of the Polish-German Non-
Aggression Treaty.  
 
Due to the festive nature of Ribbentrop's visit, the German leadership seemingly 
made a tactical decision not to press Poland on the Danzig-related issues.605 Thus, 
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although much to Beck's displeasure the topic inevitably surfaced at discussions 
between both ministers, it did not cause further aggravation between the sides. 
Indeed, Beck and Ribbentrop even reached 'a Gentleman's Agreement that in the 
event of the League of Nations' withdrawal from Danzig, a joint Polish-German 
declaration will be issued confirming the status quo in the city.'606 Ribbentrop also 
assured President Moscicki that 'there exist no such issues in the Polish-German 
relationship to which he – Ribbentrop – when working with Minister Beck, could not 
find a solution to.'607 What is more, German determination to please Poland, borne 
out of their intention to ensure her cooperation, succeeded in completely confusing 
the Polish Foreign Ministry Officials. First, Beck's Chef de Cabinet, Michal 
Lubienski noticed that Ribbentrop's speech during the reception organised in his 
honour by the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was 'warmer in tone' than Beck's 
one.608 Then, Polish diplomats placed great emphasis on Ribbentrop's choice of verb 
when he spoke of the deepening (vertiefen) of Polish-German cooperation. They 
became convinced their position became strong enough to secure German 
concessions. Ambassador Lipski even argued that Poland should 'at least get an 
extension of the 1934 Treaty' but Beck haughtily declared that he 'would not ask the 
Germans for anything.' 609  Yet, he too appeared unsure of what to make of 
Ribbentrop's visit.  
He was clearly unhappy about the re-emergence of the Danzig issue, the outcome 
of his talk with Ribbentrop, and how it might affect the public mood in both 
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countries.610 On the other hand, however, Beck had insisted on the German Minister's 
January arrival and later remarked to Szembek that: 'it was a good thing, that 
Ribbentrop came to Warsaw and saw for himself what Poland was.'611 He was 
convinced that the German was impressed by Polish modernity and the country's 
cultural tradition. Favourable coverage of the visit in German press and an 
unexpected mention of Poland in Hitler's speech on the sixth anniversary of his 
coming to power in Germany, appear to have convinced Beck to evaluate it 
positively.612 This resulted in another optimistic communiqué to Polish diplomatic 
missions that assured them that 'both governments are determined to uphold the 
principle of non-aggression established by the 1934 Treaty and are striving to make 
it permanent.'613 Beck had, of course, once again misjudged the situation and, once 
again, he had succeeded in misleading Polish diplomats about the state of Polish-
German relations. One example is the Polish Ambassador to Tokyo, Tadeusz Romer, 
who, upon receiving Beck's telegram, wrote how pleased he was to hear that the 
situation in Eastern Europe had stabilised.614  
 
Ribbentrop's smiles and Hitler's apparent friendliness lulled Beck into a false 
sense of security.  But the Germans were not ready to give up and the pressure on 
Poland was to increase again. Speaking with Szembek a few days before von 
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Ribbentrop's arrival, Warchalowski the Polish Consul in East Prussia, warned about 
the growing anti-Polish sentiment within the German officer corps. What is more, he 
informed the Deputy Foreign Minister about the completion of a second line of 
fortifications around Koenigsberg which was clearly designed with a Polish-German 
conflict in mind.615 There exists no evidence about whether Szembek passed this 
information on to the Second Department of General Staff (Polish military 
intelligence) which was then in a state of chaos caused by Rydz-Smigly's replacing 
its Head, Colonel Pelczynski, with his confidant, Smolenski who had previously 
served as the commanding officer at the Centre of Cavalry Training in Grudziadz 
and had no intelligence experience.616  
This chaos was compounded by Beck's refusal to act upon vital information 
supplied to him by the Service. According to Beck's Final Report, the Second 
Department suggested that Germany were unwilling to compromise but he 
seemingly ignored them. An agent had been planted as Ribbentrop's driver, informed 
Oddzial II that soon after finishing his conversation with Beck, the German Minister 
remarked to Moltke that 'they [the Poles] are tough. We might have to change our 
planned order of things and deal with other issues first.'617 It is reasonable to assume 
that these 'other issues' meant the aggressive moves in Czechoslovakia and Lithuania 
which, the Nazis hoped, would shock the Polish leadership into compliance. 
 Jozef Beck was also not aware that, prior to his arrival, Ribbentrop was 
instructed to verify German leaders’ suspicion that Minister Beck conducted his 
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policy independently of other Polish leaders.618 This is likely why, during his meeting 
with Marshal Rydz-Smigly, Ribbentrop was extremely flattering about the Polish 
army, which he even contrasted in favourable terms with the much weakened Red 
Army.619 He did not make any explicit hints about the Anti-Comintern Pact or Polish-
German military cooperation but, given that he later proceeded to complain about the 
volatility of the USSR and German lack of intelligence in this country, one may 
presume that he was trying to sound the Army's and Rydz-Smigly's personal opinion 
on these issues. As few sources documenting Ribbentrop's visit survive to this day, it 
is unclear whether the German succeeded. However, considering that he proved deaf 
to all previous German overtures, it is unlikely that that time was any different.  
 
The Unlikely Alliances  
 
'One just does not know what the Soviets might do tomorrow', Ribbentrop allegedly 
told Rydz-Smigly in the meeting discussed above.620 In hindsight, one could almost 
misconstrue this as a slip of the tongue that should have made the Poles think. 
Especially given that by late January 1939, the first signs that the Soviet Union 
might be looking for a détente with the Third Reich began arriving on Beck's desk.  
First, the Soviet Union demanded guarantees from Finland that the country would 
not join in any anti-Soviet alliance.621 Soon after that, the Polish Legate to Helsinki, 
Henryk Sokolnicki, reported back a conversation one of his staff had with the Chief 
of the Finnish Air Force, a known Polonophile, General Jarl Lundquist. Lundquist 
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had returned from a recent aviation exhibition in Paris where one of the French 
Generals 'offered [him] a bet that by Autumn 1939 Poland would be partitioned for 
the fourth time and that France would be unable or unwilling to intervene on 
Poland's behalf.'622 This document was passed on to the Chief of General Staff, 
General Waclaw Stachiewicz but Polish diplomats continued to down-play the risk 
of a German-Soviet détente, toeing the line set out by Minister Beck, who believed 
Hitler's anti-Bolshevism to be dogmatic and '[did] not believe that Germany and 
Russia could enter an alliance.' 623  Indeed, five days after Sokolnicki's report, 
Miroslaw Arciszewski evaluated the likelihood of an agreement between Berlin and 
Moscow as low. A handwritten remark mentioned that the idea 'persists' among the 
French military but Arciszewski's finished draft stated that: 'we [the Polish 
authorities] have not noticed any attempts to forge closer contacts between Moscow 
and Berlin. We have, however, confirmed Hitler's uncompromising attitude to 
Bolshevism and the USSR. Even the value of Russo-German economic exchange 
had decreased recently.'624  
Meanwhile, the Polish Ambasador to Moscow, Waclaw Grzybowski reported that 
the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Potiomkin told him that, in a move initiated by 
unspecified members of the 'German decision-making spheres', a group of German 
trade representatives would shortly be arriving in Moscow.625 The significance of this 
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move was lost on Beck because the Poles too, were due to complete a trade 
agreement with the Soviets on 19 February 1939. Indeed, this apparent eagerness to 
focus on economic matters only strengthened Beck's conviction and prompted his 
Chief of Staff, Michal Lubienski, to declare that the USSR's 'internal weakening 
[presumably meaning the Stalinist purges] and recent diplomatic defeats [exclusion 
from the Munich Conference]' were indications that the country would withdraw 
from the international arena'.626 As late as March 1939, Beck proclaimed his trust in 
Hitler to his Romanian counterpart full name Gafencu, and argued that German 
rearmament was of no concern to Poland.627 In this spirit, he ignored the information 
supplied by the British628  and, later, Ciano's warning that the relations between the 
Axis and Moscow were different to what they appeared.629 Worse, Polish authorities 
did not appear concerned when, a few days after Hitler renounced the Polish-German 
Non-Aggression Pact on 28 April 1939, the Jewish Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov 
was replaced by the gentile Vyacheslav Molotov.630 Indeed, the Polish Ambassador 
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to Moscow, Waclaw Grzybowski was convinced that 'due to the country's internal 
condition, the Soviet Union must avoid a common Soviet-German border.' 631 
Considering all this, Beck could not have reacted to the news of the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact with anything but shock and the exclamation that 'Hitler had betrayed 
his own nation. And if the German society does not react to what had happened, the 
National-Socialist doctrine will collapse.'632 
 
We know, in contrast, that Marshal Rydz-Smigly can hardly be described as pro-
German. We have also seen that, while he previously gave the Minister a more or 
less free hand in the formation of Polish-German policy, the delay in communicating 
German territorial claims in Poland made him suspicious of the information he 
received from the MFA. Indeed, following this incident, Rydz-Smigly insisted on 
personally interviewing Polish diplomats arriving in Warsaw.633 Thus, it is not 
surprising that, despite the optimism coming from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
the Marshal took warnings about a Nazi-Soviet détente more seriously. In May 1939, 
the Military Attaché in Berlin, Antonii Szymanski had a private conversation with 
the whistle-blowing General Karl Boedenschatz during which the German reportedly 
told him that 'if Hitler becomes convinced that Germany can be surrounded by 
Poland in the East, he will not hesitate to ally himself with the Devil himself.'634 
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Having learnt about this, Rydz-Smigly immediately summoned Szymanski to 
Warsaw to find out more about the situation. Rydz-Smigly interviewed Szymanski 
together with the Chief of Staff Stachiewicz, who was in much closer contact with 
Beck and subscribed to the view that Germany is not ready for war and would thus 
like to avoid it. 635  Indeed, the attaché concluded that the majority of Polish 
commanders believed that in his actions in Czechoslovakia and Klaipeda, Hitler 
simply went too far trying to stir international panic.636 And yet, Rydz-Smigly was 
seemingly determined to verify Szymanski's information and instructions were 
issued to Polish diplomats to check the intelligence about a Nazi-Soviet détente.637 
Although the Military attaché would later claim that his warnings were never taken 
seriously.  
With most of Rydz-Smigly's papers lost, we have no way of determining what 
exactly happened between the end of May, when this instruction was issued, and the 
arrival of the first responses.  Perhaps, aware of the financial difficulties faced by the 
Polish Army, Marshal Rydz-Smigly did not believe that it could withstand a war on 
two fronts.638 Or perhaps, he was worried about soldiers' morale. Maybe he simply 
felt out of his depth and chose to believe the optimism of others instead of facing up 
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to the possibility of 'dying on the Saski Square, sabres in hand.'639 We will never 
know what influenced Rydz-Smigly’s decision. What we do know, however, is that, 
when the first responses to his instruction arrived, Rydz-Smigly clearly ignored them 
because his defence strategy never addressed the possibility of joint Russian-German 
attack.640 An odd decision considering that, unlike the haphazard Defense Plan 'Z' 
(West), the Defence Plan 'W' (East) was complete.641 
 
However, before we consider Poland's military preparedness in relation to the 
country's handling of Germany in the final months preceding the outbreak of the war 
in Europe, we shall look at the second unlikely alliance of 1939, the Anglo-Polish 
bilateral treaty. The agreement, radically altered Poland's strategic position while, at 
the same time, furnishing further evidence of the lack of trust and cooperation 
between foreign policy makers and the military.  
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Earlier, we focussed on Jozef Beck's apparent wish to improve Poland's relations 
with the West, which mostly meant Britain as French weakness was widely assumed. 
Indeed, by early 1939 the Franco-Polish alliance had become increasingly 
theoretical, prompting a remark from the Chief of Staff, General Waclaw 
Stachiewicz that ‘all [France] is now good for is her money lending power.’642 A few 
months later, on 3 April, he was even less generous: complaining about the apparent 
French unwillingness to fulfil the material side of her Rambouillet Treaty 
obligations.643  
Nevertheless, save for instructions for Raczynski to visit the Foreign Office, little 
was done to actually improve the Anglo-Polish relationship. And not surprisingly, 
given the 'strong distaste and hurt' the British reportedly felt towards Poland 
following her conduct during the Czech crisis of October 1938.644 This state of affairs 
persisted until 15 March 1939, when, breaking the Munich Agreement, Nazi forces 
occupied Prague, forced upon her the quasi independence of Slovakia and made it a 
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German protectorate on 16 March. For the first time since the 1934 Treaty, the 
Polish authorities had received no warning from the Germans and despite a number 
of reports few suspected Hitler would act in Czechoslovakia; although admittedly, 
few in Poland were concerned with the fate of her southern neighbour.645 The 
presence of German troops in Slovakia was an altogether different matter that caused 
alarm in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, according to Arciszewski, 'especially 
the General Staff, because all our defence plans became useless'.646 In one of the last 
attempts to pressurise Poland,647 the Germans immediately congratulated Beck on 
achieving his goal of creating a common Polish-Hungarian border but the Poles no 
longer cared.648  Unlike in 1938, when the acquisition of Tscheschen Silesia and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Lithuania were treated as major foreign 
policy successes, that long-standing achievement now seemed empty when 
compared with the growing German threat. Poland's public opinion and political elite 
                                                            
645 A notable example Tadeusz Szumowski's, Head of the Western Section of the Polish Intelligence 
Service, report from 7 March 1939 which he compiled information, obtained from Consul General 
Feliks Chiczewski in Leipzig, that Germany is planning an aggressive operation in 
Czechoslovakia later in the month. His warning was first dismissed in Berlin (by Ambassador 
Lipski) and then at home. The report was scribbled with 'nonsense' and 'must be drunk' and only 
the German entry into Prague saved Szymanski from facing a disciplinary action. Tadeusz 
Szumowski, former Head of the Western Section of the Polish Intelligence Service, in a statement 
to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 30 Apr. 1941, PISM, B I.6i/10. The warnings issued 
by the Military Attaché in Prague,  and Munich-based spy-ring 'Bilbao' were similarly overlooked. 
See Aleksander Wozny, Niemieckie Przygotowania do Wojny z Polska [German preparations for 
the war against Poland] (Warszawa, 2000),  245. 
646 Miroslaw Arciszewski, former Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs or Poland, in a 
statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission,  27 Feb. 1941,  PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/1. In 
truth this statement was an exaggeration as by the time the war broke out, in September 1939, the 
defensive Plan 'Z' was revised to, incorrectly, expect an attack from Slovakia and Silesia. Watt, 
Bitter Glory, 416. 
647 Marek Kornat quotes an entry from Goebbels' diary, made on 25 March 1939, which reads that 
'Hitler intends to put some light pressure in Poland and hopes for a positive outcome. But there is 
a fly in the ointment, we will have to guarantee all of Poland's borders.' Marek Kornat, Polska 
1939 roku wobec paktu Ribbentrop-Molotow: Problem zblizenia niemiecko-sowieckiego w 
polityce zagranicznej II Rzeczpospolitej [1939 Poland and the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact: The 
foreign policy of the Second Polish republic and the problem of a Soviet-German detente], 
(Warszawa, 2002),  266.  
648 Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Jozef Lipski, Polish Ambassador in Berlin, 
16 Mar. 1939. AAN, MSZ/5437; also, Starzenski, Trzy lata, 172. 
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were, once again, turning against the Foreign Minister. The Parliamentary 
Commission on Foreign Affairs became extremely critical of Beck. One of its 
members, General Lucjan Zeligowski, even accused Beck of treason for what he was 
'called out' by Colonel Zygmunt Wenda.649 Aware of its declining popularity, in May 
1939 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs endeavoured to improve its standing with the 
public by inviting members of all political parties to join in its propaganda 
campaign. This initiative was blocked by Rydz-Smigly.650 As we know, the Marshal 
and his OZN have been running an extremely successful personal propaganda 
campaign and benefited from Beck's poor public rating. What is more, he was no 
longer interested in political dialogue with the opposition and allowed for continued 
use of the Bereza Kartuska concentration camp651 whose inmates included critics of 
Polish military policy.652  
 
As the chaos in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intensified, with Beck once again 
away with 'flu' and mounting German pressure on Lithuania, the United Kingdom 
                                                            
649 [Awantura, brawl] after Miroslaw Arciszewski, former Second Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs or Poland, in a statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 27 Feb. 1941, Polish 
Institute and Sikorski Museum (thereafter: PISM), A.11.49/Cz/3/1; [Ostre starcie, face-off.] after 
Zaranski (ed,), Diarusz i Teki, 528 and 530. 
650 Miroslaw Arciszewski, former Second Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs or Poland, in a 
statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission,  27 Feb. 1941, Polish Institute and Sikorski 
Museum (thereafter: PISM), A.11.49/Cz/3/1. 
651 The camp, modeled on German camps in Oranienburg and Dachau was created in 1934, following 
the assassination of Minister Bronislaw Pieracki. At the time of its inception Bereza was described 
as a concentration camp. However, current Polish historiography refrains from calling it that due 
to the use of this term in Polish post-war propaganda. Nevertheless, foreign historians and the 
Library of Congress continue to do so. Andrzej Garlicki, Piekne lata trzydzieste [The beautiful 
Thirties], (Warszawa, 2008) 247-252.  
652 Journalist Stalislaw Cat-Mackiewicz was repeatedly threatened with internment and eventually 
imprisoned in Bereza for 17 days (between 23 March and 9 April 1939) for his criticism of the 
National Defence Fund (a fund-rising vehicle drawing contributions for armaments from both the 
state and the public), insufficient weaponry and  'undermining public belief in Polish war 
readiness.' Stanislaw Cat-Mackiewicz, Polityka Becka [Beck's Policy], (Krakow, 2010), 187; also, 
Garlicki, Piekne lata, 250. 
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renewed its interest in Poland.653 And, proving Michal Lubienski correct when he 
observed that 'everyone is somehow courting Poland,'654 on the 21 March, the British 
simultaneously communicated 'their proposals for a joint declaration, consultation 
and common defence' to the Polish Ambassador in London, Raczynski, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.655 According to witnesses, Beck was extremely pleased 
that the British approached Poland and not vice versa but, staying true to Pilsudski's 
beliefs, instead of a multilateral agreement between Poland, the UK, Russia and 
France or a unilateral British guarantee, he wanted to pursue a bilateral Anglo-Polish 
treaty. He took this proposal to President Moscicki and Rydz-Smigly and obtained 
their agreement.656  
Looking back at Beck's speeches and papers from the period after the occupation 
of Prague, it becomes clear that the Minister held a distorted view of the levels of 
war-readiness and military capability of the Polish Army and there is some 
indication that this was a result if deliberate misinformation by the military 
command. First, when Beck addressed senior foreign ministry staff, on 24 March he 
told them that  
Germany is no longer predictable (….) Together with the highest 
authorities in the state, we have drawn a line (…) beyond which comes 
                                                            
653 On 20 March 1939, Germany issued an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the surrender the port 
town of Klaipeda (Memel). It was ceded to Germany on 22 March 1939. Gerhard Weinberg, The 
Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Starting World War II 1937-1939, (Chicago, 1980), 536; 
Richard Watt, Bitter Glory. Poland and its Fate 1918-1939, (New York, 1982), 394. 
654 Michal Lubienski, Minister Beck's Chef de Cabinet, to Eugeniusz Romer, Polish Ambassador in 
Tokyo, 14 Mar. 1939, PISM, Kolekcja Ambasadora E. Raczynskiego. 
655 Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Warsaw, 21 Mar. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/1; also, Starzenski, Trzy lata,173; Anita Prazmowska, 
'The Eastern Front and the British Guarantee to Poland in March 1939, European History 
Quarterly, 14 (183), 183-185. According to Donald Cameron Watt, the British proposals were 
actually sent out to Warsaw late on 20 March. Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came. The 
immediate origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939, (London, 2001), 178. 
656 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 183. 
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out Polish non-possumus. Meaning [that] we will fight (….) [I]t is more 
sensible to come out toward an enemy than wait for him to come to us. 
This is a troublesome enemy because it appears to be lacking restraint in 
its ideas and actions. Perhaps it can regain its sense when met with 
firmness, which had not happened before (….) With her 9 divisions, 
Germany has been strutting around Europe but no one can take Poland 
with such force.657  
 
The implication is that Beck spoke with Rydz-Smigly and that the military 
leadership considered starting a war to be a viable last resort option in the Polish-
German diplomatic conflict. Indeed, in a later conversation with Ambassador 
Kennard, Beck told him that prior to the Anglo-Polish agreement, he 'liaised with the 
army and was informed about the capability of Polish forces (….) Our troops are 
positioned in such a way that they are ready for both defensive and offensive 
combat.'658 He then went on to explain that Marshal Pilsudski had taught the Polish 
army rigorous realism and to eschew 'paper' calculations. And although Beck 
conceded that material difficulties prevented Poland from taking advantage of its 
human resources, it is clear that the Minister was a victim of optimistic military 
                                                            
657 Zaranski (ed,), Diarusz i Teki, 529. We will not focus on Beck's obvious underestimation of 
German military strength. Numerous historians have discussed this issue and Jan Weinstein 
identified two possible explanations for it. Namely, Beck could have been referring to German 
troop movements in Saxony in May 1938 or press reports from March 1939, which estimated that 
Germany occupied the romp-Czechoslovak state with approximately 120.000 soldiers which 
corresponds with roughly 9-10 divisions. Ibid., 715; also,  Marian Zgorniak, Europa w przededniu 
wojny. Sytuacja militarna w latach 1938-1939 (Europe in the run-up to the war. The military 
situation between 1938-1939), (Krakow, 1993), 37.  
658 Jozef Potocki, Head of the Western Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to 
Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, 24 Apr. 1939, PISM, A.12.49/WB/1. 
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propaganda. Indeed, even as late as 22 July, Beck continued to believe that Poland's 
strategic position was good.659 
He was not alone. The army embarked upon a systematic and extremely 
successful disinformation, or perhaps even auto-disinformation, campaign.660 The 
diplomats (although some later denied it), public661 and, according to Frankowski, 
even the allied French General Staff were led to overestimate the Polish Army's 
strength.662 In his only authorised press interview, Marshal Rydz-Smigly described 
the Polish Army as 'smaller than [the] German but a good army' and stated that 
Poland would 'fight for its independence in any circumstances, even devoid of 
allies.'663  Indeed, the official brief supplied by the Polish General Staff to Counsellor 
Frankowski insisted that 'the Polish army does not need allied support, [though] 
admittedly German East Prussia poses certain strategic problems but, in the event of 
war, it becomes a German liability because it can be easily cut off from the 
mainland; German occupation of Slovakia will also turn to haunt them.'664 In fact, 
                                                            
659 Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 679. Incidentally, Poland allies were also overly optimistic about 
the country's military capability. In Paris, general Gamelin overestimated not only the prowess of 
the Polish army but also the extent of the country's rearmament and preparations. Martin 
Alexander, The Republic in Danger. General Maurice Gamelin and the politics of French defence, 
1933-1940, (Cambridge, 1992), 311. 
660 According to Ambassador Edward Raczynski, following his official visit to Poland, British 
General Edmund Ironside concluded that the Chief of Staff and the Polish military leadership are 
deluded in their assessment of the military situation. Edward Raczynski, former Polish 
Ambassador in London, in a statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 21 Apr. 1941, 
PISM, A.11/144/273. In his diaries, published after the war, Ironside is less blunt. In a note dated 
13 July 1939, he wrote: “The Poles seem to have too low an opinion of the German Army's value. 
They consider that they are over-motorised.” Edmund Ironside, Time unguarded: the Ironside 
diaries, 1937-1940, (Westport, 1974), 82. 
661 Reminiscences of Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski. Michal Komar, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski: 
Wywiad Rzeka [Extended interview with Wladyslaw Bartoszewski], (Warszawa, 2006), 29-30. 
662 Feliks Frankowski's, former Counselor in the Polish Embassy in Paris, statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 31 Mar. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/5. 
663 Mary Heaton Vorse's interview with Edward Rydz-Smigly. July 1939, published in August 1939 
in Morze i Kolonie, No.8, Archimum Polskiej Agencji Prasowej (PAP), 
http://dzieje.pl/aktualnosci/wywiad-z-marszalkiem-edwardem-smiglym-rydzem-lipiec-1939-r, 
accessed on 30 Dec. 2014.  
664 Feliks Frankowski's, former Counselor in the Polish Embassy in Paris, statement to the Winiarski 
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both Rydz-Smigly and Frankowski were either mistaken or deliberately overstating 
Polish strength as a rough comparison of the Polish and German forces (see below) 
clearly indicates the latter's superiority: 
German and Polish Forces in September 1939 665 
 Total men Armd./ 
mot. Divs. 












Germany 1.5m 15 37 1 1 53 (1) 3600 6000 1929 40 
Poland 1.3m 1 brig. 37 –  11 37 (12) 750 4000 900 50 
 
That during July 1939 military negotiations with representatives of the British 
Army,666 Marshal Rydz-Smigly refused to travel to London and disclose essential 
military information because 'these things are covered by secrecy', illustrates just 
how determined the Polish command was to pretend that 'the military matters [were] 
all right.' 667  Indeed, according to Edward Raczynski, the military command's 
obstinacy caused a rift between the Marshal and the Ambassador in the summer of 
1939. More importantly, however, Rydz-Smigly was also able to stall the debate on 
a solution to the on-going debate about Poland's fiscal and economic policy, 
preventing devaluation and recalibrating the economy into war-mode.668 
                                                                                                                                                                        
Investigative Commission, 31 Mar. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/5.        
665 Table after Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, 1020. 
666 On 6 May 1939, Ambassador Kennard informed deputy Minister Arciszewski that a British 
Military delegation would soon be arriving in Warsaw to negotiate a military alliance. PISM, 
A.12.49/WB/3. Interestingly, although the Ambassador assured Arciszewski that an official 
instruction on the matter should be expected within days, it did not arrive until two months later.  
Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, to Clifford Norton, British Charge d'Affaires in 
Warsaw, 6 Jul. 1939, TNA, C 94825418, FO 417. General Ironside learned that he was to lead the 
mission on 4 July. The visit began on the 17 and ended on the 21 July.  Ironside, Time unguarded, 
76. 
667 Edward Raczynski, former Polish Ambassador in London, in a statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 21 Apr. 1941, PISM, A.11/49/Cz/3/19. 
668 Edward Raczynski, The British-Polish Alliance, its origin and meaning, (London, 1948), 47. 
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In these circumstances, one cannot be surprised that on the eve of his trip to 
London in April 1939, Minister Beck – always inclined to bombast and posturing – 
declared that 'Poland must speak with England [like an equal] d'egale a egale. We're 
not ones to take gifts. And if there is to be a war, we will fight one way or another'.669  
 
Later in this chapter we will see that Beck did not lose hope that the conflict could 
be resolved through diplomatic means until the very end. Misled about the Polish 
military strength and defence capability, he found himself pursuing a foreign policy 
that befitted a country larger and stronger than interwar Poland. 
 
'There is still time for diplomacy...' 
...said Beck to his secretary Starzenski after receiving the British offer of a 
multilateral Pact on 21 March 1939 and he most certainly believed it.670 Beck left for 
London on 1 April and on his way, met with Ambassador Lipski who informed him 
of growing German hostility towards Poland. He urged him not to publicise any 
agreements signed with the British, and to keep the text of such documents 
compatible with the Franco-Polish Treaty that was accepted and recognised by 
Berlin. 671  Beck acknowledged Lipski's worries about the supposed 'encircling' 
['Einkreisungspolitik'] of Germany, stressing that Poland would only ever enter a 
defensive pact. Indeed, according to his Final Report, he expected the London 
government to propose 'an open arrangement containing generalities' complimented 
                                                            
669 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 193-194. 
670 Ibid., 175. 
671 Ibid., 184. 
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by a secret military agreement.672 What is more, Rydz-Smigly and Moscicki seem 
also to have been wary of a hostile German reaction and Beck had no mandate to 
sign a public agreement.  However, upon arrival in Britain, Beck's view changed. He 
interpreted the panic among British parliamentarians as heralding the beginning of 
their country's involvement in Central Europe and, exceeding his brief, decided to 
sign and publicise mutual security guarantees.673 Confiding in his secretary, Beck 
reasoned that '[his decision] will affect [Polish] relations with Germany, but if war is 
unavoidable, it's better to show ones cards in advance'.674 This suggests that he treated 
the new Anglo-Polish alliance as a 'bargaining chip' in the spat with Berlin.675 
Indeed, describing the events leading to the Anglo-Polish alliance, Beck himself 
emphasised a 1935 conversation with Hitler, during which the German leader 
stressed the importance for the Third Reich of good relations with the British 
Empire.676 In hindsight, we see that Beck was wrong in his assessment of the 
situation and not only did the new alliance not give him 'more breathing space,'677 but 
it actually reduced his room for manoeuvre almost beyond existence.678 Beck's 
Ambassadors in London and Paris confirm that the Minister believed that 'Hitler 
                                                            
672 Beck, Ostatni raport,  175. 
673 Pawel Starzenski quotes excerpts from Sir Henry Channon's diary serve as an excellent illustration 
of the confusion and indecision among British politicians. '[26 March:] I'm not sure that the Polish 
guarantee is wise. It may stiffen the resistance of the Poles, as we unintentionally stiffened the 
Czechs last year. [1 April:]  Everyone is happy with our guarantee to Poland [5 April:] Colonel 
Beck's visit was evidently a success... We must have allies, and Poland is now our newfound 
friend. The Government is getting jitters and is groping for allies everywhere. [17 April:] 
Something must be done to make the Poles more reasonable towards the German demands over 
Danzig and make overtures to Germany...' Starzenski, Trzy lata, 113-114. 
674 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 115. 
675 Phrase used by Edward Raczynski, former Polish Ambassador in London, in a statement to the 
Winiarski Investigative Commission, 21 Apr. 1941, PISM, A.11/49/Cz/3/19. 
676 Beck, Ostatni raport, 176. 
677 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 105. 
678 Handwritten annotation on the margin. Howard Kennard, British Ambassador in Warsaw, to 
Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary in London, 9 May 1939, TNA, N 2375230638, FO 
371/23699. 
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liked to get things through threats and blackmail but he would back down in the face 
of a large scale conflict.'679 And that, 'by having Britain on [Poland's] side he could 
avert the war through some sort of a treaty' or perhaps use the possibility of entering 
a multilateral alliance with the Soviet Union to put pressure on Berlin.680 Feliks 
Frankowski even noted that Beck was ‘not very happy’ about the French guarantees 
that followed the British declaration of support made on 31 March 1939. Although 
Paris and London cooperated on the matter, Warsaw was not consulted. Beck 
complained about this to Ambassador Noel and was reportedly concerned that open 
French support would incite German fear of 'encirclement.'681 
 
As we have already seen, Beck was of course wrong to assume Soviet 
cooperation but at least in this case, his mistake could be attributed to ignorance. 
One is, however, puzzled why he thought that the Third Reich might still yield under 
pressure. We saw that he had after all himself pointed out that Germany had never 
been challenged before. Moreover, after the occupation of Prague, this conviction 
cannot be put down to Beck's supposed trust in Hitler's word. While the Führer’s 
open hatred of the Soviet Union made the reconciliation between Bolshevism and 
National Socialism seem impossible, the Minister had himself stated that in his 
European policy, Hitler could no longer be trusted.682 Thus, the only plausible 
                                                            
679 Juliusz Lukasiewicz, former Polish Ambassador in Paris, in a statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 22 Nov. 1941, PISM, A.11/Cz/3. 
680 Edward Raczynski, former Polish Ambassador in London, in a statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 21 Apr. 1941, PISM, A.11/49/Cz/3/19. 
681 Feliks Frankwski, former Counselor in the Polish Embassy in Paris, in a statement to the 
Winiarski Investigative Commission, 31 Mar. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/5. 
682 See the previously cited speech to Ministry officials. Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 715. 
Moreover, on his way to London, Beck observed that 'a turn of history is coming. I am going to 
London to maintain peace. But if there is to be a war, we must survive it in decent company where 
a given word is still worth something.' Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki,  186. He had also reportedly 
 231 
explanation for Beck's conviction is that the Army misinformed him. He had been 
led to not only, overestimate the Polish military strength but also to underestimate 
the Germans. Tytus Komarnicki suspected that as early as March 1938 (the 
Anschluss), the Staff misled Beck about the German military capability and that the 
Minister had been told that Germany has 'wheezing' tanks.683 We know that Michal 
Lubienski agreed.684 
Ambassador Lipski even believed that the reason Polish-German relations 
became so difficult between Munich and the outbreak of the Second World War was 
due to the poor coordination of the foreign, economic and military policies out of 
which the military one was especially poor. Because, 'a state must be aware of its 
buffer zones against its neighbours.'685 
 
Nowhere did Beck's persistent hope that an armed conflict can be averted 
manifest itself more clearly than in the two failed resignation attempts. One was 
Beck's own offer to step down following his 5 May speech when he suggested to 
President Moscicki that a new Minister 'not tainted with accusations of cooperation 
with Germany' would find it easier to reorient Poland's foreign policy.686 Beck's 
reasoning was certainly logical but the President refused to replace him. Whether 
this was due to lack of suitable alternative or to other reasons remains unclear. By 
                                                                                                                                                                        
stated that 'if Hitler goes mad and starts a war, he will destroy not only Germany but also many 
other countries apart from his own. Hitler is Austria's revenge for the Battle of Sadova 
[Könniggrätz]. He will never win this war.' Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 185-186. 
683 'Dychawiczne' [Wheezing] was a phrase used by Tytus Komarnicki, former Polish Representative 
to the League of Nations, in a statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 5 May, 1941, 
PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/8. 
684  See Chapter Seven, page 238.  
685 Lipski argued the Polish High Command focussed too much on Danzig and too little on 
defensively weak spots such as Slovakia. Jozef Lipski, former Polish Ambassador in Berlin, in a  
statement to the Winiarski Investigative Commission, 28 Feb. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/10. 
686 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 214. 
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late May, however, Beck ruled out stepping down and reportedly insisted that he was 
'honour bound to stay.' 687  He was also concerned that his departure could be 
interpreted as 'burning of bridges' with Berlin and thus, render future negotiations 
more difficult.688 
The second failed resignation was that of Jozef Lipski. Following the German 
renouncement of the 1934 Treaty and Beck's 5 May speech, the Ambassador decided 
he 'could no longer remain in Berlin' and suggested Szembek, Arciszewski and 
Lubienski as possible replacements.689 Beck initially ignored Lipski's request but 
later conceded that he had indeed 'spent himself there'690 and approached Szembek 
with an offer of the posting. Beck believed that there were signs that Germany 
wanted a dialogue with Poland and that, despite the inability to maintain a friendly 
and close relationship with Berlin; a compromise could still be reached. This, 
however, required a new ambassador, someone 'experienced', 'calm', immune to 
unpleasantness and 'not from Poznan [Posen] [Greater Poland].'691 Beck's intention to 
negotiate was even more evident in his response to Szembek's concerns that his well 
known pro-rapprochement position would mislead Berlin and the rest of Europe that 
Poland was ready for concessions. He did not want to send 'anybody overly bellicose 
to Berlin'.692 In the end, the matter of Szembek's transfer to Berlin was never 
finalised, there were no Polish-German talks, despite the British and Vatican's 
                                                            
687 Ibid., 214. 
688 Ibid., 214. 
689 Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 600. 
690 'Zgral sie tam' [He's played his part] Ibid., 615. 
691 Between 1795 and 1918, the Greater Poland region formed part of the Prussian Partition and an 
anti-German sentiment persisted in the region even after independence. Ambassadors Jozef Lipski 
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attempts to initiate negotiations, and Lipski remained in post until the outbreak of the 
war. 
 
Beck's flawed assessment of Poland's military situation and overdeveloped pride 
are also evident in his approach to the economic negotiations with the British. As we 
read earlier, Jozef Lipski acknowledged the lack of coordination between Polish 
foreign, economic and military policies, but branded the latter weakest. August 
Zaleski, on the other hand, criticised Beck's high-brow style and accused him of 
placing little importance to economic matters, which he supposedly considered 
'beneath him.'693 Indeed, the practical ambassador Raczynski urged Beck to initiate 
economic talks when the Minister arrived in London to sign the Anglo-Polish 
guarantees.694 Yet, by 21 April 1939, Poland was 'the only [originally underlined] 
Eastern European state, which had not taken the opportunity of its recent 
negotiations with the British government to seek London's financial assistance,' 
which seems to prove Zaleski's point.695 Even the British were surprised by this 
inactivity and Ambassador Kennard ended up approaching Beck, two days after 
Norton let out the first feelers and a day before Beck was planning to rise the matter 
himself.696  
 
                                                            
693 August Zaleski, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, in a statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 24 Feb. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/15. 
694 Starzenski, Trzy lata, 204. 
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If Zaleski's assessment of Beck's attitude to economic matters was correct, the late 
commencement of Anglo-Polish financial negotiations could plausibly be explained 
solely by the Minister's haughtiness and pride. However, Lukasiewicz and Starzenski 
argued that Beck lacked time to schedule financial negotiations.697 Nevertheless, he 
had time to make a demonstration of Polish support for Hungary. And, even Beck's 
sympathisers agree that the political side of the Minister's April visit to Britain 
seemed most important to him. Beck refused to drop heavy hints while in London 
and even when the Anglo-Polish financial negotiations were about to begin he 
objected to the idea that 'staff talks and … financial talks, … form a foundation for a 
[future] treaty'.698 
Nevertheless, upon conclusion of the bilateral agreement, Beck was visibly 
relieved that Poland would now had the backing of the enormous and strong British 
Empire. He was convinced that Britain would, if need be, fulfill her treaty 
obligations towards Poland but exaggerated the scale of any future British assistance 
and her overall military might. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that Beck's 
initially cavalier approach to starting monetary talks was in part due to him not 
knowing the truth about the state of armament of the Polish Army. 
 
Studying documentation from the period, one is struck that apart from 
Raczynski's insistence, remarkably little attention was given to possible British loans 
amongst Polish commanders and policy-makers. The Polish Treasury had not liaised 
with the Foreign Ministry about this matter until 15 April, a week after Beck's return 
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from London, and even then, an honest assessment of Polish financial needs had yet 
to be compiled.699 Indeed, it was only after 21 April that a sense of urgency started 
creeping into the matter. One can identify a number of possible reasons for this shift. 
First, the military authorities became increasingly doubtful of France's ability to 
fulfil the obligations it took upon herself in Rambouillet. 700  Furthermore, the 
heightened military readiness following the partial mobilisation of 23 March 1939 
was taking its toll on Poland's already poor finances. It even became a topic of 
gossip and the British counsellor Norton asked the Polish Foreign Ministry’s 
economic expert, Wszelaki if it was true that the government's 'Air Force Loan' 
might be spent to cover the Army's current expenditure rather than building-up the 
Polish Air Force.701 Moreover, the Treasury, which had apparently also been kept in 
the dark about Poland's poor defence capability, was wary of putting the economy on 
war footing.702   
Following Beck’s cumbersome attempt to open the negotiations that started with 
a complaint that 'mixing money and politics is not a pleasant thing to do and must 
only be done for a good reason',703 a month passed until Warsaw received London's 
invitation to negotiate, during which time the Poles drove themselves even more 
hysterical about securing financial help. And yet, falling into a by now all too 
                                                            
699 Jozef Potocki talking to Szembek about his meeting with Minister Kajetan Morawski and director 
Domaniewski from the Treasury. Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 559. 
700 Szembek's and Stachiewicz's conversations on the matter as well as secondary literature sources 
are referenced in detail in footnote 643. 
701 Jan Wszelaki, Economic Counsellor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, in an internal 
memo, 21 Apr. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
702 According to the papers of the Chief of Staff, general Waclaw Stachiewicz, Minister Eugeniusz 
Kwiatkowski worried about over-stretching the economy. Bogdan Stachiewicz, General Waclaw 
Stachiewicz. Wspomnienie, [Remembering General Waclaw Stachiewicz], (Warszawa, 2004), 112. 
Instead, the Treasure decided to raise money through partial devaluation of the zloty. Tymoteusz 
Pawlowski, Armia Smiglego. Czwarta w Europie – Siodma na swiecie [Smigly's Army. Fourth in 
Europe – Seventh in the world], (Warszawa, 2014), 52. 
703 Jozef Potocki, Head of the Western Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to 
Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, 24 Apr. 1939, PISM, A.12.49/WB/3. 
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familiar pattern, neither of the three participating institutions managed to agree on 
what precisely they wanted to gain from the upcoming talks and how to conduct 
them.  
Initially, Minister Kwiatkowski considered sending a delegation consisting of 
Adam Koc, Treasury official Wieslaw Domaniewski and, in accordance with Rydz-
Smigly's wishes to have his own man there, a military expert. They were to be 
introduced by Jozef Potocki from the Foreign Ministry. However, the delegation sent 
was only three men strong, lacking a Rydz-Smigly appointee. This was justified by 
Koc's military background. Colonel Koc was, according to Beck, 'chosen as the 
Head of the delegation not, of course, as a representative of the banking industry, but 
a confidant of the Government who also possessed military experience (as a colonel 
of the General Staff).'704 Director Domaniewski and counsellor Wszelaki from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs made up the complement. A separate military delegation 
was to leave for London the following week.  
 
The perceived objectives of the Polish Treasury, Foreign Ministry and the Army 
were similarly disjointed. Hand-picked by Kwiatkowski, Koc held a delusional view 
of Polish military strength and believed that the Polish 'enormous land army' would 
be 'a colossal help to the British Empire' but because these commitments were 
putting a strain on the weak national economy he expected Britain to pay Poland's 
mobilisation costs and fund 'other investments succouring Polish defensive efforts 
including river regulation, rail and motorisation' as well as building reserves of 
                                                            
704 Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in 
London, 9 Jun. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
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munitions and armaments.705 This mirrored the Treasury Minister’s own reluctance to 
put the economy in war footing. He insisted that 'receiving a British loan was a 
necessity, [because] if the state of military readiness persisted; it would destroy all 
he had done for Polish economic revival. And he wouldn't be able to restart the 
process again.'706 Of this, Kwiatkowski managed to convince Beck.707  
Rydz-Smigly, on the other hand, wanted the loan to go towards rearmament in its 
entirety. Upon seeing the draft of the financial aid memorandum addressed to 
Britain, he demanded that all mentions of ordinary financial aid (bank loans, 
economic stimulus money) be removed even though they were put there on the 
request of Kwiatkowski.708 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain even reproached the 
Polish authorities for their half-hearted commitment to rearmament709 and wondered 
whether they should either 'create new large military units' or 'prepare sufficient 
armaments and munitions reserves.'710 This lack of understanding only unnecessarily 
added to the internal tension in Poland. In June 1939, Rydz-Smigly reportedly 
complained to Zaleski that 'Kwiatkowski didn’t have money for rearmament,' it is 
implied that the Treasury also told Rydz-Smigly that the National Bank refused to 
                                                            
705 Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 574-575. 
706 Ibid., 577. 
707 Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in 
London, 9 Jun. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
708 Jan Wszelaki, Economic Counsellor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, in an internal 
memo, 17 May 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
709 Specifically, Chamberlain questioned spending on public works and artificially maintaining an 
expensive currency. Minutes from Raczynski's conversation with Chamberlain. Edward 
Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, 
6 Jun. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
710 Minutes from Raczynski's conversation with Chamberlain. Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador 
in London, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, 6 Jun. 1939, PISM, 
A.11.49/WB/3. 
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issue a loan to the military. According to Zaleski, who was on the Bank's board, the 
institution was never approached.711  
 
What neither Beck nor anyone within the Polish governing circles realised was 
that, despite its speeding armament, the United Kingdom was not producing enough 
equipment and munitions to meet its own domestic need.712 Their assessment of 
Britain's financial position was just as wrong. Despite trying to hide its imperial 
decline by making grand gestures of generosity, London actually had little money to 
spare. Furthermore, the congenitally blinkered British Treasury did not recognise the 
strategic importance of extending a loan to Poland. It ranked Warsaw ninth behind 
Bucharest and Baghdad and slightly ahead of Kabul and Belgrade.713 And yet, 
encouraged by statements from Generals Ironside and Carton de Wiart, the Polish 
Foreign Ministry clung to the idea that Britain would 'go all the way.'714 This was fed 
back to the Army and Rydz-Smigly who must have put some credence in it because 
on 20 July he complained to Szembek about British inconsistency and the 'silly' way 
in which they were conducting the economic talks.715  
The negotiations dragged on and despite the Foreign Office's supposed support, 
the Polish delegates found conversations with Treasury personnel (especially with 
Sir John Simon, the Chancellor himself) frustrating because they 'treated the matter 
                                                            
711 August Zaleski, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, in a statement to the Winiarski 
Investigative Commission, 24 Feb. 1941, PISM, A.11.49/Cz/3/15. 
712 In a conversation with Szembek on 26 April 1939, Adam Koc excitedly declared that '[Poland] 
has the whole fleet and air force of the British Empire is behind her.' Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i 
Teki, 574. 
713 Donald Cameron Watt, How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War 1938-
1939 (London, 2001), 334. 
714 Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki, 676. 
715 Ibid., 676. 
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as purely of economic, monetary and political [but not strategic] nature'716 and 'did 
not put forward any practical proposals (…), only a number of arduous demands 
[devaluation of the Polish currency, restrictions on Polish coal exports] that had little 
to do with the purpose of the negotiations and harmed Poland's economic 
interests.'717 To add, insult to injury, 'the proposed sums,718 which would be available 
upon meeting conditions that were unacceptable [to Poland], were merely equal to 
Polish government’s monthly defence expenditure.' 719  Beck appealed, through 
Ambassador Raczynski to Chamberlain and the British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Halifax, but to no avail. Meanwhile, the delay in Anglo-Polish negotiations caused 
malevolent amusement in Berlin and the Polish Foreign Minister reverted to his 
high-handed style of politics.720 Raczynski urged Warsaw not to break off the talks, 
arguing that 'all the clauses offending [Polish] national sensibilities have been 
removed.'721 Nevertheless, on 24 July, Beck decided that since the negotiations were 
unlikely to allow for 'a fast improvement of Polish army's equipment' the 
government in Warsaw did not see fit to continue them.722 Material credits and 
                                                            
716 Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in 
London, undated (Summer) 1939, PISM, A.11.49/N/3. 
717 Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in 
London, 16 Jul. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/N/3. 
718 Poland hoped to receive up to £10m in cash and £20m in material credits. However, as the 
government in Warsaw did not agree to British conditions, the final agreement, signed in August 
1939, did not include a cash loan. Instead Britain was to provide £8 million for equipment, £1.5 
million for resources and £2 million for infrastructure. Pawlowski, Armia Smiglego, 52. 
 For comparison, the Polish monthly defence spending in late spring and summer 1939 was 
approximately 200.000 zloty (£8000 - AK) pcm. Zaranski (ed.), Diariusz i Teki,  645. The total 
armament spend for the period between 1936 and 1939 was 3 billion zlotys (equating to 
approximately £120 million – AK). Pawlowski, Armia Smiglego, 54.  
719 Jozef Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to  Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in 
London, 16 Jul. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
720 Jan Wszelaki, Economic Counsellor in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Michal 
Lubienski, Minister Beck's Chef de Cabinet in Warsaw, and Jozef Potocki, Head of the Western 
Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw 28 Jul. 1939. PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
721 Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, to Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Warsaw, 23 Jul. 1839, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
722 Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in 
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alliance treaty talks continued as before, and the Minister remained convinced that 
the political agreement with Britain was 'of incomparably greater importance than 
the (…) financial talks.'723 
 
Until the very end, Jozef Beck held out hope that a military conflict could be 
averted by diplomatic means. Nothing illustrates his commitment to avoiding war as 
much as his last attempt to resolve the conflict peacefully. On the day of the signing 
of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact – the impossible had become a reality – the Polish 
authorities were informed about another British attempt at mediation and warned not 
to do anything to provoke a hostile reaction from Berlin.724 Hitler did not take the 
ensuing talks seriously but Beck hoped that a deal could be struck. And so when 
Rydz-Smigly's decision to mobilise resulted in panicked demarches from the British 
and French Ambassadors he pressurised the Marshal not to jeopardise peace talks 
and postpone mobilisation by one day, until 30 August. How he achieved this feat is 
unclear because the conversation between both men was unrecorded, but considering 
Rydz-Smigly's previously expressed doubts about the success of any Polish-German 
talks, Beck must have been extremely persuasive. The decision to push back the 
mobilisation greatly handicapped Poland in the first days of combat. German forces 
took advantage of the dislocation of troops and attacked units which were often 
under-strength, their soldiers still in transit.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                        
London, 24 Jul. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 
723 Beck's response to Halifax's message. Jozef Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Warsaw, to 
Edward Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London, 28 Jul. 1939, PISM, A.11.49/WB/3. 




In the summer of 1939, the Polish army stores held just enough munitions to last it 
through one major battle. The Commander in Chief had no war plan and the Foreign 
Minister did not realise that the time for negotiations had run out. Not an auspicious 
set of circumstances in which to face an invasion. The German attack on 1 
September 1939 caught Poland off guard. Urged by Ambassadors Kennard and Noel, 
Minister Beck persuaded Marshal Rydz-Smigly to postpone full mobilisation until 
31 August. This meant that when the attack came the troops were dispersed, still in 
transit to their defensive positions as outlined in Plan 'Z', rendering it useless. 
Although individual formations resisted the German attack, there was little 
coherence in Polish army's activities.  
 
The September Defensive Campaign could not have been won by Poland, 
especially after the USSR opened a second front.725 Yet, this thesis argues that the 
many shortcomings in defence planning were avoidable, that Jozef Beck did not 
pursue the only policy available to him,726 and Marshal Rydz-Smigly’s western 
defence strategy did not fail solely due to Poland's lack of financial resources.727 
Neither can we lay the blame solely on wishful thinking. 728  This chapter 
                                                            
725  See page 233 and Chapter Seven, page 235. 
726 Marek Kornat makes a case for this in his Polityka Rownowagi 1934-1939: Polska miedzy 
Wschodem a Zachodem [The Policy of Equilibrium 1934-1939: Poland the East and the West], 
(Krakow, 2007). 
727 A thesis propagated by Czeslaw Grzelak and Henryk Stanczyk in their Kampania Polska 1939 
Roku [The Polish Campaign of 1939](Warszawa, 2005). 
728 As Roman Wapinski did in his essay: 'Rezultat kalkulacji czy chciejstwa? Kwestia wspóldzialania 
Niemiec i ZSSR przed 17 wrzesnia 1939 roku w wyobrazeniach polskich srodowisk 
przywódczych (Zarys problematyki)' ['Calculation or wishful thinking? The Polish leadership's 
views on the likelihood of German-Soviet cooperation before 17 September 1939'] in Henryk 
Batowski (ed.), 17 wrzesnia 1939. Materialy z ogólnopolskiej konferencji historyków, Kraków 25-
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demonstrates that throughout 1939 the Polish political and military leadership made 
a series of avoidable errors. 
The secrecy that shrouded Germany’s territorial demands towards Poland eroded 
the last remnants of trust between Minister Beck and Marshal Rydz-Smigly. The 
campaign of disinformation that ensued only confounded the Polish public, as well 
as her diplomats; Western governments who continued to view Poland as an aspiring 
member of the Axis, and finally Germany itself. Precious time that could otherwise 
be spent strategising or rearming was wasted, as the Polish authorities were unable to 
decide on a plan of action. In the end action was forced upon them when Germany 
decided to occupy Prague, started implementing its plans to encircle Poland and 
when Britain came forward with its guarantee.   
As befitted one of the architects of the Polish-German Treaty of 1934, Jozef Beck 
never truly abandoned the hope that Poland and Germany could coexist peacefully. 
Underestimating the German threat, he was convinced that an agreement could be 
reached and conducted Polish foreign policy accordingly. However, by 1939, the 
relationship between Beck and Rydz-Smigly had broken down so much that not only 
was Beck pursuing German policy independently but the military had begun to deny 
him information about Poland's own capability and situation. Thus the Minister, 
perhaps always misguided about Germany, conducted policy in those critical months 
almost equally misguided about his own nation.  
 
Beck was but one victim of a systematic military propaganda campaign. The 
General Staff might not have considered a German invasion until March 1939 but 
                                                                                                                                                                        
26 pazdziernika 1993 r. [17 September 1939. Conference proceedings, Krakow, 25-26 October 
1993], (Krakow, 1994). 
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the Army had long cultivated the myths of Polish mighty military and its great 
commander Marshal Rydz-Smigly. Yet, when faced with the prospect of fighting a 
bloody and unequal combat, possibly on two fronts, Rydz-Smigly failed. He chose to 
ignore the signs of an upcoming Nazi-Soviet agreement and did not even attempt to 
prepare for the eventuality of a second attack. The optimistic view that prevailed in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was shared by many of the Marshal's 
subordinates in the General Staff made this all the easier for him. Though he 
continued attempts to improve the state of the Polish army, he eventually fell victim 
to his own propaganda of success. The Polish economy was unable to support the 
country's war effort and the Treasury Ministry was unwilling to sacrifice the 
economy to prepare a supposedly already mighty force for a war that was not going 
to start. Beck's hauteur and the Treasury's sloth delayed the opening of the financial 
negotiations with Britain. The lack of a cohesive objective did little to help matters. 
After Poland broke of the financial talks, the material loan negotiations continued to 
drag on but were concluded too late to be of any significance.  
 
This thesis examines the gradual erosion of trust and cooperation between the 
Foreign Ministry and the General Inspectorate of the Armed Forces and 1939 was 
when these deep-rooted problems all came to a head. The Polish military and 
political leadership suffered from delusions about Poland's place in Europe, 
Germany's intentions and even their own army's capability. These problems were 
further exacerbated by the internal conflict that beleaguered the country's elites. In a 
time of an acute national crisis the Polish leadership should have come together to 
face the German threat united. Instead, as the situation worsened its members were 
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pulled further apart and in the end, not having prepared its country for war, the 






Chapter Seven: The Epilogue 
 
Together with most other ministries, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the bulk 
of the diplomatic corps accredited in Warsaw left the city on the evening of 4 
September. The cavalcade of private and governmental cars, and lorries loaded with 
people, papers and a hodgepodge of personal possessions,729 slowly weaved its way 
east - through the elegant spa town of Naleczow, Krzemieniec famous for its 
Lyceum, the historic town of Kolomyja and finally into the border-town of Kuty. 
The President, his entourage, and the government, including Minister Beck, all left a 
few days later and joined the convoy in Naleczow. They were closely followed by 
the General Staff and the Commander in Chief, Edward Rydz-Smigly. The Marshal 
was accompanied by his wife, who had recently returned from the French Riviera to 
pack up the couple's belongings. The unpopular Mrs Rydz once again raised 
eyebrows when she joined the column of refugees heading a procession of several 
cars carrying her family and servants and two lorries piled up with fittings from the 
Rydzs' state-owned official residence.730 
 
The refugees arrived in Kuty on September 17th, barely hours before the Soviet 
aggression would open up a second front encircling the embattled Polish forces. The 
Red Army was advancing with considerable speed and, during an emergency session 
held in late afternoon, the government decided to cross over to Romania, Poland's 
                                                            
729 Jan Szembek's wife Jadwiga, wrote after the war that in the rushed evacuation, her husband 
decided to leave behind the antique furniture, Aubusson carpets and most of the art in the couple's 
apartments but dragged with him two suitcases packed with his diaries and personal documents. 
These papers would later be published as a four-volume diary. 
730 Dariusz Baliszewski, ‘Polska Femme Fatale’ [‘The Polish Femme Fatale’], Wprost, 51\52, (2006), 
102-106.  
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historic ally with whose government Minister Beck had previously arranged for the 
safe passage of Polish dignitaries.  
 
Initially, it was thought that the evacuation would be limited to civilians; the 
President, the government, various family members and the gold reserves of the 
Polish National Bank. Yet, on 18 September, Marshal Rydz-Smigly announced that 
he too had decided to cross the border, abandoning the fighting forces. He would 
later explain this decision by his faith 'in [Poland's] allies' word and [their] 
honour'.731 In 1941, hiding in occupied Warsaw to which he had returned, Rydz-
Smigly, echoing his pre-war convictions,732 told General Maxymowicz-Raczynski's 
widow that he had hoped to entice Bucharest, Paris and London into immediate 
action on Poland's behalf.733 Indeed, he even advised his troops to, if at all possible, 
retreat and cross over into allied countries – hoping that he could command the re-
formed Polish army in exile.  
 
Unsurprisingly, Rydz-Smigly's decision caused consternation and, not 
infrequently considerable anger, among his peers. Indeed, recalling that day, Colonel 
Stefan Sobocinski, who manned the border crossing with Romania, revealed that he 
threatened to court marshal a police inspector for defeatism after the latter 
announced that Marshal Rydz-Smigly’s convoy was approaching the border 
                                                            
731 Wspomnienia Reginy Maxymowicz-Raczynskiej. PISM-NY, Kolekcja Edwarda Rydza-Smiglego, 
Zes. 98/1. 
732 Recounting his 8 May 1939 conversation with Rydz-Smigly, Kazimierz Smagorzewski, 
correspondent of Gazeta Polska in Berlin, quotes the Marshal's belief in French and British 
assurances. Letter from Smagorzewski to Richard Wojtak, 16 April 1974. JPIoA, Kolekcja 
Edwarda Rydza-Smiglego Zes. 98/1. 
733 Wspomnienia Reginy Maxymowicz-Raczynskiej. PISM-NY, Kolekcja Edwarda Rydza-Smiglego, 
Zes. 98/1. 
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bridge.734 Allegedly, some went even further. According to his niece's account, the 
Voivode of Posnania, Colonel Ludwik Bocianski, attempted to commit suicide in 
front of Rydz-Smigly in shame him into remaining in Poland.735  
A fellow Legionary, Bocianski had known Rydz-Smigly for years so upon seeing 
the Marshal, he did not hesitate to bring the convoy to a halt. When the baffled 
Rydz-Smigly stepped out of the car, Bocianski tried to remonstrate with him – to 
save the 'Army's honour' – but got nowhere. So after the Marshal pushed him aside 
and turned to get back to his car, the Colonel took out his pistol, turned it on himself 
and fired. Rydz-Smigly's adjutants loaded Bocianski's seemingly lifeless body onto 
the car and the column resumed its journey.  
  
Not long after Bocianski's attempted suicide, the Marshal would participate in 
another, although perhaps less spectacular, confrontation. After the Polish civilian 
and military authorities crossed into Romania, it became clear that Bucharest had 
reneged on its earlier promise of safe passage. In fact, the President, Ministers and 
the Commander in Chief were all to be interned.  
 
According to an eye witness, as Marshal Rydz-Smigly boarded the official train 
and bade farewell to the gathered dignitaries, he refused to shake Minister Beck's 
hand, accusing him instead of deception.736 We cannot be sure whether he was 
referring to the transit misunderstanding, Minister Beck's foreign policy doctrine, or, 
perhaps, both. What we do know, however, was that Jozef Beck also felt that he had 
                                                            
734 Slawomir Koper, Zycie prywatne elit Drugiej Rzeczpospolitej [The Private Life of the Elites of the 
Second Polish Republic], (Warszawa, 2009), 238-239. 
735 Dariusz Baliszewski,  'Most honoru' [‘The Bridge of Honour’], Wprost, 38 (2004), 72-76. 
736 Letter from Karol Wedziagolski published in Kultura, no. 153/154 (Paris, 1960). 
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been deceived. According to Waclaw Zbyszewski, while still in Poland, Minister 
Beck told his subordinates that he was misled by the military command. Indeed, in a 
language reminiscent of Pilsudski, the Minister complained that he 'thought he had a 
hundred divisions while in reality he had a pile of shit'.737 In hindsight, Beck's closest 
associates all agreed that the Minister was ignorant of Poland's real military 
capability. Michal Lubienski even observed that Edward Rydz-Smigly avoided 
dialogue with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.738 Indeed, Beck's Chef de Cabinet 
went so far as to imply that the Marshal might have had an ulterior motive in doing 
so. Presumably it was to trip Beck up and force his resignation from the Foreign 
Ministry.739  
One of the examples of Beck's apparent ignorance of the military imbalance cited 
by Lubienski was his opinion about the state of the Polish air force. Apparently 
during count Galeazzo Ciano's 1939 visit, Beck boasted to his Italian counterpart 
about Poland's state-of-the-art air force. The Italian foreign minister allegedly went 
green with envy after being told by his hosts that Poland had six aircraft regiments of 
advanced aircraft just like the one he was visiting.740 In reality he was looking at 
nearly the entire Polish air force. The country's military aviation was a shambles and 
grossly underfunded. Indeed, even the money generously donated by the public 
towards its build up was redirected to plug up holes in the military budget. Beck was 
similarly mistaken about the Polish capability vis-a-vis Danzig.  
                                                            
737 Waclaw Zbyszewski, Gawedy o ludziach i czasach przedwojennych [Stories of pre-War times and 
people], (Warszawa, 2000), 254. 
738 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, p. 11. JPIoA Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina Zes. 103/28. 
739 This could be inferred from Lubienski's belief (discussed earlier in this thesis) that the Minister's 
position depended on delivering continuous diplomatic successes. Please refer to Chapter Four, 
pages161-162. 
740 Michal Lubienski's manuscript, p. 60. JPIoA Kolekcja Jana Weinsteina Zes. 103/28. 
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Beck's and Rydz-Smigly's September 1939 comments suggest that both men 
realized the consequences of their poor relationship much too late. Rather than 
acknowledge their mutual fault, they never ceased to blame the other. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I set out to examine two intertwined themes in Polish domestic and 
foreign policy. My first objective was to examine the inception and evolution of the 
interpersonal conflict between Minister Beck and Marshal Rydz-Smigly. The second 
task was to assess the effect this poor relationship had on the institutions led by both 
men and on their perception of the German threat.  
 
Both Jozef Beck and Edward Rydz-Smigly were products of the struggle for 
Polish independence and Pilsudski's regime. Indeed, one may even call them 
'Pilsudski's children'. They met Poland's first Marshal as young men and came of 
political age in his shadow. In May 1926, both Colonel Beck and General Rydz-
Smigly supported Pilsudski's coup d’état and were later rewarded for their loyalty 
with positions of power. They both referred to the Marshal as 'the Commandant' and, 
ostensibly, afforded him considerable reverence. Yet we saw that in reality their 
attitude towards Pilsudski differed. For Beck, he was a father figure. And along with 
his sayings, the Minister adopted Pilsudski's worldview. Rydz-Smigly, on the other 
hand, saw in the Marshal his commanding officer whose orders must be carried out. 
However, he had previously experienced the older man's volatility and, as Pilsudski's 
health deteriorated rapidly, became increasingly wary of his decisions. The Marshal's 
death in 1935 brought this difference in outlook between Beck and Rydz-Smigly into 
the open.  
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In a bid to entrench his position, Edward Rydz-Smigly lent his support to the 
President who wanted to neutralise the 'Colonels' forming Pilsudski's inner circle and 
consolidate his power. With the new General Inspector's cooperation, Moscicki 
successfully outmaneuvered the then Prime Minister Walery Slawek and formed a 
government of his choosing. Jozef Beck was one of the few survivors of this 'purge'. 
But although he had remained neutral, the blatant disregard of the late Marshal's 
wishes made him suspicious of the new government.  
He soon found that the feeling was mutual. Rydz-Smigly did not agree with the 
Minister's pro-German line. This, we saw, would eventually lead to his direct 
interference in Poland's foreign affairs. In the beginning, this was limited to vetoing 
proposed members of diplomatic delegations. Rydz-Smigly’s first direct foray into 
diplomacy was his September 1936 visit to France organised by the French 
Ambassador to Warsaw, Leon Noel. While the trip did not deliver the results Noel 
had hoped for – the severe weakening or ousting of the Foreign Minister – it 
successfully stoked existing tensions between the Ministry and the General 
Inspectorate. The visit, which was initially agreed without the Minister's knowledge, 
turned out to be a success – a propaganda coup. Edward Rydz-Smigly not only 
revived the flailing Franco-Polish military alliance but also signed the Rambouillet 
Treaty securing a financial and material commitment from the French whom Beck 
disliked and, like Pilsudski, distrusted.741  
Much to the Foreign Minister's annoyance, Rydz-Smigly attempted to capitalise 
on his diplomatic victory at home. His controversial promotion to Marshal and 
elevation to Poland's 'First Citizen' came shortly after the French visit. Beck and 
                                                            
741 See Chapter Three, pages 126 – 127. 
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many other ‘Colonels’ saw this as chutzpah and resented the usurper of Pilsudski's 
place. However, neither the Foreign Minister nor anybody else was able to openly 
resist Rydz-Smigly's rise.  Instead, the Minister's opposition took the form of 
disruption. If he ostensibly accepted the new Marshal's authority over most areas of 
foreign policy, he tried to keep sole control over the Polish-German relations. The 
atmosphere between both men became so bad that it necessitated formal 
reconciliation in early 1937.  
  
We know that this 'patching up' had little long-term impact. Indeed, the formation 
in 1937 of the Camp of National Unity reignited the smouldering conflict. Intended 
as the political force behind Rydz-Smigly, the OZN sought with varying success to 
engage with the Opposition. However, the alliance with ONR-Falanga, an extreme 
wing of the National Democrats, only exacerbated the decomposition of the 
Pilsudskite Sanacja. Politically inactive Pilsudskites protested or shunned events 
organised by the Camp and its members. Minister Beck also refused to join the 
movement, but his Ministry initially succeeded in maintaining a working relationship 
with the military.  
However, by November 1937, Beck and Rydz-Smigly were drawn into conflict 
again as the Marshal's internal politics increasingly frustrated the Minister. The 
nationalistic agenda advocated by the OZN interfered with the diplomats' work in an 
area over which it had previously enjoyed full control:  Polish-German relations. A 
seemingly minor event – the likely publication of an aggressive editorial, which 
prevented Warsaw from reaching an agreement with Danzig over the Free City's 
proposed constitutional amendments, proved crucial for the Beck – Rydz-Smigly 
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relationship. Suddenly everyone in the elite knew that the author of Poland's 
international strategy, Jozef Beck and its highest military authority, Edward Rydz-
Smigly, disagreed about the country's foreign policy. Worse still, this realisation 
prompted many to try to by-pass the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and settle matters 
directly with Marshal Rydz-Smigly.  
The Germans now adopted the tactic, previously employed by the French, of 
bypassing the diplomats and liaising directly with the military leadership. The move 
by the Auswartiges Amt to step up their attempts at building a rapport with Marshal 
Rydz-Smigly and thereby entice Poland into joining the Anti-Commintern Pact 
particularly disconcerted Jozef Beck, who was previously able to stave off dismissal 
thanks to knowledge of and good relations with the Nazi leadership. And even 
though German efforts bore no fruit and did not shake off Marshal Rydz-Smigly 's 
suspicions of the Third Reich, they made Minister Beck realise that his government 
position was uncertain. Consequently, we saw that in an attempt to hold on to his 
post, Jozef Beck increasingly focused on delivering successes. 
  
Before 1937 ended, he proceeded to reassert his relevance to the German 
leadership and to stop the Polish-Danzig conflict from escalating. This 'achievement' 
took the form of two separate, although coordinated, declarations in which Warsaw 
and Berlin agreed to uphold the rights of their respective ethnic minorities. The 
announcements were contingency measures and, in a bid to rebuild Jozef Beck's 
prestige, their importance was overblown.  
Indeed, 1937 – a year far more eventful than it appeared at first sight - could be 
regarded as the watershed moment for the Beck – Rydz-Smigly relationship. The 
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Marshal's steadily growing influence over Polish politics changed the country and 
the authoritarian regime that governed it. Despite its initial difficulties, the Camp of 
National Unity provided a sufficient support base to allow Rydz-Smigly and his 
associates to alter the Sanacja ideology and marginalise the Colonels. For Jozef 
Beck, who never joined the OZN and had been suspicious of the organisation since 
its inception, these changes were unacceptable. As a man whom we know to have 
lived his life by Pilsudski's rules and a Minister determined to adhere to foreign 
policy directives issued from the first Marshal's deathbed, he disapproved of an 
alliance with the National Democrats so despised by his idol. Similarly, the Camp's 
nationalistic propaganda – aimed at increasing Rydz-Smigly 's internal popularity – 
made Beck's work more difficult. Moreover, we must not forget about the Krakow 
incident that further complicated matters between the Bruehl's Palace and 
Wierzbowa. Cardinal Sapiecha's willful decision to move Jozef Pilsudski's remains 
from their original resting place may seem trivial, and the controversy surrounding it 
absurd. But for Beck, emotional attachment to the dead Marshal was so powerful; it 
embodied all that was going wrong in Poland. Not only did Marshal Rydz-Smigly's 
half-hearted reprimand prove the growing influence of the National Democrats, 
worse still, it suggested that many of Pilsudski's old soldiers were abandoning his 
cause and deviating from their erstwhile leader's creed.  
This realisation introduced a new dynamic into the strife central to this thesis. As 
noted earlier, convinced that his position was weak but nevertheless intent on staying 
in office to uphold the foreign policy prescribed by Pilsudski, Jozef Beck looked to 
secure his position through diplomatic successes. This change in attitude was 
obvious to his closest associates, who noted the Minister's increased appetite for risk. 
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And while Beck was no ministerial rogue, who could be held solely responsible for 
the disastrous September 1939 campaign, his newfound willingness to make political 
bets had a profound effect on Poland's military preparedness and its perception of the 
German threat.  
  
Initially everything seemed to be going well. At first, a happy coincidence 
enabled Warsaw to end the 18-year long impasse in her relations with Kaunas. A 
border incident served as a pretext to send out an ultimatum demanding the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. Lithuania bowed to its terms. The Polish 
public, stirred up by a press campaign, was ecstatic. Minister Beck was pleased not 
just because he fulfilled the late Marshal's wish but also because he managed to 
deliver it on his (that is, both the Marshal's and the Minister's own) name day. But 
despite the symbolism, most of the glory for Poland's success went to Pilsudski's 
successor, Edward Rydz-Smigly who was, unsurprisingly, delighted.  
As we know, issuing an ultimatum was Minister Beck's ingenious solution to an 
internal disagreement. The President and his protégée, Finance Minister, 
Kwiatkowski clashed with Rydz-Smigly and his supporter Premier Skladkowski. 
The former wanted to talk with the Lithuanians, the latter to fight. The nation, 
goaded by the OZN's bellicose propaganda called for an invasion. In these 
circumstances, Beck's suggestion seemed like a reasonable compromise. However, 
the Foreign Ministry did not take timing into account. The Polish-Lithuanian border 
incident came just days after the Nazi ultimatum forced the Austrian Chancellor 
Schuschnigg to acquiesce to the Anschluss. Thus, although they urged Kaunas to 
accept Warsaw's demand, many in London and Paris suspected collusion with 
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Berlin. Their assumption was inaccurate but in the Western Powers' eyes it marked 
Poland down as an opportunist nation. Indeed, it took some effort by the British 
Ambassador Sir Howard Kennard to discourage his superiors from giving up on 
Warsaw.742  
Beck's strategy fooled outsiders into thinking that Poland was gravitating towards 
Germany but its impact on domestic politics was no less profound. The huge 
popularity of the Lithuanian cause confirmed that Rydz-Smigly’s and the OZN's 
strategy of combining post-May 1926 reverence of the Army with nationalistic 
propaganda was working. The public responded to strong speeches and 
demonstrations of strength. This realisation helps to explain the readiness with which 
Poland's leaders agreed to act in Czechoslovakia.  
  
As we have seen, the literature on the Polish-Czechoslovak crisis of 1938 often 
concentrates on the role played in it by Minister Beck. However, this thesis 
demonstrates that this focus is not wholly justified. Jozef Beck was not the sole 
driving force behind Warsaw's plans to reclaim Teschen Silesia and Marshal Rydz-
Smigly and President Moscicki's aquiescence in the scheme was not secured by the 
Minister's persuasion. For instance, the Polish military newspaper Polska Zbrojna 
had been running an anti-Czech campaign since the spring of 1938. And while the 
territorial dispute ensured that no love had ever been lost between Warsaw and 
Prague, foreign diplomats had begun to remark on the Polish military's increasingly 
aggressive attitude toward Czechoslovakia. 743  The timing – shortly after the 
Anschluss – is significant and suggests that the change could be attributed to the 
                                                            
742 See Chapter Four, pages 167 – 169. 
743 See Chapter Five, pages 184 – 186. 
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strategists' realisation that Czechoslovakia was likely to become Germany's next 
target. This, in turn, raised the possibility of a Soviet intervention on behalf of its 
ally in Prague. As work on the defensive plan 'Wschod' neared its end, the planners 
realised it would be rendered void if the Russian Army were stationed to the south, 
benefiting from Czechoslovak military infrastructure. Thus, the military command 
pushed for achieving a common border with Hungary.  
Minister Beck broadly agreed. However, contrary to the popular depiction of the 
crisis, the decision makers were not unanimous. Although in February 1938 Beck 
spoke about a common border with Regent Horthy, he did not see its establishment 
as an urgent matter, unlike that of reclaiming the lost Teschen Silesia about which 
the Foreign Ministry, the military and the presidency were all in agreement. 
Therefore, for a brief period during which Polish authorities decided on their course 
of action, we can see full cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the military 
high command. Nevertheless, although Minister Beck and Marshal Rydz-Smigly 
remained in constant contact with each other, their communication was not very 
effective. Indeed, even agreeing as to what constituted 'the lost Teschen Silesia' 
proved difficult. To the Minister it meant only territory inhabited by a Polish 
majority, whereas the Army included additional Slovak territory. Eventually the 
military's version prevailed. So, despite Beck's protests and threats of resignation, in 
October 1938 Poland incorporated small but supposedly strategically important parts 
of Spisz and Jaworzyna.  
 
As it turns out, the Army's reasoning proved very shortsighted. Not only did their 
action cause resentment towards Warsaw among previously sympathetic Slovaks, it 
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also prevented Minister Beck from continuing his talks with the pro-Polish section of 
the Slovak nationalist movement. Alienated, Slovakia turned towards the Third 
Reich, compromising Poland's strategic position and surprising many of her officers 
who expected Slovakia to become their country's natural ally.  
  
The debacle over Slovakia happened shortly after Beck's confrontation with 
Rydz-Smigly and Moscicki over their treatment of Walery Slawek, and this time the 
disagreement proved too much for the Minister. Immediately after the Polish 
acquisition of Teschen Silesia, Beck's relationship with Marshal Rydz-Smigly 
collapsed. Clearly unhappy about the direction Poland's new leadership was heading 
in and their propensity to exploit foreign affairs for domestic gains, Jozef Beck 
decided to shield his domain from further political interference. To this effect, the 
Minister hid the existence of German territorial demands, which arrived on 23 
October 1938. This move proved just as shortsighted as the military’s insistence on 
claiming a few mountain passes, because, while he won himself time in which to 
mull over the Nazi claims and contemplate ways in which they could be 
accommodated, Beck denied the military arguments against spending cuts, thus 
impeding Poland's armament modernisation and her overall war preparedness.  
  
We know that the Minister was denied accurate information about the Polish 
Army's military readiness. So was almost everyone else in Poland, including the 
Finance Minister Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski. Moscicki's protégé, who was disliked by 
both Beck and Rydz-Smigly and by and large reciprocated their feelings. Moreover, 
Moscicki's political backing made him less susceptible to pressure. Despite 
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struggling with a prolonged financial crisis, Poland consistently spend a third of its 
GDP on the military, a staggering amount considering the country's financial 
situation but not enough to quickly meet the Armed Forces' equipment needs.744 
Diverting greater funds from the budget or a greater focus on arms manufacturing 
would have endangered the country's fragile economic recovery. Despite the boost 
provided by the annexation of Teschen Silesia, whose mines and factories 
significantly added to Poland's industrial output, Kwiatkowski was unwilling to risk 
recession without a valid reason. So as long as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
assured the Treasury that all was well between Warsaw and Berlin, the powers 
controlling the public purse refused to loosen its strings. After all, in autumn 1938 
Poland appeared to be in a better strategic position then ever. Despite the snub of not 
being recognised as a major player in the region by the Great Power statesmen 
convening in Munich, Poland's decision to pursue an independent foreign policy 
brought two major diplomatic victories. The country now enjoyed proper working 
relations with all its neighbours and would soon share a border with friendly 
Hungary. Moreover, Poland’s western and eastern boundaries were secured by two 
Non-Aggression agreements. Yet the OZN's growing nationalism and Minister 
Beck's policy of wielding threats and ultimatums raised eyebrows in London and 
Paris and alienated Poland’s neighbours. 
 
Furthermore, as militaristic propaganda became more intense in 1938-39 even its 
authors began to lose grasp on strategic reality and through the last months of peace, 
Polish policy makers and commanders lived in part in make-believe worlds founded 
                                                            
744 Tymoteusz Pawlowski, Armia Smiglego. Czwarta w Europie – Siodma na Swiecie [Smigly’s 
Army. Fourth in Europe – Seventh in the World], (Warszawa, 2014), 50 – 54. 
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on a whole series of misperceptions and miscalculations and separate ones to boot. 
In the world inhabited by Minister Beck, his German counterpart was independently 
pursuing his own interest in Danzig. Once it became clear that the initiative had the 
Fuhrer's backing it was played down as bluff because in Beck's eyes Hitler was a 
political opportunist after quick and cheap gains, and not an aggressor bent on 
igniting a European war. Beck simultaneously maintained that he was an ideologue, 
incapable of making pragmatic compromises like an alliance with the Reich's 
archenemy the Soviet Union. Germany's March 1939 invasion of the rump of the 
Czechoslovak state put a question mark beside Beck's first assertion, but despite 
intelligence reports advising to the contrary, he clung to his second belief until the 
signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact proved him wrong again.  
Reading too much into German press's reaction to Ribbentrop's politeness during 
his successful visit to Warsaw, Beck paid no heed to diplomatic reports raising the 
alarm that the growing anti-Polish hostility among Nazi officer corps and the 
construction of fortifications ominously close to Polish borders. This tactic of 
downplaying the German threat proved particularly damaging in 1939, when it 
indefinitely delayed the introduction of a third work shift towards arms production 
by again failing to provide arguments to convince Finance Minister Kwiatkowski to 
sanction it.  
  
While the Foreign Minister was unwilling to credit the increasingly worrying 
intelligence reports warning of a Nazi-Soviet détente and suspicious German 
military activity, Marshal Rydz-Smigly, who scarcely trusted the Minister and found 
what trust he had further eroded by the latter's concealment of the initial German 
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territorial demands, was willing to investigate them. He requested, to some internal 
resistance, that all Polish foreign representatives brief him when in the capital. But 
caught up in the internal power struggle, he too failed to act on their reports. Indeed, 
as we saw in Chapter Six, in a mistimed attempt to introduce 'his' people into the 
administration, Rydz-Smigly severely impaired the effectiveness of the Second 
Department of General Staff – the Polish Intelligence Service – in the immediate 
run-up to the Second World War.745  
  
Meanwhile, Poland's strategic position had been eroded substantially. The 
German invasion of the Czech lands, the acquisition of Klaipeda and particularly the 
establishment of a protectorate over Slovakia caused panic among the Polish military 
leadership. The realization that the strategic situation had worsened caused a 
backlash against Jozef Beck. He was attacked by the OZN-dominated Parliamentary 
Commission for Foreign Affairs and even accused of treason.  
Yet, despite their rising unease, the high command continued to propund the 
image of military might. As Stanislaw Mackiewicz discovered, pointing out the 
evident gap between Polish and German capability was a dangerous occupation that 
carried with it the risk of imprisonment on the charge of defeatism. Poland's French 
allies were also deceived about Warsaw's strength, but the deception proved 
particularly damaging for foreign policy formation. Unaware of his country's 
weakness, Minister Beck pursued diplomacy that did not match Polish strength. 
Having assumed that Germany would be unwilling to attack a Poland capable of 
putting up a prolonged fight and thus weakening its strategic position vis-à-vis 
                                                            
745 See Chapter Six, page 216. 
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France and Britain, his policy was riskier than it otherwise might have been. In fact, 
had he known that Polish munitions stores contained little more than thin air, he 
might have been less willing to brandish the British guarantee which was bound to, 
and indeed did, vex Germany. Lacking accurate information about the state of the 
Polish Army, Beck hoped that the agreement would be a deterrent to a German 
Chancellor who continually stressed the importance of good relations with the 
United Kingdom. It was a gamble he lost and the Minister was soon forced to 
embrace the failure of the foreign policy guided by Marshal Pilsudski's instructions. 
Beck's 5 May 1939 parliamentary speech was rapturously received, but was also the 
Minister's admission of failure. Marshal Rydz-Smigly might have felt vindicated as 
he always mistrusted Beck's pro-German line but he himself was not without blame.  
  
In the course of this thesis I have examined the conflict between Jozef Beck and 
Edward Rydz-Smigly from its origins immediately after the death of Marshal 
Pilsudski until the outbreak of the Second World War. It first manifested itself over 
both men's different attitude to the Polish alliance with France but soon evolved into 
a deeper ‘ideological’ struggle. As he assumed the top command, Rydz-Smigly's 
relations with Beck cooled, while the Minister started to view the new Marshal as a 
usurper, claiming not only Pilsudski's title but also his policy-making prerogatives.  
The struggle was an unequal one and Beck soon found himself conceding some of 
his powers to Rydz-Smigly who was able to block diplomatic nominations and 
influence policy in all areas bar Polish-German relations. Eighteen months after 
Pilsudski's death the rivalry between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the 
General Inspectorate for the Armed Forces became common knowledge among 
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Warsaw's elite, and attracted the attention of foreign powers looking to exploit it to 
serve their purposes. Eventually, the situation deteriorated to the point when formal 
reconciliation became necessary. But the 1937 shaking of hands had no effect on 
Beck and Rydz-Smigly's relationship. In fact, as the Marshal battled for power and 
influence in Poland, the conflict only grew worse. His brief flirtation with the 
National Democrats and the subsequent adoption of some nationalist principles by 
his Camp of National Unity started to interfere with the Foreign Minister's German 
strategy. Moreover, as he came under increasing fire for cosying up to Berlin, Beck 
looked to strengthen his position by delivering popular diplomatic successes. His 
popularity soared after the establishment of relations with Lithuania and again, after 
the incorporation of Teschen Silesia but so, and to a greater extent, did Rydz-
Smigly's.  
Moreover, as appalled officials in Paris and London grew increasingly suspicious 
of Warsaw, inside Poland the 'glorious' coups de main of 1938 increased the Poles' 
confidence in their military might, a misconception irresponsibly perpetuated by the 
OZN's propaganda. Feeling stronger, the country grew less conciliatory and more 
nationalistic. Indeed, it is probable that had they been made public, the German 
territorial demands of October 1938 would have resulted in an open confrontation. 
Minister Beck's uncertainty about the origin of these claims and his lack of trust in 
his Cabinet colleagues' discretion led him to conceal their existence until early 
January 1939. Undoubtedly, this lost Poland precious time to prepare for war. 
However, the military was not itself without fault as it had consistently misinformed 
the Minister and, indeed, the rest of the government, about Poland's military 
readiness. Convinced of Poland's high capability and reassured about Germany's 
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good intentions, Finance Minister Kwiatkowski refused to increase military 
spending, denying his country the opportunity to ready itself against the Third Reich.  
And, while it is unlikely that Poland could have rearmed sufficiently to 
successfully defend itself against Germany – let alone Germany and the Soviet 
Union - the broken relationship between Beck and Rydz-Smigly denied Poland the 
chance to better the odds it faced. Thus, in the run up to the Second World War, the 
























Appendix 1: The Organisational Structure of the Polish Military Command (April 1935 – September 1939) 
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746  It is important to note that, in theory, there was no hierarchical relationship between the Ministry for Military Affairs and the General Inspectorate of the Armed 
Forces. However, Rydz-Smigly’s more senior Rank as well as the fact that he reported directly to the Supreme Commander (Moscicki), meant that, in reality, the 
Ministry was seen as subordinate to the General Inspectorate.  
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Service (including a full personnel list and the Niezbrzycki-Zychon 
controversy) 
• ambassador Janusz Lukasiewicz Papers – correspondence and articles, 
materials and document for the memoir 
• Collection of President Ignacy Moscicki – notes and diary of presidential 
adjutant, major Hartman 
• General Kazimierz Sosnkowski papers – documents and personal papers 
(1928-1938) 
• Marshal Rydz-Smigly papers (fragments) – personal and official papers 
and documents, notes from Rydz-Smigly’s meetings with Goering, 
correspondence with Gamelin, press interviews and articles, programmes 
and documents about Rydz-Smigly's official visits and reception of 
foreign dignitaries (e.g. general Ironside and Prince Michael of Romania), 
materials for 1938 propaganda publication 'Byscie o sile nie zapomnieli', 
audience books, biographical materials 
• Kazimierz Switalski papers – correspondence, manuscripts of 
unpublished diary (1927 – 1935), documents and files from the Ministry 
of Public Safety and Security 
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• Jan Weinstein papers – copies of Polish, German and British documents 
from 1930s, Jadwiga Beck's archive 
• The archive of colonel Ryszard Wraga (aka. Jerzy Niezbrzycki) – memoir 
manuscript 
(vi) The National Archives - London  
• Foreign Office (FO 371, 417, 688, 404 and 954/19B)– diplomatic reports 
from the ambassador in Warsaw Howard Kennard, analysis of the Anglo-
Polish relations, assessment of the Poland's international situation in 
1938, reports and analysis of Polish Foreign Policy (1938-39), German 
military aims and objectives, materials on minister Beck's visits to 
London 
• Cabinet Papers (CAB 63, 65/1, 66/1-3 and 81-88) - papers and reports by 
Sir John Simon, lord Halifax, lord Runciman and Sir Anthony Eden (e.g. 
on the Four Power Pact and the Stresa Front, the Munich Conference and 
Czechoslovak Crisis, etc.), diplomatic reports from the British Embassy 
in Berlin (intelligence analysis and threat assessment), analysis of Anglo-
German and Polish-German relations, cabinet minutes, Hankey Papers 
*** 
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